INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1896.

THE HEGEMONY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.

THE cardinal point in the Kantian philosophy is, that if science is a function of mind, it is neither the sole nor the most important function. There are limits between which scientific exposition may be applied, but beyond these rests a vast territory in which our speculations must be controlled by entirely different principles. Such is the fundamental idea of Kant. On the contrary, it is on the established or probable data of science that Auguste Comte proposed to construct what he denominated the cerebral unity of mankind. To which of the two must we grant the true intellectual hegemony? This problem still profoundly interests minds not only in France but in all those countries which concern themselves with the future. In our day, we have seen, after the philosophers, critics, novelists, poets, and then professional scientists take up the question of the relations of science to belief. These excursions of scientists and men of letters into the domain of philosophy have served the purpose of reviving interest in great problems. The single drawback is, that neither side has always given sufficient attention to defining their terms, to properly stating the question at issue, to avoiding hasty solutions. Men of letters are too often unable to go beyond the vague idealism with which Renan contented

himself, or professional scientists beyond the narrow positivism of a Littré. We have seen very recent illustrations of this danger in the discussions which have arisen on several occasions between men of letters and scientists over the so-called "bankruptcy of science." Those who have maintained this thesis have employed subtle tactics: they have arrayed on the one hand the positive results of special sciences,—they have confined themselves in the meanwhile to physical and natural sciences,—and then, on the other hand, they have pointed us to religions with their replies all ready to the problems of life and conduct. The scientists, in their turn, have vaunted the benefits of science, and its discoveries in the material and industrial order, as if morality were a mere question of physical well-being or of pure hygiene. We should indeed be led to conclude that a philosophy or a system of ethics had never existed unless in theologies and mythologies of all descriptions or in mathematics, physics, and physiology. This would be making too cheap a disposition of history; it would erase at a single stroke of the pen the sciences, so justly called moral, from psychology and ethics to philosophy proper. Most certainly, if it be true that physics and natural history, as such, ever engaged to furnish a philosophy of the world and of life, we should be justified in concluding that these sciences have bankrupted themselves, that they have meddled with that which in no way concerns them. In the same way, chemistry would bankrupt itself, should it pretend to explain the movement of the stars, the precession of the equinoxes, the eclipses of sun or moon. And by the same reasoning, theology went into bankruptcy when it presumed to decide that the sun moves around the earth, since Joshua once stopped its course. Every usurpation of one science on a domain foreign to it, is sure to end in such discomfitures as these. These bold adventures, it is true, are too common on the part of scientists, who, in the pride of their special discoveries, imagine sometimes that they have discovered the universal secret; fortunately, these scientists do not constitute science. Should all bankers become insolvent, arithmetic would still be as trustworthy as ever. Perfectly legitimate as

it is to restrict each scientist to his own territory, it is as truly illegitimate to hold Science (with or without the capital) responsible for the false bills of exchange drawn in its name. It is ignorance and not science which in such cases always goes into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of science could by no possibility consist in aught else than this pretension to usurp the place of philosophy; for in its own domain scientific truth is worthy of our respect, even of our love, since it contributes to our intellection of things. Saint Augustine says: *valde ama intellectum.* Neither the gates of hell nor those even of paradise shall prevail against science.

A few years ago, the youths in our schools were divided between the neo-idealists and the neo-positivists. In an eloquent discourse to students, M. Zola declared himself a "hardened old positivist," and felt under obligations to apologize for science. "Did it promise happiness?" he inquired. And he replied: "I do not believe it. Science promises truth, and the question is to know whether we shall ever be able to manufacture happiness out of truth. In order to be at peace some day, we need a great deal of sacrifice, the absolute renunciation of self, a serenity of intelligence satisfied, which, as it seems, is possible only among the elect few. But as we wait, what a cry rises from suffering humanity. Shall we ever be able to live without lies and without illusions?" M. Zola conceded, in the course of his address, that in literature the naturalist school had "too much narrowed the horizon." "Personally, I regret that I ever became a sectary in my desire to confine art to truths that were capable of demonstration." Would not M. Zola be forced to admit that in philosophy also, positivism has too much narrowed the horizon? And can we admit the pretended positivist definition which M. Zola gives us of the ideal? "What else is the ideal," he asks, "than the inexplicable, those forces of the vast universe in which we bathe without knowing what they are?" No; the ideal cannot signify the unknown; it is the direction—cognizable at least in part—of the reality as it arrives at a consciousness of itself in man. M. Zola concluded by counselling his hearers to forget the "malady of the infinite." He advised

those who suffer from the "mysterious" to throw their life "into some gigantic labor," which would bring good results even if they never saw the end of it. But thus presented as a daily duty, without any principle to justify this duty, work becomes at bottom only a means of intoxicating yourself, a means of "diversion," as Pascal said, more hygienic (in general) perhaps than gaming and dissipations of other sorts, but the true moral sense of which escapes us for the lack of some philosophical doctrine which fixes for the individual his place in human society and in universal society. M. Alexandre Dumas appeared on the scene of action, and was not afraid to predict that men, after having tried everything else, would end, "and that very soon," by applying seriously to life the law of brotherly love, that they would even be swept away "by the madness, the rage of love." He declared that he discerned already among those phenomena which seemed so menacing to us, the signs of these love-tendencies which spring up among men. Tolstoï, who leans towards an analogous optimism, affirmed that "the more men believe that they can be led by some exterior force operating outside of their own will in transforming and ameliorating their own existence, with the greater difficulty will this amelioration take place." M. Brunetierè demonstrated with his habitual ardor that the physical and natural sciences have not succeeded in explaining the nature of man as man,—that is to say, as a being endowed with feeling, thought, and will; and still less the origin of those genuinely human attributes, of that which constitutes man as such, and that in consequence these sciences have failed to reveal to us the future destiny of the essentially human in man. But the eloquent writer went beyond the goal which he had set for himself by pushing the offensive too far; in thus confronting religion and science, he seemed to forget philosophy. This was in the eyes of Tolstoï the principal defect in the address of M. Zola. "On the contrary, the more they believe in what Dumas predicts, that the time will come, infallibly and soon, when men, inspired by brotherly love, will modify of their own volition the whole of their existence, the more rapidly will this time arrive." Relying on the force of

ideas, Tolstoï concluded that "by announcing this modification in human sentiments, we shall realize it the sooner." Very recently still, this question of science and faith appeared in France in a still more sharply accentuated and ringing form. The following are the principal arguments produced in this debate. "We are not able," declares one, "to conceive of man without morality, without language, and not in society; and these are the very elements of the definition which surpass the means, the methods, and the pretensions of science." Of purely physical science, yes; but can psychological and moral sciences teach us nothing as to the origin of society, which, as it appears, springs from the social instincts of men, just as in certain animals from social instincts less highly developed, and which have nothing supernatural in them? "Science," declares another, "has not sufficiently accounted for the origin of man." Nor that of the insect or of the bird. Must we for that reason suppose a miraculous origin? "Science has not entirely explained the origin of human language." Nor the origin of the nightingale's song. Must we then conclude that God was its singing-master? The questions of historical origin acknowledge a mass that is unknown, but never miracles and mysteries. The metaphysical origin of matter and thought is a mystery only for our intelligence; but science has never promised to unveil this mystery, nor to make known the unknowable. The positivism of Comte and the evolutionism of Spencer have given to the unknowable even an exaggerated *rôle*. The Mosaic hypothesis of creation, we must admit, "gives us a reply to the question, whence we come, and the theory of evolution will never give us this answer." But the hypothesis of the emanation from the bosom of Brahma, and, generally speaking, religious narratives of all sorts, give us likewise a reply to the same question. How, then, are we to choose without summoning philosophy to our aid?

If our intelligence is not above suspicion, what are we to say as to our feelings and our imagination? These faculties which you declare incapable of real integrity when philosophy and science are concerned, will they suddenly become veracious when the question is of religious myths? And are we

to argue that men of science are inferior to aboriginals like Moses, because the latter had more imagination and knew less?*

Science, unfortunately for it, has been defended by scientists. One of the most illustrious of these has reminded us that we are indebted to science for the telegraph, the railroad, and even "dyestuffs"! M. Berthelot adds, that "he adheres to the moral code of duty and of the honest man." His morality has its origin neither in "egotism nor fanaticism." Of course. But is that a reason why this code should not rest on some philosophical principle? Does it imply none in its principles or in its conclusions? That is what the scientists do not tell us. To the question of what we are, M. Morselli thinks it sufficient to answer, "We are vertebrates, mammals, primates of

* Nor have the philological sciences been able in their turn to keep all of their promises. If it is true that the Hellenists "formally engaged to show us in the philosophy of Greece and Rome the whole of Christianity," the Hellenists were certainly very presumptuous. But I fail to see that Ernest Havet has ever appeared to believe that the whole of Christianity is in Hellenism. Progress is undeniable in humanity. One is justified in saying that there will always be "something in Christianity which Hellenism cannot explain," but whether explicable by natural means or not, is an entirely different question. Shakespeare cannot be explained by the literature which preceded him, and which contains nothing which adds to his genius; but we are not to conclude from this that "Macbeth" and "Hamlet" were composed under the dictation of the Holy Ghost. Likewise, the Hebraizers have not explained the Bible by the Mahabharata; but we must grant also that the Orientalists have just as little explained the Mahabharata by the Bible; all of which does not go to prove that the Mahabharata is a supernatural work, but only an original work. "There is something in the history of the people of God which is not to be found in that of any other." That is certain. And we can also say that there is something in the history of the Greeks which cannot be found in that of any other, not even in the history of the Hebrews. It does not seem to us that we have here, either for Greek or Hebrew, proof of anything "irrational" or "marvellous." History, also, has not discovered "a law of history," and this though historical sciences are mere "idle curiosity," if their least researches do not tend to "a philosophy of history." But this philosophy is the task of philosophers; and if Condorcet, Turgot, Comte, Vico, Herder, Kant, and Hegel have not revealed some single law of history which was absolute, they have nevertheless discovered a multitude of partial laws which leave this to be inferred. Moralists *a priori* can declare this law, and sociologists *a posteriori* can with more and more ease discover its operation in the bosom of actual societies.

an order but slightly different from that of the quadrumanes."* To the question, "whence we come?" M. Morselli replies, "We come from earlier forms which, in the adaptations to the conditions of life, have acquired the small number of specific characteristics by which we distinguish other anthropoids." At this moment one has just discovered a form which is probably intermediate between man and the primates,—the "*Pithecanthropus erectus* of Sumatra." M. Morselli did not perceive here that he was replying to questions of a purely biological character which teach us nothing of what we are morally and intellectually.

II.

In this entire discussion, in which the point at issue is to determine whether or not science is to have the final leadership of humanity, one thing has been neglected,—the definition of science. This term has a broad sense and a restricted sense. A *science*, in the broadest acceptation of the term—or at least a *cognition*—is a rationally established system of facts and ideas which, over a given range of objects, confers certainty, assurance, probability, or even a doubt that knows why it doubts. To know that we do not know, and why, is none the less to know; a negative solution is, after its fashion, a solution. To know that a thing is possible, or, better still, that it is probable by virtue of such and such reasons for it and such and such reasons against it, is always to know. Thus it is that belief founded on reason enters the category of science. Science is then each legitimate product of the intelligence operating freely with the aid of what the theologians call "natural reason." Thus understood, science includes universal philosophy as well as special sciences. It is belief alone, founded on the authority of others, not regulated, and incapable of demonstration, or on the imagination or feelings to which a supernatural bearing is given, which must be excluded from the domain of knowledge and of science in the broadest sense of the word.

* "La Pretesa Bancarotta della Scienza," Parma, 1895.

Apart from the antagonism of natural intelligence and supernatural belief, we can establish in the domain of the former a new antagonism between the pure sciences and philosophy.

Science, in the true sense of the word, hinges on the relations of objects to each other independently of their relation to the sentient and thinking object. This last relation, at least, is understood. Among the ancients, as M. Boutroux has excellently demonstrated, science is the cognition of that which *is*, of that which subsists amid all changes. For them, it is the substance, the essence, the completed form or act; it is the efficient cause; it is, above all, the final cause. That is to say, science is philosophy itself. As we moderns understand it, science becomes, by detaching itself from philosophy, the perception of the constant relations between things, such as these appear to us, independently of what they may be in themselves. Science hinges, above all, on the laws of growth and change; on the laws, at one and the same time both practical and theoretical, of the *production* of things.

Bacon confines himself to the problem of material production: what phenomena must we assume, indeed, as the antecedent in order to produce some consequent phenomenon, without our being able to know in the meanwhile *why* the antecedent involves the consequent. Descartes, in his turn, assumes as a standard what has been termed the ideal production of mathematics, which undertakes to explain why this consequence is enveloped in this particular principle; considering every empirical fact as a consequence or effective solution of a mathematical problem, he endeavors to ascend to the data of the problem in order to establish the necessity of the sequence.

Unquestionable it is, that the positive sciences, as thus understood, will take an ever-increasing part in the utilitarian and even moral direction of humanity; for the world and life cannot present themselves with the same uniformity to a society in which the sciences have reached their maturity as to a society in which they are still in their infancy. Scientific ideas, moreover, are the only ones which are identical between indi-

viduals. The moment an element of faith enters among these ideas, individuals begin to disagree. When we appeal to the sentimental prejudices which frequently enshroud confused, imperfectly elucidated, and in part unconscious ideas, we appeal unquestionably to a considerable force, but to one which is sure to enclose a multitude of individual divergences. Sentiments which are the correlates of scientific ideas are those which have the most chance to fuse into a single and collective sentiment. The domain of peace increases, then, between minds with the domain of science, at that exact point where the light shines, whatever division may remain possible in other directions. Science is nothing else than that social knowledge which is one of the essential elements of social consciousness. That which is scientific, no one any longer disputes; it becomes henceforth part of the collective experience and the collective reason. Geometry, for example, is a social possession in the intellectual order, an integral part of an universal intelligence: society thinks and acts geometrically. Of course, the individual must rethink geometry and reconstruct it in order to understand it; but while his intellect thus puts itself in harmony with universal truth, we can say that it harmonizes also with social intelligence in which this truth is henceforth living and conscious. We are justified in concluding that each science socializes truth. While it is a step in advance towards the objective synthesis, it is also a step in advance towards the subjective and human synthesis; it contributes to the formation of the collective soul. It is not merely social intelligence which thus becomes richer and more systematic, more varied and more unified, but also social sensibility and social will. Finally, the sum total of social ideas of every kind engenders, along with correlative sentiments, correlative actions, not only in the individual but also, and above all, in the universal consciousness. Thus each one has a share in modes of action which are the property of all; different minds coincide in those truths which awaken them to common sentiments; they form thus a spiritual organism. Science is one of the constitutive factors of society; society is in its turn one of the constitutive factors of science. Man,

reduced to individual isolation,—if such isolation were possible,—would be about as incapable of science as the beast; he would have only a germ of it, imperfectly developed by a restricted experience. Science implies a society of consciousnesses which are exercised reciprocally and towards exterior things; it is a triple harmony with each and with the whole. The idea of an "organization by science" can merit only universal assent, because, as we have just seen, every scientific discovery is an enlargement of the social consciousness, and at the same time of social sympathy and social synergy.

It remains now to ask, whether the individual sciences are sufficient to found the true "cerebral unity" of the human race. This problem, which so profoundly engages the thought of to-day, is in the main exactly the one which Comte offers in the law of the "three estates." Man, as they say, dies when he sees his own ghost; thus, according to Comte, theology sees its ghost in metaphysics and dies; and metaphysics then sees its ghost in science and dies in its turn.

In this difficult problem three hypotheses are possible; we may admit, either that theology and metaphysics will eventually be absorbed in positive science, or that they will continue to co-exist with science; but that they will have a domain more and more circumscribed, an influence more and more restricted, or that, while confining themselves more and more to their own domain, without infringing upon science, they will increase proportionably with the increase of science itself; so much so, that each scientific progress would not be a reduction, but an extension of true metaphysics and of true theology, or if you will, of true philosophy and of true religion. There is a development by negation and destruction; there is also a development by affirmation and construction; there is finally a development by the synthesis of the two into a single more comprehensive idea. It is in this method that true evolution consists, and the dialectic of Hegel is here in accord with the evolutionism of Spencer. If by metaphysics you mean the explanation of the facts of experience by means of entities and of causes which cannot be verified by experience or established in a definite relation with it, then it is

manifest that metaphysics, thus understood, ought to disappear, since it is only an erroneous way of construing scientific explanation. But we must distinguish ontology, which is an abstract mythology, from pure philosophy, which seeks its support in the real, embraced by consciousness.

That true metaphysics is to grow ever poorer and then disappear in the abstract, is hard to conceive when we pass from Heraclitus to Plato, from Plato to Aristotle, from Aristotle to Descartes, from Descartes to Leibnitz, from Leibnitz to Kant, from Kant to Hegel and to Schopenhauer. Metaphysics has surely been despoiled of its ontological character, of its entities, just as religion has been of its grosser myths; but its contents, far from having been impoverished thereby, have been enriched in the meanwhile under the twofold relation of extension and comprehension. True metaphysics contains, moreover, an element which cannot be reduced to the category of pure science, and which thus assures its perpetuity. We have seen that science concerns itself with the mutual relations of objects, considered independently of their relation (1) to a sentient and thinking subject; (2) to the whole of existence. This duplex relation is assumed, at least, but once for all; after which the phenomena, just as they are, being given, science engages to determine their objective relations, while it eliminates as much as possible the subject itself, the consciousness for which they exist and through which they are known. Such a point of view is partial and abstract, since it does not embrace the whole of the reality. What we term reality must be at one and the same time both objective and subjective; it is, the unity of things with the mind which knows them. Pure sciences are partial in still another respect, in that, even in the sphere of objects and their relations, they are restricted to fixed species of objects and to fixed categories of relations. After abstracting the thinking subject, they abstract still further all objects other than the one which is to be considered; the mathematician disregards all relations other than those of magnitude and extension; the mechanist all relations other than those of movement, and so on. These limits are essential to science as we understand

this in modern times, occupying, as science must, a special point of view. It is to these very limits that science owes its perfect certainty, for at the outset, it takes something for granted without mounting higher, and it stops at the given conclusions actually obtained without being obliged to anticipate what is to follow. Hence, also, its rigorous method, which, exercised between clearly determined boundaries, has only to seek generous ties between particular facts or particular concepts. Sciences consider thus simple "aspects" or simple "phases," never wholes. Comte, therefore, observed that to explain the slightest object,—an explanation which must always remain incomplete,—the scientist must summon to his aid a multitude of sciences: mechanics will account for a first aspect, physics for a second aspect, chemistry for a third, etc. When man is in question, nothing less than the totality of sciences will suffice. We are warranted, then, in affirming that the subjects of science are always finite. Positive science, content with making clear the relation of finite things to things finite, never deeming it necessary to embrace the infinite, the whole. The world always remains for science a broken mirror, while philosophy, by piecing together the fragments, strives to catch a glimpse of the grand image. Comte himself has declared that abstractions and "preliminary simplifications," without which there could be no science, in the true sense of the word, always require a corresponding process of recomposing, since we wish to arrive at prevision of the fact in its actuality. We are obliged, in order to thus previse, to re-establish the concrete unity of nature. But what is philosophy, if not a step further in the same direction? Philosophy corrects the abstraction which has thus been made of the thinking subject, re-establishes the unity of nature and of thought. It has been correctly observed that when science destroys the unity of the objective world, it does so, as a rule, consciously. The abstraction, on the contrary, which philosophy endeavors to correct, is generally unconscious. The geometrician knows well enough that the ellipse does not exhaust a planet's conditions of existence; but in revenge, he can very easily conceive that we can search for the laws

of the intelligible world without once taking into account the necessary relation of this world to intelligence. He can conceive, furthermore, that the intelligible laws of geometry would continue to exist unimpaired even if there were no sort of intelligence at the base of the real world. The province of the philosopher is to determine to what extent the real is thus possible without the intellectual.

Purely empirical psychology isolates the mind of the world, and considers it as an object among the objects which it must contemplate. Metaphysics or pure philosophy regards mind as "a part of all that it knows," that is to say, as conditioning what it knows at the very moment when it is conditioned by it. Philosophy is not then like science, a pure abstraction, but rather the integral re-establishment of the *concrete*. To philosophize, says Hegel, is to think the totality of things, to conceive of things in unity which is greater than their divergences, and accounts for these. Philosophy, even when it considers isolatedly the unity and the subjective movement of thought, just as geometry considers abstractly the relations of space, so acts in order to discover more surely and the more clearly this unity and this movement in all the *objects* of thought.*

If philosophy, as Auguste Comte has defined it, is the effort to arrive at a full cognition of the world, it is, according to Hegel, the effort to arrive at a complete "self-consciousness." The two points of view are true, and they are inseparable. We have a completer knowledge of ourselves in proportion as we know the world which acts on us and in us, and we have a completer knowledge of the world in its reality and in its intelligibility in proportion as we possess the fuller consciousness of that standard of reality and of intelligence which is in us, which is ourselves, and according to which we necessarily judge every other existence, every other thought. Philosophy may claim, then, over against the sciences that perennity of which Leibnitz spoke. And, furthermore, however incomplete the present philosophical conception of the

* See Caird, "Social Philosophy of Comte."

world and of life may be, it is nevertheless to philosophy that the intellectual hegemony in the practical order belongs, because the rational basis of morality depends neither on the positive sciences nor on religious faith, but on philosophy itself. Theoretically, we are unquestionably not obliged to philosophize; we may take the abstract point of view of science, and say, "Movements are conditioned by such and such laws which we formulate in this or that symbolical manner. That which actually moves, I do not know; why and how, I do not know." We are then like one, who, confronted with other men and animals, should say: "When I give a blow to these extended and mobile forms, I receive one in return which causes me pain. What there is back of the forms which thus resist me I do not know; why they strike me when I strike them I do not know. Could it be possible that my blows cause them something analogous to the pain which I experience? I do not know, and I do not wish to know." The attitude of the pure positivist towards nature is something like this; he is not willing to inquire whether behind the movements of these beings which he ranges under the category of inanimate matter there is not something analogous to that back of the movements of beings called dumb brutes and of beings called men. Just as he pleases! He is not forced to speculate on the real conditions of phenomena, in so far, at least, as no problem of practical morality demands a solution of the philosophical problem.

But as regards men and even animals, we are indeed obliged to assume the existence of the psychic behind mechanical appearances. If I looked on men as machines which did not feel, neither morality nor society would be any longer possible. The necessity of reasoning by analogy is here practically obligatory, and it receives its justification theoretically in the fact that *all takes place just as if other men felt and willed like ourselves.* For animals, the verification is the same, though less sure; so much so, indeed, that Malebranche could persuade himself that his dog did not feel.

With respect to beings called inanimate, the verification becomes more and more difficult, and even impossible. And it

is for this reason that we can here dispense with inductions and analogies. Practically and scientifically it is enough, then, to act according to the abstract laws of mechanics, without concerning ourselves with the inquiry whether these so-called inanimate beings are but the mask of some rudimentary form of psychic life. But as for the philosopher, this abstraction is not sufficient for him; his vocation is to make hypotheses, not, of course, upon the unknowable, but upon the unknown. When verification is no longer possible, he declares, exactly the reverse of Newton, "*Hypotheses fingo.*" And that hypothesis, moreover, which is the immediate and natural prolongation of experience, that is to say, sensation and impulsion, instead of springing up suddenly from nothing in animals, are already existent there under less developed and more stagnant forms,—at first in vegetables, then in minerals, and, generally speaking, in the molecules of which animals themselves are only more complex combinations. In other words, in the domain of positive science we are content to infer one relation from another relation without touching on the question of what reality lies beneath or beyond. To positive science, the proposition that "a stone is heavy" has in nowise the signification that the stone makes an effort of any sort or encloses in itself a *force* analogous to that which I feel; it expresses merely a normal relation between *phenomena;* but I am obliged to animate it, to spiritualize it in a certain fashion, just as I animate and spiritualize you in order to conceive you as *real.* When I examine objects that are supposed to be *inanimate,* when I conceive them philosophically in themselves, and no longer scientifically in their exterior relations among themselves or with me, I can represent them to myself only as *forces, tendencies, appetites, activities,* more or less obscure wills, in a word, as rudimentary sorts of self, as sub-conscious and quasi-mental existences; for mental existence is the only sort which cannot be resolved into phenomena and relations. When it is a question of similars, as we have seen, no more hesitation is possible: I throw myself completely into these, and they are for me other egos which, like me, suffer or rejoice, act, live, and wish to live. This induction which rests

on the actual, this objection of the mental, which is the single truth *an sich* which I can apprehend, because it is in me, because it is myself,—this induction is the first condition of a system of ethics. To act morally, then, is no longer to act according to appearances and the relations of appearances; it is to act in the world of realities and according to the inductive cognition which we have of this world.

This is why we have often said a moral act implies a philosophy, while the construction of a bridge or of a steamboat implies none at all. Without question, whatever hypothesis we make as to the "underlying principle of morality," practically we shall always be obliged to give it the wider interest in order to reach some conclusion with reference to it; without question, moreover, this wider interest stands in the same relation to the unknown groundwork of morality that, in the word of the Gospel, love to our neighbor seems to stand to the love of God: the only method of determining its contents, the only way of giving it a practical expression. But, again, we need some hypothesis or some more or less conscious philosophical thesis as to the ultimate significance and sense of morality in order to defend morality against egotism. "In science," as has been objected, "the empirical groundwork of things is confused with the formula; for the physicist heat is the movement itself which permits us to determine its laws." Yes; because the physicist has need of nothing more than this; but the moralist is bound to determine whether "the wider interest" is a real good instead of merely seeming to be a good; when we are summoned to renounce ourselves, we cannot be satisfied with the merely seeming. We must form for ourselves some idea, some representation of the reality and of the ideal direction which results from the very nature of reality. There is nothing either truly human or individual or social without an ideal which determines it. There is no ideal without a more or less explicit conception of the reality itself, that is, without a conscious or unconscious philosophy, in a scientific or religious form, of which morality is only the translation into sentiments and acts.

III.

Does it follow from the foregoing definitions and distinctions that science will have the moral hegemony of humanity? Purely objective science, no; science at once objective and subjective, with philosophy as its indispensable crown, yes. But when we affirm that philosophy and science must have the moral and intellectual hegemony in future societies, we do not mean by that to deny the influence which must also belong to sentiment, especially to the religious sentiment. In the first place, great philosophical and scientific ideas are accompanied by æsthetical and moral sentiments which give them their practical worth. Then, again, practice is not merely the application of a theory; it is still more a complex action; it is a new synthesis in view of a new end, in some sort, a new theory; it is obliged indeed to take into account other elements than the merely intellectual. Scientific and philosophical knowledge, remaining, as these always must do limited, there will always exist beyond them a sphere which is open to beliefs which are based on intellectual valuations and on sentiments. Hence what we call moral faith, which is the foundation of all religious faith.

According to Bossuet, "when the reason which forces our assent is in the object itself, this is knowledge; . . . when the reason for believing a proposition is derived from him who proposes it, there results belief or faith." The criterion of all faith, according to this early theory, would be affirmation on the testimony of others. But, even then, faith is only an application of knowledge. The reasons which determine the assent are always objective; the other individuals, their moral and intellectual value, their own relation to the fact which is to be established, their competence, their impartiality, etc., all this is the object of our judgment, whether this be probable or certain, but the object, in fine, of scientific judgment. The "assertions without proofs of the wise and experienced man," says Aristotle, have great value, chiefly in moral questions; but, as has been answered, this is not because these assertions are actually without proof, but because he who affirms them has expe-

rienced them, and has reasons for affirming them. Very different is that faith based on testimony, that purely moral belief which according to the followers of Kant constitutes true faith. Moral faith, they say, brings to the philosopher an increase of assurance, an "increase of knowledge." For example, freedom, from the point of view of pure reason, is at best only possible; but from the point of view of the practical reason, it becomes not merely better known, but certain, and is in this sense an object of faith. Faith, as has been said, affects the moral character of the judgment, it furnishes no new judgment.* But faith, even in this form, is, as we think, always an application of knowledge, and is valid only in proportion as it includes cognizing elements. An increase of assurance can come only from an increase of reason, and so of knowledge. That I may have the assurance of freedom from a practical point of view, I must know some moral principle like duty, which makes freedom necessary, and the assurance of freedom will be subordinated to the knowledge of duty as certain and as implying power. I shall not content myself with changing the modality of the judgment; I shall pronounce new judgments. The value of my belief will be in direct proportion to the value of my knowledge. So far as its validity is concerned, faith then is a sort of confused knowledge, merely probable, or assurance limited at certain points. So far as all else is concerned, faith is a sentiment, a passion, a habit. We believe, indeed, not solely with our intellect, but with our sentiments and our innate or acquired impulses. It is incontrovertible that our sentiments and our impulses, the result as they are of a social *action* prolonged through centuries, contain a hereditary store of truth, though a truth mingled with much error. If it were necessary that each individual should with his hypercritical reason doubt everything, and, like a Descartes in miniature, refuse to remember that men had ever existed before him, we should be in great danger of having something very different from what Descartes was. It is then most important that we should take into account the social

* M. Darlu, *Revue Philosophique*, October, 1892.

heritage in those questions which concern others and ourselves. In this sense, it will often be much better for him who does not pretend to be a philosophical innovator or creator to follow the dictates of his heart, not to break too suddenly with the "wisdom of nations." The philosopher himself, who has learned from Socrates and Kant how circumscribed our knowledge is, will hesitate to elevate his personal opinion above the universal conditions of the society in which he lives. In this sense, faith is most legitimate; but nevertheless this legitimacy is still founded on reason: assurance of a sum of truth inherent in the moral and social discipline, assurance of individual fallibility, assurance of the impotence of abstract reasoning when exercised on problems that are too complex, etc. Moral belief remains here, nevertheless, the *rationabile obsequium.*

In questions, even, which do not concern morality, we cannot always analyze all; a man of business who launches himself into an enterprise, acts according to a belief, that is to say, according to a probability which carries with it some risks. He sees reasons for and reasons against; it seems to him that the "*fors* carry it," perhaps because his desire is on this side; and he ventures. But is the conclusion from such reasoning against science? If we could only have a veritable science in all practical affairs, we should all act scientifically. Because we lack this, we all act just as intelligently as we can, and there, where intelligence becomes silent, we follow our instinctive sentiments which are intelligence stored up by life; among these instinctive sentiments, it is always surer and more rational to give the preference to the altruistic, which have been formed by the experience of the ages themselves, and which represent the action upon us of entire society. A "good sentiment" is collective reason, instead of being reason in detail; but it is none the less reasonable for never having been reasoned out. Can you explain to a child all the reasons of what you enjoin upon him? When this is possible, you ought to do it; but is this always possible, his mental status considered? When you have him learn Latin towards the age of nine or ten, can you make him understand all the good

he will derive from classic studies? Does he possess the elements necessary for the solution of the problem? Likewise, these grown children whom we call the people, can they begin in the morning by doubting everything in order to act for the rest of the day in the full glare of the goddess Reason? We must shed abroad as much light as possible, but what if we cannot make it penetrate there where that other form of light, heat, exists? Will you extinguish the fireside because this warms the whole body but does not especially dazzle the eyes? Belief is also very often an æsthetic sentiment, with its own peculiar evidence which it is impossible to explain in detail. Can you prove *more geometrico* that the Venus of Milo is beautiful? Suppose a negro should prefer a Hottentot Venus, by what train of reasoning will you be able to convince him? Correctness of taste, trustworthiness of judgment in things of art go as little by systematic reasoning as does the marksman who strikes the target.

It was in this sense that Pascal could correctly say, "The heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." But whose heart? The heart of the savage cannibal? The heart of the civilized man? The heart of the Mussulman? or that of the Christian? All depends on the degree of intelligence in this heart, either in the reflective condition or in the condition of heritage received by tradition and education. The pretended conflict between intelligence and the heart is in reality the conflict of one form of intelligence with another, of the reflective with the spontaneous. By itself and in itself, the word heart has no meaning: sentiment without intelligence has no definite contents. Only blind corporal appetite, like that of hunger and thirst, can dispense with intelligence and with much more! The true reasons of the heart can, therefore, become intelligible to the reason itself, doubtless not to the mere abstract reason, but to the reason which takes into account all the real data of a problem, that is to say, the data of all the reasons. Because we cannot always enumerate, one by one, these complex and profound reasons which present themselves so tumultuously to the inner glance, and are none the less reasonable for that, must we con-

clude that we act blindly? He, who embraces a totality at a single glance and acts accordingly, is not for that reason blind.

Reason, in fine, can exist under a synthetic and an analytic form. The latter gives account to itself of itself. There are, unfortunately, problems in the moral and social order so complex that our analysis, can never be exhaustive. In this case, we are constrained to trust to a synthetic view. If we had to analyze everything to the bottom before acting, we should never act at all. The reason demi-science is often more dangerous than ignorance, is because it is an unconscious and half-way analysis, which nevertheless thinks that it is complete and assumes to rule our action. Such a science may be compared with a merchant who should forget half the columns in his bill and act accordingly. He could not fail to be speedily ruined. Nevertheless, demi-science, with all its disadvantages, is a necessary moment, a stadium in evolution. The misfortune is that our human science is always demi-science; and hence, the very legitimate *rôle* of sentiment and of belief. But never should belief revolt against science and put itself in opposition to it. Science remains, as we have seen, a true social possession; it is a domain the limits of which are unquestionably uncertain, but the interior of which is none the less uncontested and incontestable. In ethics, there is always to be found a part which is truly scientific, that part which relates to the essential conditions of human development, and especially of social development. The domain of sentiment, on the contrary, remains the most indefinite. Where is the seat of the authority here? and where the certitude? Science, it is objected, "concerns itself only with the past," and has only a feeble, practical influence; to belief belongs the future. Those, who make this objection, forget that the peculiar province of science is exactly this, to forecast and to realize the future. Its two methods, induction and deduction, with the verification which completes them and the hypothesis which precedes them, enable science to forestall the future and to direct it in the line of our desire. Static science, which seems to be only of the past, represents all

that is stable for to-morrow and εἰς ἀεί; dynamic science, truly opens up the future and follows change itself, but by means of law.

It is a human duty *par excellence* to seek for the greatest possible amount of certitude. But there is no other true certitude than intellectual certitude. Undoubtedly we must love truth in order to seek for it: if Pythagoras had not loved geometrical truth, he would never have discovered his theorem nor immolated his hecatomb; but the preliminary condition of intellectual exercise is not this exercise itself. So long as Pythagoras confined himself to loving, he discovered nothing. Love and good-will can supplement in a practical way the imperfection of knowledge, but they do not render certain what is uncertain except by an illusion which cannot be erected into a rule, either of moral or of intellectual conduct. The first rule is sincerity towards yourself and others. That faith is "efficacious" is incontestable, but its efficaciousness does not constitute its truthfulness. We can move mountains in the name of an error as well as in the name of truth.

The Mohammedans have gained battles in the name of false beliefs. We often have personal or national prejudices which we erect into universal and permanent needs of the human conscience, without remembering how often the "exigencies of the conscience" have varied with the ages. We cannot make these prejudices a criterion of the value of theories; besides, it is not belief alone which engenders action; it is action also, the fact accomplished and often accomplished, which engenders belief. Belief, far from having the right to always judge the act, is often itself only the product of the act, of ancestral routine. How, then, may we accord the hegemony to belief, since it may be just as truly the product of a secular error as the principle of a truth which dominates practical life? "Mind," said Comte, "ought to be the minister of the heart, never its slave." Hence the condemnation of all dogmatic and authoritative faith. Freedom ought to remain the essence of belief even when this, under the name of religion, becomes collective and social.

According to Auguste Comte, religions become less and

less concrete, and go on becoming more and more abstract, until, like metaphysics, they end in complete negation. But we must distinguish here between the imaginative elements and the philosophical and moral elements in religions. The fact is incontestable that religions progressively lay aside their mythology and become more and more spiritual. But it has been rightly observed that the fetichism of savages, in spite of its apparent luxuriousness of folly, is, in reality, very poor and very monotonous from the point of view of the imagination and of æsthetics. Nothing is so much like the fetichism of the Papuans as the fetichism of the Bushmen, or that of any other inferior tribe. But religions have a metaphysical, moral, and social significance which, far from decreasing with time, becomes, on the contrary, the richer for this. It has been rightly observed how much more complex than the Hebraic idea of Jehovah or the Hindu idea of Brahma, is the Christian idea of the God-man, who lives in us and for us, and in whom we live in our turn. We can say, therefore, that religions themselves continue to become more universal and, at the same time, more individual; they follow the simultaneous law of integration and specification. Then, too, if the tendency of mythology is to disappear, the immediate result of this will not be a tendency on the part of religion to disappear, nor is it proved that the religious sentiment lost in complexity, in depth, in universality, when from fetichism it became pagan, and from pagan Christian.

Meanwhile, there is in this problem great cause of embarrassment. We may indeed ask ourselves whether religion, in so far as it is distinct from metaphysics and from ethics, is not composed of precisely this mythical and imaginative element, of the anthropomorphic representation of the deity, and of miracles united to mysteries. In this case it is certain that religions assume in our time more and more of a philosophical aspect as they lay aside their mythic element. In this respect, we must admit that Protestantism is incontestably nearer to pure philosophy than is Catholicism. Comte would have the right, then, from this point of view, to maintain that religion, in so far as it is only mythology and human representation,

tends to become absorbed in metaphysics and ethics; these being conceived, it is true, under the form of social and collective, and not merely individual, beliefs. Will philosophy and religion take then, as Comte believes, the scientific, positive form? Here, again, all will depend upon our definition of science. If you conceive of science as objective, after the fashion of mathematics and physics, it is impossible to hope for such an objectizing of that which concerns, on one side, the thinking or willing subject and, on the other, the final unity of the subject and of the object in a relation which is truly universal. Philosophy even has not the same point of view as pure science. Much less, still, can religion become objective science if we understand by religion a belief, a sentiment both collective and personal, a union of minds and of wills towards a supreme end. Religion is a philosophy of sentiment and of imagination which is chiefly social, although it addresses itself to the individual; it is a poetry of consciousness seeking after the loftiest universal ideal. Here, again, the point of view has no longer the objective and exterior character of those verities which Comte calls positive. Thus, Comte himself makes an appeal in the religious order to the subjective method, but one incompletely understood and too utilitarian.

We certainly cannot demand of philosophy what these positive religions pretend to give,—positive knowledge as to the mysteries of existence. But in these religions themselves, we see the empire of dogma ever decreasing. Protestantism allows freedom of investigation, and freedom of investigation extended to all, is philosophy itself. Philosophy is not an immutable dogma; it is a progressive movement. Progress is not in philosophy a sign of inferiority, but of superiority. There are Indian tribes who believe that the soul of one who sleeps, is really on a journey, and that he must not be awakened before his soul comes back, at the risk of cutting short his existence. In the same way, we must not awaken the people too suddenly out of their mythological dream: we must give their reason time to return.* Philosophy like science ought none the less to accomplish its work, to be

* See Guyan, "Irréligion de l'avenir."

solicitous of nothing save the truth, to cherish no feeling of hostility towards positive religions, and at the same time make no hypocritical compromises.

It is the consciousness of the unity between our true self and the law of the universe which constitutes religion, philosophically interpreted. To admit, in other words, that the true consciousness of self is reached only through the moral consciousness, and this through the social consciousness, and this through the law of the universe, is to admit the very principle of all true religion, under whatever form one may represent to himself this moral unity of the world. He is moral who says: Do the good, let come what may. He is religious who says: The good will arrive soon or late to all; and morality, far from being an illusion, is the true revelation of the universe. But this idea of a supreme synthesis between the natural and the moral is at bottom thoroughly philosophical, and it pertains to philosophy to justify it. Instead of drawing sceptical or mystical conclusions from this present debate as to the value of science, as is now done in France and England. we should rather form a superior conception of science and its *rôle*. We have been, and that for a long time, one of those who rebel against the conception of science as purely representative; a conception which is intimately bound up with that of a purely reflective intelligence exercised on objects independent of itself. He who maintains that the idea is a force, ought to maintain likewise that science also is a force, that is to say, an action and a production, not merely a reflection of objects.

One of the errors of science and of philosophy in the intellectualist form which they have taken in our epoch, has been precisely this, to overlook the fact that philosophy and science are not solely speculations, but also actions and productions.* They are so not merely by their possible consequences or by the exterior end which they have in view, but indeed in themselves and by themselves, in their own essence and in their formation.

---

* See "Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces."

Science, indeed, discovers new solutions only by asking new questions, and it is here we must declare: Every question, well asked, is half answered. Moreover, a question asked of nature is always an idea of mind, a directing idea, an idea-force. The question is worth as much as the idea, and the reply as the question.

When Plato sought for universal forms in things, when Aristotle sought there the individual act, and its final cause, when the middle age attempted to find there the quiddity, the substance-form,—the directing ideas led to very different questions from the one which distinctively modern science asks: how? according to what law? After all, then, philosophical ideas govern science. In other words, it is the subjective development of the human intelligence and the self-consciousness which it attains which permit it to propound, an objective world of new questions and to reply, knowledge of the world being inseparable from self-consciousness. We have here a double development, the two elements of which are in partnership. We must know ourselves better and better in order to interrogate nature; we must know nature better and better in order to interrogate ourselves. Philosophy and science, without ever being confounded with one another, are always united: the progress of one is the progress of the other. The world becomes what it is to our cognizance only by the development of our own consciousness: we can find in it nothing which we are not prepared to ask it by virtue of our own internal development. And not only is the power itself of interrogating nature characteristic of thought; but yet more, after having taken the initiative in the question, it ought very often to take that of the reply, under the form of hypothesis at first, then that of verification, then under that of application. We have repeated many times, while giving it a broader sense, the saying of Aristotle: "To know is to act." Bacon has declared in vain that we must passively obey nature in order to command her. Even in physics, we must reconstruct by the instrumentality of our thought an ideal nature, and act on this in order to determine later whether real nature co-operates with our action and we

with that of nature. The conception necessarily precedes the experimentation, and what we call truth is the result of co-operation, an efficacious collaboration, not a passive registering of mere inert impressions. Psychology is far less passive than physics. It also is a production of facts, an experimentation which combines and calls forth phenomena. We act always in psychic facts. It is through ourselves, at least in part, that they exist: in observing them, we modify them, often even evoking them. But some one will ask: How shall we apprehend, then, an independent reality? We answer, that we do not create psychic facts; and that if our effort to know them by reflexion modifies and changes them, this is by virtue of regular laws, by virtue of a determination which can become the object of consciousness. Besides, in psychic facts there is the sensitive element which is passive, and which is introduced into us from without, an object of possible study. The relations of our sensations, of our pleasures, of our pains, all this is also an object of possible study. It is doubtless not an isolated subjective phenomenon which we are examining, as none such exists without an objective element. But it is legitimate and possible to study interior facts, not as the reflex of exterior objects, but only in so far as these are the expression of the profounder subjective phenomenon which underlies them. If we are unable to make of this inner subjective phenomenon an object of discursive science, and even if we are obliged to consider it as an ultimate datum, it is still true that we can draw ever nearer to this remote subjectivity and organize interior facts in their relation to it, and not in their relation to the outer world. Thus is a psychology possible; not a psychology that is separated from all physiology, but a psychology, whatever special name we may give to it, which is a knowledge of ourselves such as we become, such as we make ourselves under the action from without and the reaction from within. For a still stronger reason, the active character of intelligence is still more manifest in general philosophy where absolute verification becomes impossible. When science has discovered law and order in nature, it has not yet acquired its highest value nor its greatest interest. Science, to reach

this, must appear in essential relation with intelligence even and with will. The part of universal philosophy is to re-establish this relation which has been neglected or despised by positivism. Philosophy alone is the study of the reality itself both as fact and consciousness. The contemplative consciousness? or the active? Not the former, for by the very fact that it contemplates and reflects, it changes and abstracts; but in the second, in which we are the whole of ourselves, in which, along with the sentiment and the action of practical life, we obtain the most intense sentiment of reality. This reality, moreover, is not immobile and as if crystallized in the past; it is in the process of becoming and determines the future. It embraces then as one moment the *done* and the *to-be done*, the realized and the more or less conscious ideal which realizes it.

The reaction against science will not have been in vain. It will have served to prepare a *philosophy of action* in which the thought is no longer merely a reflection and a copy of the model subjectively presented, but a creation of new effects in harmony with those already existing. We believe, then, that if we attribute a "force" to the "idea," we can conciliate all that is exact in the intellectual theory of truth which makes a "harmony" of the two, and in the volition theory which makes an "action" or an "active belief" of them; truth is the simultaneous and individual harmony of actions and of ideas, the determinism of which is the manifestation, the will not being any more unintelligent than the intelligence is inactive. We conclude, therefore, that the true hegemony belongs to the intelligent volition of universal ends, a volition which exists as obscure consciousness in religion, but reaches in philosophy and in science the clear consciousness of its goal and of its means.

ALFRED FOUILLÉE.

Member of the Institute of France.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION.*

THE question that I propose to consider—at least in some of its aspects—is this: What light do biological theories of evolution throw upon the history of human society and on the practical problems of human society? The phrase "social evolution," as generally used, implies the assumption that biological conceptions do throw *some* light on social phenomena; it generally implies, also, that without biological theories and conceptions social phenomena cannot be properly studied nor social problems scientifically dealt with. It is very often assumed that some knowledge of biological conceptions is a sufficient equipment for the study of social phenomena; and it is sometimes even implied that with the help of a few formulæ that have, or seem to have, the sanction of biological science, the sociologist can solve theoretical and practical problems which have baffled historians and politicians for centuries.

At first sight there seems something reasonable in the view that biology supplies the key to sociology. Whatever else human beings may or may not be, at least they are living beings, subject to the laws of biology, or (to express the matter without any element of misleading metaphor) illustrating the same laws as all other living beings do. On the other hand, the greater complexity of social life among human beings, as compared with what may be found even among the social animals,—still more, as compared with anything that may be found among plants,—may well suggest that biological conceptions cannot without criticism, perhaps not without considerable modification, be applied to social phenomena. There is an important truth suggested in Mr. Spencer's description of society as "superorganic." A consideration of the superorganic character of human society may help to explain the suspicion with which the historical student, im-

* This paper was read before the Cambridge (England) University Ethical Society.

mersed in his particular problems, is apt to regard the generalizations under which the "sociologist" is in haste to bring the chaos of miscellaneous facts accumulated by the industry of antiquarians and the enterprise of travellers. The sociologist (especially when he is simply the biologist sociologizing) is apt to regard the historian as merely occupied with the higher gossip: on the other hand, the contempt for distinctions of time and place, and the unscholarly use of authorities, which too often characterize the sociologist, are apt to make the very word "evolution" stink in the nostrils of the genuine historian. "Evolution" and "development" seem only grand names for history treated inaccurately.

It is worth noting that in every period the prevalent notion of what constitutes "scientific" treatment depends upon what happens to be the predominant and victorious science of the time. In the seventeenth century, to treat a subject "scientifically" meant to treat it mathematically, however ill adapted the material might be for such treatment. The warmest admirers of Descartes and Spinoza do not generally think that their treatment of philosophical and ethical questions gained from the fact that the ideal of the mathematical sciences was always before their minds. In a later period, we know how the analogy of chemistry influenced the associationalist psychologists. Biological conceptions are certainly less inadequate than mathematical, physical, or chemical conceptions in the treatment of the problems of human society; but an uncritical use of them in a more complex material means a constant risk of mistaking metaphors for scientific laws. To adapt a phrase of Bacon's, we might say that the conception of evolution which is adequate in the biological sphere, is nevertheless *subtilitati rerum humanarum longe impar*,—"no match for the subtilty of human history."

Let me illustrate this by considering the applicability of the idea of *natural selection* to human society. Whatever view be held as to the truth or falsehood of the Lamarckian theory of use-inheritance, all biologists and all sociologists would admit that natural selection is a real cause at work in human society. The only question in dispute is as to the range of

its operation, and as to the degree in which it can explain the phenomena. The question for the biologist is: What other factors, if any, are there in organic evolution? The question for the sociologist is more complicated; for he must not assume without proof that there are no other factors in social than in organic evolution, nor that natural selection means exactly the same thing in human society that it does among plants and animals.

There is an error that is still not uncommon in the popular application of biological theories to social questions. The phrase "struggle for existence" is often taken as if it applied specially to conscious struggling or fighting. Now, industrial and commercial competition is far more closely analogous to the struggle for existence in the organic world than is a war between tribes or nations. The "peaceful" or "friendly" rivalry, as it is sometimes called, between individuals competing for employment is the struggle for existence in its strict biological sense. Such competition, if unchecked, ends in the survival of the fittest, *i.e.*, of the fittest to survive under the particular conditions, and in the starvation of the unsuccessful. If the competition does not end in the starvation of the unsuccessful, that can only be because there are other factors at work than natural selection. On the other hand, although war is one aspect of natural selection among human beings, the military organization of a tribe or nation for the purposes of attack or defence necessarily involves a mitigation and partial cessation of natural selection within the tribe or nation. So far as the history of the world has yet gone, war has been a more important factor than industrial competition in producing social *organisms* as distinct from mere social *aggregates*. We can see this even in the purely economic sphere. As the carcase brings the vultures together, so the material of an industry and the presence of consumers may collect the workmen; but it needs a struggle with employers, or with some other set of workmen, *i.e.*, it needs industrial war to produce organization among them, and to make them something else than merely competing individuals.

In using the phrase "social organism," it is necessary to

remind ourselves that in all human societies, except the most rudimentary, every individual belongs to more than one social organism, and that a struggle is possible between the different organisms to which the same individual belongs. Family, clan, city, nation, church, university, club, social caste or class, each of these is a social organism, competing with like organisms and often with one another in the struggle for existence and in the struggle for the allegiance of their individual members. Now to this there is nothing analogous in the purely biological sphere. The domestic animals, with a divided allegiance between their kindred and their human friends or masters, are "an exception that proves the rule;" for they are slaves of mankind, and so quasi-members of human societies. Thus, in applying the conception of natural selection to human beings, we have to recognize that there is not merely the struggle for existence between individuals competing for food and for the opportunity of producing and rearing offspring, but also, and to some extent interfering with this "natural" struggle, there is the struggle between societies; and, secondly, we have to recognize that these societies are of different kinds, so that an individual may belong at the same time to flourishing and to decaying social organisms, and the same individuals may be rivals in certain relations and allies in others. When, therefore, the biological moralist tells us that certain things are injurious to the social organism, it becomes important to ask him "to *which* social organism?"

Natural selection, in its biological sense, means the death of the less successful. So far as the conception in this sense is applicable to the explanation of human history, it means that certain races and certain customs have survived because other races and those observing other customs have perished. But it would be strangely to ignore the facts of history, and of the world that we know in our own experience, to suppose that it is only through the slow and deadly process of natural selection that the various elements in our civilization have been produced, preserved, and diffused. Even among the higher social animals lower than man, a great many habits are

due to imitation and not to instinct, *i.e.*, they are transmitted in the *social inheritance* of the race, and are not dependent on *heredity*, in the biological sense. Thus, birds learn how to build their nests, partly at least, by example and individual experience. It has been noticed that young swallows do not build so expertly as older birds. Among pigeons, the art of bringing up a family is learned by the less experienced from the more experienced. Among butterflies, on the other hand, all habits that make for the welfare and success of the race must be due to inherited instincts (the butterfly, *e.g.*, never sees its offspring as butterflies; education is thus impossible); and if "natural selection" accounts sufficiently for such instincts, that means that individuals not possessing the necessary instincts in sufficient degree are constantly perishing. Among human beings, on the other hand, while inherited instincts, produced and preserved by natural selection, undoubtedly exist, we must avoid the mistake of exaggerating their number and range; for social inheritance is relatively more important as we advance in the scale of development. The prolongation of infancy makes education necessary and possible; and the helplessness of the young may thus be regarded as the source of civilization, *i.e.*, of all that separates man from the mere animal. The rudiments of social inheritance, as I have just pointed out, already exist among the vertebrates lower than man; but language enormously extends its power and importance. Tradition, acquired experience, and definite institutions can be handed down from generation to generation altogether irrespective of biological heredity, and may therefore be handed on from one race to another.

Now, in all this there is nothing inconsistent with the theory of natural selection. The helplessness of infancy, the rise of language, the possibility of transmitting experience irrespective of heredity may all quite well be said to be themselves due to natural selection. But we must recognize that the existence of these elements in human society makes social evolution something very different and much more complex than what can be accounted for by natural selection, as that is understood in the purely biological sphere.

Consciousness and reflection *may* be explained *historically* as the result of natural selection. Our simian ancestors who first happened to have brains which enabled them to adapt means to ends, instead of simply following their instinctive tendencies, got a great advantage over their less reflective brethren. The use of tools and of language separated them off from the others; but while securing the success of the tribe as a whole, this separation undoubtedly led to a diminution of the stringency with which natural selection had hitherto weeded out the animals less fitted to struggle unaided with one another and with the rest of nature. Reflection *may* have originated through natural selection: once originated, it can be adapted to purposes which seem to have no bearing on the advantage of the individual or the species in the struggle for existence; such purposes, for instance, as mathematics and metaphysics, which to Mr. Russel Wallace seem inexplicable by natural selection. What is originated for purely practical ends may be adapted to ends that are of no obvious or immediate practical utility; and thus we should be prepared to find in human society many phenomena that cannot be accounted for directly by natural selection, and some even that seem to conflict with its operation, at least through considerable periods and over large areas. Reflection directed to individual and social utility may suggest the adoption of courses which prove in the long run to be socially injurious and lead to the injury or extinction of the race that has adopted them; but in other cases reflection may lead to the alteration of injurious customs whose ill effects natural selection would have proved too late for its lessons to be of any use. Thus in social evolution natural selection is often supplemented and partially supplanted by artificial selection: such artificial selection being sometimes injurious and sometimes beneficial. Natural selection tests the social utility of customs and institutions too late for the benefit of those concerned: utilitarianism—if by utilitarianism be understood a consideration of *social* well-being—is the attempt to anticipate and avert, where possible, the cruelty of natural selection. But in asserting that human society presents many phenomena that cannot be

accounted for by natural selection in its purely biological sense, I am not denying the truth of the theory, but rather extending its range. There is going on a "natural selection" of ideas, customs, institutions, irrespective of the natural selection of individuals and of races. Below the level of conscious adaptation of means to ends, a habit, which was once beneficial but which through change in the environment has become injurious, can only disappear through the extinction of all the individuals practising it. Where there is consciousness and reflection, the *habit* may be changed without the extinction of the *race*. Thus, we have to notice two marked differences between human and sub-human evolution: (1) As I have just been pointing out, customs and institutions may perish without the necessary destruction of the race that practised them, and (2), as I pointed out before, customs and institutions may be handed on from race to race, and may long survive the race among whom they originated.

When we find any persistent characteristics in a species of animal, *e.g.*, an organ shaped in some particular way, a particular color or arrangement of markings, a peculiar habit, etc., we are justified in using natural selection as a clue to an explanation. That is to say, we are justified in asking ourselves, What advantage does the species get through this peculiarity? But even in the case of organic evolution we must be on our guard against the supposition that everything is due to natural selection. Thus, certain peculiarities may possibly be due to sexual selection,—a luxury which is permitted to certain species where natural selection is not too severe. Certain peculiarities, again, may be survivals, which are harmless, or at least not sufficiently injurious to have disappeared. Thirdly, wherever we have any relative cessation of natural selection, we have *panmixia*, *e.g.*, where animals are under domestication we have a greatly increased variation in color and markings; apart from any special artificial selection, this is due simply to the animals being defended against their enemies of the wild state, so that those without the specially protective colorings are not killed off. Now, in human society it is reasonable to expect that every one of

these causes will operate more largely than in the sub-human sphere. The formation for purposes of attack and defence of compact groups of human beings causes a diminution of natural selection within each of the groups; artificial selection of all sorts goes on under the influence of ideas and sentiments of various kinds, religious beliefs, caste prejudices, etc. *Survivals* are rendered still more possible than in the biological sphere, because of the relative cessation of natural selection within large groups; and, for the same reason, there occur variations of all sorts and "bye-products" (Weismann's phrase) which are not constantly weeded out by natural selection.

Thus the theory of natural selection when applied to human society sets a problem, but does not solve it. In illustration, let me take first the case of religion. Everywhere human societies have some sort of religion; if we adopt a sufficiently wide definition of religion in order to cover the enormous diversity of practices and beliefs which for the purpose of scientific study we have to include under the name, a diversity so great that the acts which are commanded by one religion may be condemned by another, and that what seems essential to religion in the minds of some people (*e.g.*, a belief in a future life, or a belief in a personal God) may be altogether or nearly altogether absent from the religions of other great sections of mankind. Now the theory of natural selection suggests, as it has suggested to Mr. Benjamin Kidd, that religion must everywhere further the success of a society. Religion, according to Mr. Kidd, is what induces the individual to subordinate his interests to those of the social organism. This opinion is, I take it, arrived at solely by a deduction from the general theory of natural selection. At least, I do not find that Mr. Kidd has made any attempt to prove from history that *all* religions have had that effect in *all* the societies which have practised them; and it is in that wide form that the proposition would need to be proved in order to justify his statement inductively. Religion exists everywhere among human beings; therefore, it must be due to natural selection; therefore, its essence is to further social utility. Such, I take it, is Mr. Kidd's argument. The curious thing is that ex-

actly the same argument might be applied to the case of reason. Reason exists everywhere among human beings; but Mr. Kidd regards reason as everywhere antagonistic to the interests of the social organism. I do not intend to press that objection, however, because, in the one case as in the other, I regard the statement as far too general and sweeping to be of any scientific value. I shall quote Mr. Kidd's definition of religion "in the sense in which alone science is concerned with religion as a social phenomenon :" "A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." Now, with regard to this statement, there are some questions one would like to ask. (1) *Which* race? the whole human race, or a particular race? (2) *Which* social organism? the particular political society to which the individual belongs, or some future society? The interests of a particular race are not identical with the interests of the human race as a whole: an individual might be furthering the interests of the human race as a whole while helping on the destruction of his own particular race. And, as I have tried to indicate already, an individual may belong to many social organisms, and some of these may be wholly or partly antagonistic to one another; so that conduct which furthers the interests of one may be directly or indirectly injurious to the interests of another.

I need not apologize for referring specially to Mr. Kidd's views, as "social evolution" is at present, in every one's mind, associated with his book. Mr. Kidd has certainly done a good service by calling the attention of the general public—the public which has given his book so cordial a welcome—to the significance of religion for the science of sociology, in all its branches, and in both its theoretical and practical aspects. He is indeed under a strange delusion in thinking that scientific students of society have ignored the social significance of religion. The opening passage of Professor Marshall's "Politi-

cal Economy" might be cited as a conspicuous testimony: "The two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the religious and the economic." What is quite true is that the place of religion in human history is too often the subject merely of ecclesiastical or of anti-ecclesiastical declamation; or, else through fear of giving offence, it is left severely alone. This last attitude has been the preparation for the scientific attitude, but is not itself scientific.

But I cannot see that anything is to be gained by discussing the question of the significance of religion for social evolution in such a highly generalized form as that in which it is put by Mr. Kidd. Indeed, if we define religion as he does,—as something which necessarily tends towards social progress,—it becomes meaningless to ask what the social significance of religion is. That is already answered in the definition, although, as I have just shown, the words "race" and "social organism" are left ambiguous. But the really important and interesting question remains unanswered: Which of the religions of the world, known to the ordinary man and to the scientific student of religions, are "religions" in Mr. Kidd's sense of the term? One of the problems which most puzzles the careful student of human history is presented by the apparently anti-social and injurious elements contained in so many of the world's religions. This very matter has been urged as an objection to the applicability of the theory of natural selection to the explanation of social evolution. Has not the fear of the gods, from which the brutes are free, stood in the way of mankind in their struggle with nature? The pursuit of science, which has surely in some cases been of some social utility, has in all ages exposed men to charges of impiety. It might be plausibly argued, indeed, that pilgrimages, by promoting pestilence, exercise a severe natural selection, and that cannibalism, which is in most cases connected with religion, has produced the survival of the toughest; but it is difficult to see how human sacrifices, mutilation, extreme asceticism, the perpetual celibacy of large numbers of picked persons, have promoted the social efficiency of the races which have adopted such practices under religious sanction,

—least of all, if social efficiency is mainly promoted, as Mr. Kidd seems to think, by a teeming population multiplying in excess of the means of subsistence.

Now, I do not think such objections so fatal to the social utility of religion generally as they may at first sight appear. The conditions of social well-being are very complex, and great gains in certain directions may compensate for many drawbacks in others. Thus there can be no doubt that in all primitive conditions of society religion is the strongest bond of social cohesion. Elements in it which, taken by themselves, are anti-social or injurious in character, if they have tradition and long-established custom in their favor, may persist without doing sufficient injury to outweigh the social gain that comes from the religion as a whole. But the social utility of such a religion comes not from its irrational character, but in spite of it, and because it is the *common* religion of the whole tribe or nation. That is why primitive religions, though they may contain very little dogma, cannot tolerate dissent from the customary observances, and are apt to be jealous of the introduction of new, *i.e.*, foreign, gods. Religions of the primitive type are thus among the strongest of conservative forces in a society, and among the strongest of bonds uniting its members to one another, and at the same time separating them from those of other societies. But religion is certainly not the sole bond of union between human beings, nor is a conservative force necessarily under all circumstances beneficial. Independent of and prior to all religious sanctions there is a social instinct, which exists among all gregarious animals; the observance of a common ritual enormously strengthens the unity of a social organism, but it is not something that comes into existence out of nothing. On the other hand, it must be noted that what under certain conditions promotes social well-being may, under changed conditions, come to injure it. Extreme conservatism and antagonism to outside influences, which are a strength in certain relations, prove a weakness in others. This is true not only of primitive tribal religions, but of religions professedly universal in character. Thus some of the very same elements which make

Mohammedanism promote the social efficiency of its converts from lower tribal religions, make it socially injurious when confronted with Western civilization. So, too, the organization of the Latin church in the middle ages provided the rigid discipline which alone could mould the barbarians who had overthrown the Roman Empire into orderly and civilized nations; but this same mediæval system, wherever it remained unaffected by rationalism in regard to beliefs about nature and the supernatural, and in regard to the conduct of politics, has proved an impediment to national progress and prosperity.

Universal religions, including Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, present a much more difficult problem to the sociologist than primitive tribal religions, or than the national religions of the great peoples of antiquity. A universal religion, so far as it is true to its ideal, breaks up the bonds of nationality and even of kinship, although it may go on to create a new social organism,—a church, *i.e.*, a community of creed, not of race or political allegiance. What we actually find is, of course, a compromise between such an ideal and the older type of purely tribal or local religions. We find a universal religion professed which influences human conduct to some extent, while the greater part of people's lives (I am speaking of the ordinary, average person, not of the enthusiast nor of the criminal) is regulated by the social inheritance of their particular country, or of the class or caste to which they belong.

Thus, if it be asked, "What is the effect of religion on the interests of the race or on the interests of the social organism?" it seems to me all important to know not merely *what* race and *what* social organism are meant, but *what* religion. Nay, even if the question be asked about the Christian religion, it is still necessary to know *which* Christian religion? The religion of the hermits of the Thebaid is not quite the same thing, for the purposes of sociology, with the religion, say, of the ordinary English or American citizen of the present day. And if one wishes to settle any definite question,—say, how far the spread of Christianity led to the decay of the Roman Empire, or how far the decay of Spain

was due to the ruthless suppression of heresy,—it is surely better to consult the historian who has made a special study of the particular causes at work in each case than to have recourse to any sweeping formula about religion in the light of biological science, with whatever oracular solemnity that formula may be propounded.

The antithesis which Mr. Kidd, like many other people, finds between reason and religion seems to me based on a very inadequate psychology and on a very curious reading of history. Reason may often lead individuals to act in an anti-social fashion: does not religion, especially if it be of an irrational kind, often lead them to act in a fashion quite as anti-social? The religion which has helped to create and further so many movements of social reformation in modern times is a religion which had inherited a large part of the rationalism of Greek philosophers and Roman legislators, and which, at least in Protestant countries, has come more or less under the influence of modern science. It may be perfectly true that mere anti-religious rationalism would in the long run lead to a selfishness destructive of social cohesion, and so become a cause of national decay; but it is equally certain that, under the conditions of modern life in civilized countries, in proportion as religions remain uninfluenced by rationalism, they become sources of national weakness and not of strength.

But when we speak of "national decay" or of "social progress" there is an ambiguity in the phrases which the biological sociologist is apt to overlook. From the point of view of biology and of natural selection in its biological sense, the only matter of interest is the continuity and persistence of the race. For the sociologist there is an important difference between a race and a nation. Nationality is usually based on race, to some extent at least; I do not think the facts of history justify us in considering it as necessarily based on race. If a people think they are of the same race, and if they speak the same language, have the same traditions, and through geographical conditions or the pressure of economic and political circumstances have come to have a community

of interests and of aspirations, these are far more important factors in the sentiment of nationality than a racial identity such as would satisfy a careful ethnologist classifying mankind according to the shape of their skulls and the characteristics of their hair. Switzerland shows that a nation may exist in spite of diversities not merely in race, but in language, in religion, and in past history. Switzerland is a living refutation of merely ethnological solutions of political problems. A nation (*Volk*) is, to use the convenient term of German political science, a *Culturbegriff*, not a *Rassebegriff;* it implies a community of civilization, not necessarily a community of race. Now we have already seen that in social evolution the transmission of a type of civilization is possible independently of the continuity of the race; so that a race may be even dwindling in numbers whilst its type of civilization may become more and more diffused, because more fitted to survive in the struggle for existence with other types of civilization. Thus the decay of a race is not *necessarily* the same thing as the decay of the nation with which in some past time that race was identical. I do not mean to deny that in the struggle between nations the dwindling of a once dominant race may become a very serious source of weakness; whether that be so or not depends on many other considerations. What I wish to urge is, that for national continuity the assimilative power of the national civilization may be of far more importance than the mere numerical increase of the race which originally formed the nation. When the Spartan race dwindled, the Spartan state necessarily decayed, because the race was the state. On the other hand, every one of the Roman families that fought against Hannibal might have been extinct in the time of the Antonines; but the "Roman people" was becoming nearly identical with the civilized world. If no descendant of the "pilgrim fathers" survived on the American continent, the main characteristics of the New England type of civilization might still predominate over the vast multitudes from all lands which that type of civilization is assimilating. To the biologist, the dwindling number of births in France and the rapid increase of the German people

are the sole significant factors; they are not the only factors of which the sociologist should take account. Nearly every foreign immigrant into France is, if he settles there, assimilated by the French nation. Run over some names recently conspicuous in French politics: MacMahon, Waddington, Gambetta, Spuller, Waldeck-Rousseau, etc. On the other hand, nearly every emigrant of the overcrowded population of Germany is lost to German nationality, and is in a few years speaking the English tongue, and becoming an heir to the institutions and traditions of the United States or of some British colony. There is one part of the world where the French race remains almost entirely under the influence of a religion which is sufficiently non-rational to satisfy Mr. Kidd's definiton; and there the race certainly increases with a rapidity that outruns the means of subsistence. They would increase more rapidly still were it not that (as Mr. Goldwin Smith has remarked) under the influence of their religion they trust to little images of the Virgin instead of to vaccination as a security against the ravages of small-pox. It is, of course, possible, though it seems hardly likely, that the French Canadians will become a more important factor in the history of the world than the French nation has been. But I can fancy many a patriotic Frenchman, if the choice were offered him, preferring that his country's literature should be admired throughout the civilized world rather than that his descendants should be swarming in the tenement-houses of American manufacturing cities. And if we recur to the case of Germany, I think the influence of the German universities on the picked students of America is a far more important element in determining the German factor in American civilization than the swarms of Teutonic immigrants.

In arguing for the possibility of national progress irrespective of racial increase, and even of racial continuity, I must guard against misunderstanding. I do not mean that a community consisting mainly of Negroes, or perhaps even of Mongolians, could carry on our "Western civilization" without that civilization suffering in quality. I only mean to urge that mere increase in numbers is not necessarily the sole or the best way of preserving a type of national existence

that seems worth preserving. A people may be more socially efficient whose "standard of living" is not perpetually lowered by an increase in excess of the means of subsistence, provided always (and this is the commonly neglected element in the population question) that natural selection is not replaced by an artificial selection of the unfittest.

This brings me to the last point I intend to consider, viz., the bearing of the theory of natural selection on the question of socialism. According to Mr. Kidd, the tendency of the movement now proceeding in the Western world is not towards socialism, as that is commonly understood; social evolution does not diminish competition, but brings all mankind into the rivalry of life on conditions of equal social opportunities. Competition seems certainly most in accordance with natural selection in its biological sense, but Mr. Kidd speaks of natural selection becoming "humanized" through the operation of the "altruistic sentiment" which has permeated society as the effect of the Christian religion. Now, two questions suggest themselves: (1) How can natural selection be humanized without ceasing to produce the survival of the fittest? All philanthropic interference with the starvation of the unsuccessful means a certain amount of artificial selection, which hinders the racial progress that would be produced by unchecked natural selection. To get the real benefits of natural selection, we should require not merely to give up all philanthropy, but to abolish all such institutions as inheritance of property, marriage for life, probably all law and order,—everything that separates us from the animals. Simply to abolish all factory acts and land acts and sanitary acts—in fact, so far as Great Britain is concerned, all the laws passed since 1846, with perhaps the disestablishment of the Church and the abolition of the House of Lords thrown in—would leave us still very far away from the region of unimpeded natural selection. Biological students of society see perfectly clearly that all humanitarian legislation brings with it a certain deterioration in the vigor of a race,* unless those

* See, *e. g.*, Professor J. B. Haycraft's "Darwinism and Race Progress."

unsuccessful individuals whom altruistic sentiment will not permit us to see eliminated by starvation are rigorously segregated from the vigorous portion of the community, and prevented from producing offspring. This latter course would be a method of rational artificial selection by which we could bring about in less cruel fashion the race progress that otherwise can only be obtained by leaving natural selection to do its work unchecked. The difficulty in the way of any nation adopting such rational artificial selection will probably arise mainly from the non-rational religious sentiments which Mr. Kidd thinks essential to social progress. (2) How can "equal social opportunities" be secured for all mankind, or for any portion of mankind, without a complete organization of industry being undertaken by the state, *i. e.*, without collectivist socialism? If the "friendly rivalry" on conditions of "equal social opportunity" only means that the well-equipped and the ill-equipped in mind, body and estate are to be allowed to start together in the race, the loser to be killed by starvation, that is certainly natural selection, but the "equal social opportunity" is a mockery and a sham. If, on the other hand, the loser is to be treated through altruistic sentiment as kindly as the winner, the work of natural selection is frustrated, and the well-being of the race is injured. If the equal social opportunities are to be made a reality, and such deterioration in the quality of the race is to be avoided, we must, in the first place, have a socialistic organization of industry, and, in the second place, a system of artificial selection such as the average socialist, who is apt to be an anarchist at heart, has hardly ever contemplated,—a system, however, which was proposed long ago by Plato in his "Republic" when he argued that the breeding and rearing of citizens should be regarded with at least as much care as the breeding and rearing of dogs and horses.

These are problems of social evolution which I do not think can be profitably discussed in disregard of biological science, but I do not think they can be settled by any dogmatic application of biological formulæ.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

THE ETHICAL LIFE AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE JAPANESE.

In the mental activities of the Japanese people, ambition, sentiment, good sense, and artistic taste play an important *rôle*. The race of conquerors, who, coming over from the mainland of Asia and led by the first Emperor Jimmu-Jenno, subjugated the fierce aborigines, and in the name of Heaven took possession of the islands, forever left the stamp of their imperious temper upon their descendants. Japan must strike for a first place among the nations of the earth. Eminence and honor are dearer to her people than life itself; and how much more so than wealth or luxury! Utilitarian morality will never find wide-spread acceptance among this people. It will forever be sentiment which moves them. "A thousand hill-tops and ten thousand mountain summits," sings a poet, "are all covered with grass and shrubs. Where, in what peak of particular distinction shall I plant my staff? This long-cherished ideal of manhood—where shall I find its fit illustration? Where, but in the first summit of Mount Fuji?" A prince of the great house of Tokugawa, himself the lord of a large domain, once invited a famous actress to perform a series of dances for the entertainment of his invited guests. As she danced, the whole assembly was charmed with her skill and beauty, and the highest hilarity prevailed. Yet, at the close of the dance, the prince himself sat absorbed in thought, pensive and gloomy, and was noticed even to shed tears of grief. When he was asked by a trusty servant for the reason of this strange behavior, he answered, "This person is but a woman, and an actress, yet she has attained a position of national reputation, while I, a prince and a son of Iyeyasu, have not attained a first place among men." It is due to this spirit of ambition that there is to-day so much earnest purpose, steady application, well-balanced judgment underlying certain tendencies to foolish imitation and occasional outbursts of shallow excitement. This ambition takes little note of immediate

worldly consequences. It seeks nobility and greatness for their own sakes. It would be ashamed if it turned back from the pursuit of its aims because of risks. It is sentimental in the highest and best sense of the term.

To temper this spirit of ambition, Buddhism has contributed an element of pessimism and taught the people the wisdom of contentment and resignation. It has never ceased to remind them that this life, with all its interests and ambitions, is impermanent and vanity, and that only "in Buddha, the law and the order," is to be found the Nirvana, the true life—the life of permanence and calm.* The sounds of evening-bells slow measured and melancholy, coming from some distant elevation or hill-top, and reverberating through the whole town; the great halls of temples, clean-swept and empty of all furniture; the clean-dressed and clean-shaved monks calmly engaged in their daily devotions; the innumerable names and stories of men and women, some of them of highest stations in life, who forsook the world and obtained rest for their tired spirits,—all reminded the people of life, beauty, and peace which are not of this world. The idea gradually prevailed that in youth and the prime of life the spirit of noble ambition should rule, while in old age the spirit of resignation and contentment. This latter idea of resignation to fate, or of contentment with one's lot, was no doubt sometimes practised too readily. Men and women became too easily discouraged and too soon tired of life. The life of retirement became at times

* Buddhism was introduced into Japan in 552 A.D., in the thirteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Kimmei. The powerful Soga family espoused its cause at the court, and the Prince Shotoku Taishi became its strong patron as well as its illustrious expounder. Early in the ninth century the powerful Tendai and Shingon sects were introduced; in the latter part of the eleventh century the Zen sect, which soon gained great popularity among the soldierly class on account of its pathological method of self-mastery; and in the latter part of the twelfth century Shinran and Nichirin began their great careers in the founding of the popular, and only strictly Japanese, sects of Buddhism,—the Monto-Shin Shū,—which allows the marriage of its clergy, and the Hokké Shū, noted for the methodistic fervor of its piety and the zealous propagation of its doctrines. With this came to an end the palmy days of Buddhism. Since then any creative work by the Buddhists was rarely ever done, either in the line of speculation or of founding new sects.

a thing of fashion, so that men felt, or pretended to feel, old prematurely, and young men too often had thrown upon them the duties of life for which they were little prepared.* Yet, on the whole, Buddhism rendered a good service in counteracting and ennobling the spirit of fierce strife and of worldly ambition. It helped to create in the souls of men and women a longing for the life of the spirit, however inadequate its philosophy of salvation may have been. I said above that Buddhism has tempered our philosophy of life; but it has not enslaved it, or we might have been to-day "like Sodom and Gomorrah." Buddhism, which has made, according to H. Dharmapala, "Asia mild," was a blessing in our own case, because it did not succeed in making us *too* mild. It is highly creditable to the mental virility of the people that they were able finally to assert themselves against the Buddhistic domination and declare their mental independence. It shows their good sense that they knew when and where to stop following the teachings of the Hindoo sage. Thus resulted a happy fusion of activity and calmness, of ambition and resignation, of desire and contentment, which is so well typified by our national flower—the cherry-blossom. "Among men the Samurai, among flowers the cherry." When its season comes, behold! all hill-sides and valleys, all the gardens of cities are at once covered with its blossoms. Yet in a few days the white petals begin to fall, and, being blown by gentle breezes, sometimes present a veritable snow-scene; thus they go in supreme unconsciousness, without leaving behind any trace of a greedy hold on life. The flower is loved for what it typifies as well as for its own beauty.†

This life-ideal has, however, enriched itself most largely by

* It was not unusual a generation ago in Japan to find persons regarding themselves old at forty-five or fifty, and retiring from the active duties of life, throwing over the cares of their households to their sons, and devoting themselves to writing poetry, to horticulture, to tea-drinking, or the games of *gō* and chess.

† The life of Prince Hosokawa Fujitaka, otherwise called Yūsai, a poet, a philosopher, a warrior, a courtier, and a statesman, all in one, is a typical example of this phase of Japanese life. He lived in a period of transition (1532 A.D.–1600 A.D.) leading from Ashikaga to Tokugawa Shōgunnate. I am sorry there is no space here to give some account of his exceedingly interesting life.

accepting the ethical system of Confucius. The sacred books of Confucianism, which are almost exclusively ethical, social, or political, and above all practical, in the nature of their teachings, were greatly serviceable in lines where both Buddhism and Shintoism lamentably failed. To Confucianism Japan owes that richness of ethical content in her life and thought for which she will be forever grateful. To be sure, the influence of Confucianism, after its brilliant success in establishing itself,* during the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian era, in the court and the departments of state, suddenly declined and gave its place to Buddhism; yet, with the inauguration of the last era of peace, under the shōgunnate of the Tokugawa family,† it not only regained its influence, but became predominant. If for the seven centuries previous to this it had to content itself as a parasite of Buddhism, depending for its preservation upon the kindness of the priests, it was not long after the new era before great minds arose to uphold Confucianism‡ and assert its independence against

---

* Confucianism was introduced into Japan, according to tradition, in 284 A.D. in the sixteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Ōjin. But it seems to have made little headway till the coming of Buddhism in 552 A.D. The latter seems to have gained strong adherents from the very first, because probably of its promises to confer temporal and spiritual blessings. The study of the sacred books of Buddhism, which were all in the Chinese translation, gave stimulus to the study of the Chinese language, and most naturally led to a study of the Chinese classics; and, besides, the very antagonism which the rapid spread of Buddhism called forth led to the study of the classics on the part of those who wished for something to appeal to against the Hindoo religion. During the seventh century we find troops of eager young men going out to China, braving the winds and waves of the Yellow Sea, in order to learn the literature, arts, laws, and institutions of the great Tan period of Chinese history. It was through the efforts of these young men that the first systematic form of administration was established and the first Japanese code was framed and promulgated.

† The era of peace extended from the installation of Tokugawa Iyeyasu into the office of the Shōgunnate (or the generalissimo of the empire), in 1603 A.D., to the restoration of the Mikado to his rightful authority, in 1868 A.D. It was during this period (usually called the Tokugawa period) that the institutions of feudalism were developed to perfection; that the arts and literature made their final great stride, and the distinctive civilization of Japan was consummated.

‡ The great names—Yamasaki Ansai, Nakaye Toju, Kumazawa Hanzan, Ito Zinsai, Kaibara Yekiken, Ogiu Sorai, Muro Kiuso, Oshiwo Heihachiro, Sato

the domination of Hindoo speculation. At the close of this epoch men were found in every village and hamlet who read "the four books and five classics," and who, like the Jewish rabbis of old, gathered disciples around them and expounded to them the moral teachings of the great sage. These teachings, which were formulated into the doctrine of the five relationships, could very easily be mastered by the people. They were: 1. Between father and son let there be love. 2. Between king and subject let there be duty. 3. Between husband and wife let there be proper distinctions (of functions). 4. Between the old and the young let there be orderliness. 5. Between friend and friend let there be faithfulness.

The great merit of Confucianism was in the positive and ethical nature of its teachings. It dwelt on the importance of the daily routine of life, and invested with almost religious significance the minor, commonplace events of existence. As an offset against the pessimism and the speculative vagaries of Buddhism and the unmoral, or too often immoral, superstitions of the popular beliefs, the influence of this practical system of positive morality can hardly be overestimated. If we must characterize the influence of Buddhism as negative, as we have already seen it to be, that of Confucianism was decidedly positive and vitalizing.*

There was yet another feature in the teachings of Confucius which has had a very important and far-reaching influence in Japan; it is the teaching respecting *keun-tszi*, or a man of

---

Itssai, Fujita Toko—which have adorned this period would confer glory to a similar epoch in any country. This was verily the era of renaissance for Japan.

* Confucius persistently refused to speculate on the high and mystic regions of the unseen, and confined his observations and discussions to matters of daily life. He was born in a troublous time, and his merits as a sage and statesman were little appreciated; yet, unlike many men of the time, he refused to forsake the world. His courage and heroism in the cause of righteousness are something truly wonderful. If he was not a philosopher like Plato, or a prophet like Isaiah, it was no mark of inferiority that he was "a transmitter, and not an originator," because the positive morality he exemplified and the honest, heroic grandeur of his character have proved to be the strongest bulwark against the enervating influence of the sentimental and speculative pessimism of India, both in China and Japan, for all these years.

complete culture. It formed the ideal of the Sage himself and of all his disciples. It meant a man who, through learning, culture, and self-mastery, attained a state of harmonious and complete development of all his faculties; who was therefore worthy to be intrusted with the affairs of the state, or to be made a teacher and guide of the people. The Confucian idea of social and political reform was to create a class of cultured men—men of "sweetness and light," as Matthew Arnold would say—whose mission it was to uphold before kings and princes the ideal of a righteous state, to undertake the duties of government whenever called upon, and to teach and guide the people to walk in accordance with the doctrine of the five relationships. This was indeed a grand and inspiring ideal, and it has helped to produce in Japan those enlightened princes and scholarly statesmen to whom the country owes many a salvation in times of crises, and to whose examples we owe that ideal of enlightened and upright public service which is to-day yet proving so influential. Thus was added to our philosophy of life another element which enriched what was already so beautiful and made it strongly ethical.

In the practical application of Confucian ethics the Japanese have differed very significantly from the Chinese. Among the latter it was the principle of filial piety rather than that of loyalty to the king which has been the basis of all their morality. In the Analects of Confucius it is said: "A man of true culture (*keun-tszi*) endeavors to lay the foundations. When the foundations are laid, then is the path of truth secure. Filial piety and brotherly goodness—are not these indeed the foundations for the establishment of righteousness?" Confucius taught more fully and more explicitly on the subject of filial piety than on that of loyalty. The reason for this is not difficult to see. Confucius and his disciples lived in a time of almost total anarchy, and they went from one prince to another, tendering their services, but meeting with little honest response, so that there never grew up between them and any of the princes a deep sentiment of attachment. Confucius once playfully compared himself to a jeweller with a precious stone to sell, and said, "I would sell it, I would sell it; I am only wait-

ing for a proper price." Besides, from earliest times the Chinese have lived under constant changes of dynasties and governments. and, notwithstanding all their remarkable conservatism, they were forced to embrace a theory of society which justified rebellion. As the modern Chinese social system, notwithstanding its unmitigated form of absolutism in central government, contradicts itself by having within its local administrations many elements of democratic self-government, in the same way from time immemorial the Chinese held to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, yet held at the same time that rebellion was justifiable whenever the reigning dynasty lost the favor of Heaven. The case of the saintly King Woo,* who, though subject to the reigning imperial house, yet rose against it and in the name of Heaven destroyed it, compelled the scholars of succeeding periods to give up the extreme theory of legitimacy forever.† It is evident, therefore, that in such a society as the Chinese the only bond of unity and continuity (there being no religious bond as in the case of the Jews) was the bond of family relationship; and we find that Confucianism as a national system of Ethics laid the

* The Chow dynasty, of which King Woo was the founder, lasted 1123–255 B.C. "The traditions now become decidedly more trustworthy, although still largely mixed with fable. Woo-wang [or King Woo] was brave and upright. Under him a momentous change in government took place. By him the kingdom was divided into seventy-two feudal States."—(Fisher.) The principles of government, the rites and ceremonies of State and of festivals, as well as the entire social order and ideas of this Chow dynasty, were forever idealized and crystallized through the writings of Confucius, who lived at the close of this long period, and in midst of social dismemberment and anarchy. In Shu King, or the book of history, Confucius devotes a large space to the story of King Woo.

† The theory of kingship in China was very much like the idea underlying the kingship among the ancient Jews. The difference between the two was in the fact that in one case we have *keun-tszi* or cultured men, as the transmitters and scribes of the wisdom of the ancients; in the other case prophets as the seers of approaching events and the proclaimers of the will of God. Confucius, indeed, looked to Providence to guide him to some prince who was appointed to reign and restore peace, but he never heard the voice of God telling him to arise, find a king, and set him up. In the mean time the only thing which a *keun-tszi* like Confucius could do was to prepare and make himself ready, through culture, for any call of service, and wait patiently for such an opportunity.

greatest importance on filial piety. Thus, the teachings of Confucius and the social conditions of China both led that people to regard the principle of filial piety as the first and the last. Indeed, we cannot but admire the remarkable longevity of a community of three hundred millions of people, who have preserved intact their traditions and customs, as well as their immense territory, for three thousand years and through twenty-four changes of dynasty. It seems as if here we see the confirmation of the truth of the fourth commandment in the Mosaic decalogue, which promises longevity as a reward of filial piety.

The case was different with the Japanese. They indeed held in theory that filial piety was the foundation of all virtue. Yet in practice they laid the greatest emphasis on the principle of loyalty. The claims of the King or the State took precedence of all other claims, and the almost religious devotion to the cause of the Mikado or of the State was the mainspring of all virtues. Probably one of the most remarkable things in the history of the world is the unique place the Imperial House of Japan has occupied in the estimation of the people. Think for a moment of one royal family ruling over an energetic and progressive people from the very beginning of their history, for some twenty centuries! It is true, indeed, that during the large part of this long period the chief executive duties rested upon the heads of different powerful clans, and in some cases the emperors were compelled to abdicate or sent into exile. Yet never was the throne occupied by any but the members of the imperial family. To the Mikado always belonged the right to confer ranks and to make appointments, and if in practice he was not always free to act as he chose, in theory at least his authority was never disputed. The principle of loyalty, however, as almost the sole foundation of all virtues, found its wider application after the establishment of feudalism,—from the thirteenth century onward.* For feudal-

* The founder of feudalism was Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, who, after his victory over the rival clan Taira, assumed in 1192 A.D., by appointment of the Mikado, the office of Seii-Jai-Shōgun, and established the government of the empire at Kamakura, not far from the present capital, Tokyo. He took away

ism created so many grades of masters as the nearer and more tangible objects of loyal service that it soon made this principle the all-pervading bond of social life. The Mikado had his immediate court officials and his vicegerent, the Shōgun; these had their own immediate retainers, these latter again in turn their own trusty servants, and so on. In a large number of cases the bond of attachment between a master and his servant was the heritage of many generations, and was even closer than blood-relationship. "A faithful wife never seeks a second husband, a loyal servant never serves a second master." A true retainer to a daimio (lord of a domain) never offered himself to the service of another suzerain, even in case he was expelled through no fault of his from his master's household, or where his master's house, through some calamity, came to extinction and he was left a "homeless wanderer." * But as the people advanced in intelligence and civilization, and the idea of nationality gradually dawned in the minds of the leading men, the Mikado and his cause came increasingly to be the watchword for national unity; and when feudalism was finally overthrown as the result of the restoration of 1868, the Mikado became the one and sole object of popular devotion. He represents to-day to each one of his forty-one millions of subjects the unity, interests, and glory of the whole. For this evolution from petty, divided, and often conflicting claims of loyalty into the enlightened and united loyalty of to-day, and, in fact, for the deep-rooted affection of the people towards the imperial house, Japan owes a debt of gratitude to Shintoism, which was in its earliest beginning probably either Shamanism or the simple worship of the heavens, and which very early developed into Mikadoism, or the worship of the Mikado. We owe this service especially to the later remarkable Shintoist revival, extending from the

---

from the Mikado and his court in Kiyoto all real power and authority. Kamakura is now a deserted village and a summer resort.

* A servant became often so attached to a family that he remained all his life in the service of that family, sometimes serving three or four generations of masters. Such a servant was at times led to undergo martyrdom for the cause of his master's household in cases of emergency.

middle of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, the influence of which was permanent and far-reaching, finally leading to the realization of our national unity under the restored imperial authority.*

Thus stands the contrast: the Chinese emphasizing the duty of filial obedience, the Japanese that of loyal devotion. The one finding their popular ideal of virtue in the twenty-four patterns of filial piety, which can best be described as caricatures of the great virtue, the other in the story of the forty-seven *ronins* † who avenged the death of their prince in the face of the greatest difficulties, each of whom, in order to accomplish his object, "hated his father, mother, wife, and children," and when it was accomplished committed *harakiri* in calm satisfaction. We see yet more the difference between these two peoples in the fact that among the modern Chinese, while patriotism and official probity seem to be singularly wanting, there exist in striking contrast to this some virtues of a private and personal nature. Thrift, perseverance, honesty in business, seem to follow from their devotion to the interests of their household, and the trustworthiness of the Chinese merchants has already become almost proverbial in the Far East. The criminality of the universal official swindling seems to lose something of its great heinousness when we remember that these same swindlers have the good of their aged parents or of their wives and children at heart.‡

* This Shintoist revival was led on its religious and literary sides by three remarkable men,—Kamo Mabuchi (1696 A.D.–1769 A.D.), Moto-ori Nobunaga (1730 A.D.–1801 A.D.), and Hirata Atsu Tane (1776 A.D—1843 A.D.). They were each exceedingly individualistic, but had one common aim, which was to uphold the national dignity of Japan through the revival of native literature as against the supremacy of Chinese learning, and the worship of the gods as against the domination of Buddhism. This movement had, moreover, its political counterpart in the Shintoistic Confucianism of Yamasaki Ansai (1615–1682 A.D.), and his disciple Asami (1712 A.D.–1771 A.D.), in the History of Japan by Rai-Sanyo (1780 A.D.–1832 A.D.), and in the rise of the Mito-School of learning, whose leading spirit was Fujita Toko (1804 A.D.–1855 A.D.). It was altogether a great movement, and did more than anything else to prepare the way for our national unification through the restoration of the imperial authority.

† Read Saito and Greey's "The Royal Ronins."

‡ When, after the close of the recent war, the Japanese took possession of the island of Formosa, there was presented the humorous and significant spectacle

A great deal of scepticism formerly and of surprise latterly has been expressed at the real success of reforms in Japan. New Japan is, however, a solid reality now, and is fast becoming an important factor in the affairs of the world. To what do we owe all this success? Is it due to some peculiar native endowment of the people? Is it due to the climate, situation, and surroundings of the country? I answer, that the achievement of the Japanese in the reorganization of their social and political institutions is due chiefly to their peculiar ethical life. In the first place, we must take into consideration the deep-rooted feeling of loyalty to the Mikado which animates the hearts of his subjects. When the restoration took place, his will forthwith became the law of the country. He was not only absolute in power, but almost worshipped as a divine personage. The most enlightened public opinion of the time stood before the people incarnated in the person of the Mikado, and all forms of conservative opposition were one by one swept away before his successive edicts. In the second place, we must take note of the existence of "the authority of right reason" which the cultured class, whose ideal was *keun-tszi*, represented in all matters relating to the welfare of the country. The mass of the people were indeed still slaves of ignorance and superstition, but they possessed one good quality, that of knowing whom to follow. They were humble because of the consciousness of their own ignorance, and gladly took the better-informed men, in a large number of cases their juniors in age, as leaders and guides. The stiff-necked, blindfolded "Philistines" have had no existence in modern Japan. Probably no other people in modern times have proved such humble learners. Yet their humility was not unaccompanied by some solid mental qualities, other-

---

of rich, well-fed, and well-dressed Chinese inhabitants, who had not contributed a cent towards the prosecution of the war which led to their subjugation, looking down with contemptuous smile upon the frugal fare and cheap dress of the conquerors, whose countrymen at home voluntarily contributed, aside from regular taxes, over ten millions of yen towards the maintenance of the war, the number of the individual contributors amounting to one-fourth of the total population.

wise they might have been humble learners yet unable to accomplish so much. We must, therefore, take into consideration, in the third place, the intense spirit of patriotic ambition which has characterized everybody, from the emperor down to his meanest subjects,—the enlightened and the ignorant, the high and the low, all classes of people alike,—and which led them to undergo every hardship, give up every prejudice, sacrifice every personal interest in order that they might contribute, each in his own way, towards the reformation of the country. Why did the last of the Shōguns, with the large fighting resource yet behind him, submit so meekly to what he at first regarded with justice as not the true will of the Mikado, but the dictation of certain powerful clans? Why was the Civil War which accompanied the restoration so easily brought to a close and harmony so soon restored? Why did the Imperial Court itself, in all countries the bulwark of tradition and conservatism, lead the people in our own case, by introducing modern ideas into its rules of etiquette, the emperor himself readily condescending to appear before his subjects, dressed, moreover, in European costume, a man among men? What was the one last argument which decided the initiation of those innumerable radical reform-measures which were so much needed, yet were so diametrically opposed to the popular prejudices of the times? That one argument was, "This is necessary." Necessary for what? Necessary, in order to make the country civilized and strong. Imagine, for a moment, the depths of pain and humiliation into which this proud and ambitious people were thrown when they were compelled to realize the utter powerlessness and destined collapse of Asiatic nations before the superior civilization and strength of those "red-haired, blue-eyed Western barbarians." The clearer they saw the situation the stronger became their determination to rise with one supreme effort out of this hell of shame. Nothing is impossible to those who are determined, "since nothing is impossible to him who believeth." Is it any wonder, then, that this people have astonished the whole world in these latter days of the nineteenth century with what

they have already accomplished, and yet more with the possibility of what they will yet accomplish?

The position of woman forms a very interesting as well as a very important topic in connection with the present discussion. It is not unusual to hear some writers discuss this subject in a way which seems to be entirely misleading. I am free to admit, in the first place, that the theory of womanhood as it was popularly expounded by our moralists would make it appear that the Japanese women have suffered from the same kind of religious and social despotism as the women of India or China. The Hindoo theory of threefold obedience —"when young, obey your parents; when married, obey your husband; when widowed, obey your son"—and the Chinese theory of seven reasons for divorce* were indeed popularly taught and accepted. Yet it must be remembered that here again the native good sense of the people never permitted these theories to be strictly applied in practice. The original native ideas of womanhood were extremely healthy, and there never existed any theory of woman's inferiority to man until the alien systems of religion began to prevail. We have had several empresses to govern us, among them Jingo-Kogu, the conqueror of Corea; numbers of female poets and authors† whose works are among the acknowledged classics to-day; mothers and wives without number whose chastity, wisdom, and nobility of character will bear comparison with the world's best types of womanhood. The marriage of widows was looked upon with favor, especially if they were young. The wife, if she was in subjection to her husband, was yet at the same time the mistress of the household and the revered mother of her children. Polygamy, though it was practised more or less among the highest classes, was never practised

---

* The seven reasons for divorce are: 1. Disobedience to the husband's parents. 2. Childlessness. 3. Licentiousness. 4. Over-jealousness. 5. Leprosy, and other kindred diseases. 6. Over-talkativeness. 7. Committing of theft.

† The names of Ono-no-Komachi (who flourished in the ninth century), a poetess, and Murasaki Shikibu (who flourished in the tenth century), the authoress of "Genjimonogatari" (translated into English by Suematz Kencho. London, Trübner & Co., 1882), stand pre-eminent.

among the large body of the people, including the larger number of the Samurai class. Women freely walked out on the street, those of better classes always with escorts, and their lives at home were pleasant, contented, and happy. Young ladies of the Samurai class not seldom practised the use of a halberd, which made them healthy, strong, and courageous.

It is not my intention to defend the Chinese theory of the seven reasons for divorce or the Hindoo theory of threefold obedience; yet, in justice to them, I must say that the fundamental principle lying at the bottom of these theories was not, in my judgment, the intrinsic inferiority of women (as the popular and later expositions certainly make it appear), so much as the superior claims of the family or household above all individual rights. The family, under the patriarchal system, was a unit which no individual member of it had a right to break up. If a wife, therefore, proved herself, by her character, act, or physical condition, to be hostile to the true interests of the household, it was her duty, "having come from another family into this," to leave it; in fact, neither her husband nor anybody else could keep her, if they meant to be dutiful to their ancestors. Just so with regard to woman's duty of obedience. The wife obeys her husband because he is the head of the household; the mother obeys her son because he is the head of the household. The father did the same if he had resigned his place as the head of the household and was living a life of retirement. These things sound, I have no doubt, very harsh to those who live in a community where modern ideas reign; yet the Japanese old-time ideas of womanhood, and their practical consequences, should be judged, not from the modern Western stand-point, but rather from their own stand-point; for it makes a world-wide difference whether a son succeeds to his father's estate as his right or as his duty. In our case it was his duty to so look after the affairs of the household that his mother, brothers, and sisters were as well provided for as in the days of his father. It not infrequently happened that a young man was obliged to divorce his wife, whom he really loved, because the peace of the household demanded it. I am not defending the system

of ideas which leads men and women to act in so many unnatural ways. What I wish to point out is the fact that, under all these mistaken notions, there was pervading throughout the sense of duty, devotion, and self-sacrifice; and also this, that the practical working of our theory was not near so bad as is sometimes imagined.

No discussion of Japanese morals can be complete without mention of a very popular phrase which represents—conjointly with the principle of loyalty—the ethical life of the people. I refer to the phrase *giri-ninjio*, or reason and humanity. It expresses the antithesis which so often exists in life between one's natural feelings of love, on one hand, and the call of duty on the other, when one is expected from the stand-point of ethics to pursue the path of duty, even though at the sacrifice of his natural instincts of humanity.* There is nothing remarkable in this idea, nothing peculiar to the Japanese, except that they have carried out its application in some cases to singular and fantastic extremes, so much so that their highly self-sacrificing and moral acts not seldom seem immoral looked at from the modern stand-point. We read in popular novels and romances, in dramas and stories, of persons being "compelled through the sense of *giri* or reasonable duty" to commit certain acts which were entirely opposed to their natural instincts. A wife has two children to care for; the one is her own, the other the child of her husband's former wife. The latter is, therefore, a child of *giri*, and she is twice as good to that child as to her own. A nurse to a child-prince realizes the imminent danger to which he is placed through the wicked designs of his enemies. She has her own child at the court as the playmate of the prince. The time comes when she can only save the life of the prince by sacrificing her own child as his substitute. Two young women are in love with one young man, each not knowing the other is in love with him. By and by one of them learns that the

* The popular romances and novels by such authors as Bakin, Tamenago, and the dramas of Chikamatsu, are all full of this idea. See Mitford's "Tales of Old Japan," which gives some very interesting stories illustrating this principle.

other is his destined wife because of an engagement entered into by the young man when he was adopted into the family of this girl. Obeying the dictate of "reason" she gives up the cherished object of her affection and blesses his union with her rival. Many a woman thought that she was performing her "reasonable duty" when she sold her purity and freedom, as the only thing she could do, "being but a woman," to help her poor invalid parents or her beloved unfortunate husband. If the term *chugi* (or loyalty) was aristocratic in its origin and gradually permeated into the lower strata of society, the term *giri-ninjio* was plebeian in its origin, and was found most largely in use among the masses of the people, though it extended upward through the influence of romances and dramas into the female circles of the higher classes. The term used by the aristocratic class, which corresponded almost completely to *giri-ninjio*, was *setsu-gi*, or the reasonable principle of action. The *setsu-gi* has commanded many a *harakiri* in the course of Japanese history.*

History presents few parallels to the wonderful, revolutionary effect which the coming in of modern thought produced in

---

* Here in this connection the two other phases in which this *giri* feeling manifested itself need to be noted. I mean (1) the right of revenge, or *kataki-uchi*, the killing of one's mortal enemy. The saying, "with the murderer of one's king or father one does not live under the same heavens," reigned supreme in the ethical thought of the Japanese. The romantic story of the forty-seven ronins mentioned before is a notable example of this. Another very famous story, over seven hundred years old, is that of the revenge by the Soga brothers of the murder of their father. Sometimes a wife revenges the murder of her husband; sometimes a brother that of his brother. If the son who starts on the search for his father's murderer is young, some one who hears of it, perhaps a perfect stranger, is so moved by it that he volunteers to accompany him and aid him in the noble endeavor. This idea of the right of private revenge has died out with the establishment of the new *régime* and the prevalence of modern ideas. (2) *Otokodate*, or, literally, "to establish one's manhood," was a friendly association of brave men, with one at the head of the guild, whose word was law. Its principle was to help the needy and the oppressed, to resist the oppressions of the strong. It flourished mostly in large cities, among classes below the Samurai, and it was in many cases the back-bone of plebeian morality. The utmost stress was laid on the sacredness of a promised word, and on the duty of fulfilling the trust of another. The working of this principle produced some unique and heroic figures.

Japan. The utter collapse of the feudal institutions, the sudden overthrow of the old religious systems, the introduction of the ideas of political right, of civil liberty, the inauguration of the constitutional and representative forms of government, above all, the phenomenal rise to influence of the industrial class—all these have necessarily wrought havoc with those ideals and conceptions of morals which once reigned supreme. In practice, indeed, the principle of loyalty and patriotism, of *giri* and *setsu-gi*, are yet to-day held to with deep earnestness and dogged tenacity. In fact, it is not without reason to think that both the Restoration, by bringing forward the one supreme object of devotion in the person of the Mikado, and the opening of the country to the intercourse of foreign nations, by acquainting the people with the national dangers from without, helped greatly to enlighten and deepen the feelings of loyalty and patriotism. Yet as an ethical theory and system the old conceptions have entirely lost their logical ground and may be said with truth to have completely broken down. Besides, in the light of the new situations and conditions, some grave criticisms can well be brought against them; and if the Japanese are to have a new and dominant ideal of ethical life, it will probably be the product of the same independent and peculiar working of the Japanese mind, in which will be found at the same time the best elements of the old system, and the essential elements of Western civilization, existing side by side, fused into one harmonious whole. It is interesting to note that the process of ethical reconstruction has already begun, and is, I believe, bound to succeed. New Japan is to-day confronted, among other great and pressing problems, by the problem of a new ethics, upon whose right solution rests ultimately her destiny as a new civilized power in the Far East.

The reader might, perhaps, inquire how far Christianity has contributed, or will contribute, towards the solution of the ethical problem in Japan. Does it, or does it not, bring some elements of ethical truths which were not found in our old system? The question is somewhat ambiguous. Christianity may mean in the mind of the inquirer either the religion which

has already contributed so much to enrich the ethical ideas of the peoples of Europe and America, or the Christian Church in Japan, including the native pastors and foreign missionaries. If we understand the question in the former sense, Christianity *has* certainly contributed a very important and essential element to Japanese ethical thought. I refer to the idea of individuality or personal liberty. This idea is now at the foundation of our political, legislative, and social order, and it is something our people never knew before, at least never knew in the breadth and depth of its meaning. We did not learn it, indeed, from reading the Bible or directly from Christianity; we learned it through the law, literature, and institutions of the West. Yet, since the development of this idea in Europe is due in no small degree to the influence of Christianity, we might say with truth that this is one important contribution Christianity has already made to Japan. If, however, we take the question in the second sense, what shall be our answer? It seems to be one of the many burning questions of the day, whether or not the Christian missions have done any good.* One party claims that the movement is an utter failure, the other that it has had a very important share in the progress and enlightenment achieved by the countries of the East. Our question does not concern the religious side of the missionary

* Protestant Christianity was first introduced into Japan in the year 1859. During the first ten years the prospect was exceedingly dark, but with the Restoration of 1868, and the full opening of the country to Western civilization, the outlook greatly improved. From 1880 to 1890 it made the most wonderful progress, which brought the Protestant population from five thousand in 1880 up to thirty thousand in 1890. Its influence on the nation at large is disproportionately strong compared with its numerical strength. The Greek Church (the Russian) has been very industrious, and at one time was very successful in obtaining converts. It has a membership of twenty thousand. Its actual strength is not at all comparable to the Protestants. The Roman Catholic Church, after its great success in the sixteenth century, at the time of Francis Xavier, and its subsequent entire extermination (about eighty years after the beginning of the mission), began its mission again after the recent opening of the country. It has a body of very devoted and zealous missionaries, and its membership is forty-five thousand. Its adherents are, however, almost exclusively from the lowest and the most ignorant classes, and as yet it has not shown any traceable influence on the community at large.

movement at all, but only so far as the movement may or may not have contributed to the enrichment of moral life and ideas of the Japanese people. I think it is not difficult to point out several features in the movement which have been disappointing, especially from the ethical point of view, to many thoughtful men who expected much from Christianity. This refers, however, to the negative side, to what was missing, to what might have existed in order to be more complete. But, taking the body of foreign missionaries as a whole and the native churches as they are, there is one particular in which they have succeeded in impressing on the mind of the Japanese people a very important ethical truth. I refer to the principle of monogamy and personal purity. I do not mean to say that the Japanese people have been, as a rule, polygamous, or that womanhood among them, especially in the better classes, had not a very high ideal of faithfulness and chastity. But monogamy as the only true principle of social order, and purity as obligatory upon men as upon women, were never clearly understood. If to-day our best ethical opinion has practically endorsed these truths, we must give a large measure of credit to the foreign missionaries who have been living among us for nearly forty years. To be sure, we have had among us other representatives from Europe and America; but, unfortunately, with some marked exceptions, they have, as a rule, too readily conformed to the loose ideas current around them, and, instead of being helpers towards progress, have become corrupters of our morality. But the missionaries have lived good, honest lives, and been careful not to give occasion for scandal; the native Christians, as a rule, have in their lives been consistent to their profession. All this has been an object-lesson to the people around them. Besides, during this epoch of revolutionary changes, when the old structures of society were crumbling on all sides, when many young men openly proclaimed that to free themselves from all restraints of morality was a mark of enlightenment, and when, moreover, the idea prevailed that there existed no morality in Europe and America, and that those countries were powerful only because they had superior military equipments, during this time of transi-

tion, I say, it was a very great and noteworthy thing that there should be these men and women from the Far West to represent to us the ethical and spiritual side of their civilization. By their very presence they reminded us of the importance of morality and religion in the life of a nation. In this respect their silent, unconscious influence was beyond all estimation. I have no doubt that with the further progress of Christianity in Japan, and the consequent more perfect adaptation of its teachings to the need of the people, it is destined to exercise a yet more thoroughgoing influence in the development of our ethical thought.

Before concluding, I will make a few criticisms on the old ethical ideas by considering them in the light and situation of to-day, and try to indicate the lines along which the new ethical idea will probably develop.

It seems to me a just criticism against the old system of ethics that it was too one-sided in its enforcement of duties. While the teachings about the five relationships seem, when theoretically considered, to be well balanced, yet in their practical application they often proved to be too partial and unequal in the distribution of duties. The duties of father, king, husband, or elder brother were unfairly light compared with the duties of subject, son, wife, or younger brother. It could not, perhaps, be otherwise; for the practice of morals could not but correspond with the social conditions of the time. And just for the same reason that the Confucian system of graduated morality was so well suited to the feudal forms of society, the new time and the industrial revolution, as well as the prevalence of the ideas of political right and personal liberty, will demand a new presentation of the old truth set in a system of philosophy which will correspond to the new social environment. Such a philosophy must start, in the first place, with an ethical conception of the rights of man, must give, so to speak, an ethical valuation of the individual. Modern Japan has been acting under higher impulses, in freeing the outcast *êta* class from social and political opprobrium, in freeing the serfs from the burden of innumerable feudal exactions, in giving political rights and social privileges to all

classes of people. But there has not yet been formulated a self-consistent ethical theory of man. Why is a subject to be treated with respect and granted his due right by the Mikado? Why are children to be treated with respect and reverence by their parents? Why are the commonplace, every-day virtues of chastity, honesty, thrift of such great importance? Is it not because we are human beings before we are fathers, sons, kings, or subjects? It is the idea of man as an ethical personality equal before Heaven, entitled to all the privileges of existence, to equal opportunities in the pursuit of the aims of life, which should be at the foundation of every true and enlightened social order. This ethical conception of man teaches us that not only are we to work for the best welfare of the community, but that every one is to work for the noblest development of his own personality. His life is not his own, but belongs to an ideal. His body, too, is an ethical property; he must keep it pure. No public service, or an act of loyal devotion, is perfect if it is performed at the expense of private virtues. He only is a free man who keeps his mind and body pure, and who looks alike upon all, high and low, great and small, with sincere reverence, because of the ideal that is in each and every human being.

In the second place, in the course of this reconstruction we need an ethical conception of human society. Why should we work for the good and glory of our own country? Why should we live and die for the good and glory of our emperor? When the question was asked in old-time Japan, it was promptly answered by saying, "We repay in this form one ten-thousandth part of the benefit we and our ancestors have received from the king and the state." It was essentially a feudal idea, according to which the feudal subjects render dues to their suzerain for the fiefs they hold. The sense of duty and obligation was felt most keenly by those who, like the Samurai, were in immediate relation with the sovereign, but not to an equal degree by other classes of people. We need a satisfactory philosophical ground for our patriotism, so that our service to the country may not end in a larger kind of selfish ambition. What relation do the glory and good of

Japan hold to the glory and good of other nations and peoples? Shall our attitude towards other peoples be that of self-assertive, self-glorying ambition, or one of righteous purpose and fraternal good-will? There is probably but one answer to these questions: that is, that the history of the human race is one vast, organic, ethical process; that it is an evolutionary process towards an ethical end, so that all times, all peoples, all men, are to contribute towards the realization of those states and conditions which are the ultimate goal of all history, and the fulfilment of the visions and prophecies of the best men of all the ages. One nation is but a member of the whole fraternity of nations, so that it and they are all working, with different missions and sometimes in temporary conflicts of interest and purposes, yet overruled by Providence, towards the accomplishment of one great historical process. No progressive social order can long endure without resting on some such self-consistent ethical conception of human existence. As the sunlight of an early spring morn scatters the fog which has covered the hills, valleys, and villages like one vast sheet over sleeping figures, so must these great truths of God and man shine upon the peoples of the Far East, and scatter those systems of philosophy which make arts, civilization, and the wisdom of man altogether vanity and vexation of spirit. This is the problem, nay, the conflict, which is now calling forth the most earnest efforts of the best people of Japan.

These new ideas, it will be noticed, are the essential elements in the ethical conceptions of the modern democratic Christian West. They are already present in Japan, together with other ideas of Western civilization, and will make themselves felt yet more and more powerfully till they permeate through the length and breadth of the whole social structure of modern Japan. It took old Japan one thousand years to take in and assimilate the old ideas from China and India and develop her own distinct ideal and conception of life. It is but reasonable to suppose that it will take new Japan at least a century to take in and assimilate the new ideas from Europe and America and develop her own and a more complete and

perfect philosophy of life. And when she succeeds in this attempt, then will she have attained that ideal of national greatness and glory about which the present generation of her people are but dreaming, for the realization of which they will be all willing to die. The good angel of destiny seems to be standing with a smile upon her face and pointing to the road the New Japan is to take.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

TOKYO, JAPAN.

THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN THE CATHOLIC CONGRESSES.

THE reports of the Congresses upon social questions in the Roman Catholic Church, together with the literature which these gatherings directly inspire, already furnish illustrations of inestimable value as to the part that organized religion is likely to play among the industrial and economic forces. It is the purpose of this article not to describe the various local, national, and international Congresses upon the social question, but rather to show the content and development of thought and discussion upon economic and industrial issues which the Church is raising. As early as 1862, Dr. Döllinger advised the Church to take social questions into more definite consideration. A further step was taken in 1869 by Bishop von Ketteler in recommending the clergy to study political economy as a part of their training for priestly duties. This counsel received the sanction of the assembled Bishops at their conference in that year. After the war of 1870–71, several teachers introduced economic and social science studies into their seminary courses. Though these subjects had been touched at two previous Congresses, it is after this date that the real interest begins. It is not confined to one country, but shows itself in Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium. Two young officers returned to France from German prisons * resolved to rouse the religious leaders

* The Count de Mun and his friend, La Tour du Pin Chambly.

to some sense of the importance of openly recognizing social problems as a responsibility which the Church could no longer ignore. In the earlier Congresses, a single address appears during the three days' session. This allotment of time gradually increases until other questions are so crowded out that special sessions are decided upon at which the social problem alone is discussed. In the north of France, a single yearly gathering of three days has been found too scant, and thus two meetings are held in the year.

The subject-matter at these Congresses differs in some degree in different countries. It is of great significance that both theory and practical proposals are profoundly modified by the stage of industrial development. English Catholics would not dream of parliamentary agitation in favor of compulsory guilds for the regulation of industry such as has been secured by the Catholics of Austria. Where industry is most highly developed and open to the widest competition,—a competition that shows how vast and yet how sensitive is the interdependence of trade interests,—there we find invariably that the traditional Catholic remedy of a restored type of guild regulation is least valued.

The same variations in theory and practice are introduced by the different political ideals that prevail. The kind of alliance which the brilliant Ultramontane, Decurtins, forms with the Swiss radical democracy is possible because it is in Switzerland. Whether the government is in Protestant or Catholic hands naturally modifies the Catholic doctrine of State interference. The proposals for land reform are strongly colored, if, as in Austria, the Jewish question (everywhere at bottom not a religious but an economic question) is bitterly rife.

The form which a militant Socialism takes (as in France, Germany, Belgium) acts at once upon the whole policy of the Church. The largeness and elasticity of the Catholic view may be seen by comparing the discussion and legislative activity in Austria with the social activity which has express Papal sanction in Switzerland and France. This is in keeping with the doctrine of time, place, and circumstance as

determining factors, which is laid down in the Encyclical on Labor.

Beneath these differences there are others common to all programmes,—arbitration and conciliation, housing of the poor, benefit associations, co-operation and profit-sharing, various schemes of mutual insurance, factory and even tenement-house inspection, loan funds, credit associations, and every form of saving institution to create and strengthen the thrift habit. These familiar reforms are doing service in scores of places, and are everywhere pressed for further development. Agencies are also established for furnishing the freest information to employers who may wish to adopt one or other of these remedies. It is noticeable that conservatives at the Congresses invariably recommend changes through these commonplace reforms. Everywhere something like a revolt of opinion appears, more frequently among the younger clergy, against the sufficiency of these routine proposals. The alternative succor is invariably some form of restored guild with power to compel its members or an increased supervision and activity upon the part of the State. Especially, within the last ten or twelve years no Congress has been held (upon the social question) which has not been agitated, often to the danger point, by the introduction of proposals to shorten the labor time, establish a minimum wage, to give legal personality to trade-unions formed only of laborers. The method of the Church is to work through such groups. Shall the Church (as is the case with the "Social Union" of the English Church) welcome these trade-unions and co-operate with them? How else, it is said, can the Church get at the workingman. Everywhere this form of labor union rapidly outgrows the unions made up of employer and employed together. The independent union moreover includes, in large towns, the *élite* of the workingmen. Yet few issues have given rise in the Congresses to more prolonged and heated debate in Continental countries, where such unions are largely Socialistic.* This is the terrible

* The powerful and growing labor unions known as the *Fachvereine* in Germany are practically all Socialist.

dilemma which the Church has to face; how to reach the workingmen—those who have influence with their fellows—without adopting the methods of the unions. These methods, like weapons shaped in the exigencies of war, have grown out of the long struggle with the employer. Never in any instance has the Church persuaded a union to give up its methods or in any important way to modify them. To go over onto the ground won by the unions is to take sides, and thus forfeit the sympathy of those who chiefly support the Church and the charities.

Again, what duty has the Church towards strikes? To frown upon them is to lose at once all sympathy from organized labor unions; to smile upon them is as dangerous from the side of the employer. The bolder spirits in the Church take middle ground, and resolve to stand by the strikers "where they are right." This implies some organized method of examination of special cases, with all the delicate responsibilities which such decision enforces. This keeps the Church constantly between two fires,—now from labor, now from employer.

The bold stroke of Cardinal Manning in taking sides for the dockers made him for the time, with multitudes of Protestant workingmen, the real Primate of England; but what would have followed if, in another great and passionate strike, he had as fearlessly sided against the strikers? Or shall the Church stand aloof and merely recommend arbitration? This is usually the counsel of the cautious, but the more aggressive spirits in the Church answer that this safe timidity is the one sure way to lose the last uncertain hold which the Church now has upon the working-classes.

Again, every concrete question of wage payment rouses hot discussion. There was little friction in the earlier Congresses, partly because the employing class did not take this new concern of the Church with seriousness, partly because some years elapsed before the proposals as to wages became at all definite or legislative enactments were put forward. The maximum or minimum wage and all friendly suggestions about "fair wages" are not only tolerated, but enjoyed, by

intelligent employers so long as the discussion is general. Until about 1886 scores of employers, mine owners, bankers, directors of iron-works and factories were found at these Congresses, listening amiably, and even giving their applause, to discussions of wages, hours of labor, treatment of operatives, etc., because the proposals were for the most part purely voluntary, or so far abstract in character as not to threaten any specific business with immediate discomfort.

Employers would sit at ease under any measure of good advice. They showed little opposition to the discussion of really test questions so long as the changes suggested depended only upon their free consent. If they were told that fair wages should be paid, they were not offended, because the employer believed that he had never failed in this respect. If justice were urged upon him in all his relations to his workmen, he was likely to feel very honestly that he had not been remiss in fulfilling this law. Every word of ethical import, like "fair" and "just," is not merely relative, but various interpretations from wholly different stand-points are possible. The employer who feels himself the victim of a pitiless competition which threatens the very existence of his business will have his own idea of a fair or just wage to his employés. The only significance which an employer sees in such terms is a wage which the conditions of the market make possible. Nothing can shake his conviction that wages are determined by competition with his rivals in a vast market over which he has little or no control. He is justly incensed against any one who assumes that he can pay what he likes independently of such conditions. A large part of the economic discussion at these first assemblies took for granted that the changes were to be "patronal," *i.e.*, freely initiated and controlled by the employer.

When in these discussions the voluntary principle begins to yield to some form of compulsion or outside interference, the employer is roused to antagonism. As in the English factory legislation from 1802 onward, the great majority of employers have doggedly opposed every step of interference which took the form of compulsory change in their business. This oppo-

sition will continue for a reason which brings out the conflict between the ethical or social point of view and that of the private individual employer. The stand point of the Church is always that of the community rather than that of the individual,—always that of the "long run" as against the short run. The concern of the employer is invariably with the "short run,"—his pecuniary advantage in that short period (of weeks or months) over which commercial conditions give him the slightest real control. Practically, every business is struggling for the profits of a very near future. The fierce heat of competitive rivalry compels the employer to concentrate attention on those business possibilities that are just before him. Whatever may be thought of the needs of the larger social whole and of a more distant future, it should be clearly understood that the average employer rarely sees his relation to such social whole or to such far-off future. The view of his relations is determined by an economic struggle in which the near and more immediate alone has any reality to him. It is within these sharp limits of the short run that every system of "economic harmonies" has been conceived; nor can it for a moment be denied that in the actual work of the world this "identity of interest" between employer and employed—also between both of them and the community—has been so far practically real and true as to justify much of the enthusiasm which the theory has inspired. It has, however, come to be the dreariest commonplace that no conjuring à la Bastiat can turn this philosophy of proximate pecuniary advantage into a theory that is in the least adequate to the situation. Occasions are so constantly arising in industry of sharp and hopeless conflict between instant personal gain and some value which society esteems superior to individual profit that this pleasant optimism is no longer taken seriously by any first-rate economic thinker. It is to the credit of Catholic scholars that this view from the beginning has been rejected. However strenuously opposed to State interference (Le Play and Périn) and to all forms of Socialism, the doctrine of economic freedom, as a sort of final good, has met with steady opposition by these

writers. It is this attitude which heightens the interest in the social and economic discussions at these Congresses. We seem always to be placed at that point in the conflict between the narrower and the larger good from which distinctly ethical questions spring into view.* The disturbing change which takes place as discussion develops in the Congresses is the tendency of a vigorous minority to abandon the older social method of *patronage*,—the voluntary application of such remedies as the employer finds possible. Under *patronage* the conflict of interest does not appear, because the employer controls every change that is made. Under this method even very radical proposals leave him unconcerned. But let the test questions—trade-unions, shorter working time, support of strikes—be urged in such form that the control is to be placed elsewhere, so that the employer must submit to a decision which he can but slightly, if at all, direct and determine, then he is at once in arms. It is no answer to him to say that the good of the working-class, or that of the community, demands this outside interference with affairs that seem to him private. Only in the rarest cases will he or can he see that his business interests are not one with the interests of others. Even if theoretically convinced that shorter hours, higher wages, stricter State inspection of his factory or workshop, etc., are probable advantages, he knows that the risks at least of admitting such changes are considerable, and may easily put him to such disadvantage with his competitors as to destroy that small margin of profits on which success depends.

These changes in raising the standard of labor are "long-run advantages," and it by no means follows that in any

* If the reader wishes to see this truth amply illustrated, let him look at the following reports in which strikes, hours of labor, wages, labor legislation, etc., are fully discussed. "Congrès des Œuvres Sociales à Liége, 1890." Imprimerie, 8 rue St. Michel, Liége, Belgium. "Conférences d'Etudes Sociales de Notre-Dame du Haut Mont," Nos. 1, 17, and 18, Juillet 17, 18, 1893. Also Report No. III., 23, 24, 25, Nov. 1893, published at Lille, 78 rue de l'Hôpital Militaire. "Compte Rendu du deuxième Congrès Ouvrier Chrétien," Reims, 1894, 24 rue Pluche. Also a "Mémoire" of great value published by employers upon "La Situation de l'Industrie en Belgique," rue Treurenberg, 46 Brussels.

specific case the application of the remedy will prove propitious. There is just now no nicer question involved than this attitude which the Church should take towards external interference (or, if the word is an offence, regulation or supervision) from the side of the State or other foreign organization. Yet the Church seems to have committed itself irrevocably to the principle that this control from without is a necessity in modern industrial life, so that the eternal perplexity of specific application to concrete cases cannot be ignored. This movement begins in demanding that the clergy shall be instructed in economic studies. The second step is the consideration of means through which a social doctrine may be taught. The final step concerns practical voluntary and legislative activity. At the last gathering of which the writer has any report, that at Saint-Quentin in September, 1895, the paper of the Abbé Roux, on the social training of the clergy, seems to have called out unanimous applause.* It is there not merely assumed, but aggressively proclaimed that direct and positive action should follow in social questions. To accept this responsibility of positive social activity that must to some extent thrust itself between employer and employed in time of strife,—to take such responsibility in countries like Germany, France, and Belgium, where the social question has come with a sort of fury into practical politics,—must inevitably bring out the points of conflict into sharp relief. So long as persuasion and "voluntarism," self-help, and charity are thought to be sufficient, no antagonism need arise between any reforming body and the employing class. Every generalized doctrine of "self-help" or *patronage* assumes an identity of interests among all classes of workers, but if two steps are taken, we emerge where the whole scene changes. Let it be once admitted that (*a*) the present economic individualism is so organically diseased that the acrid censure of the Socialist

* "Mais l'heure a sonné pour le clergé comme pour l'église d'opérer, dans tous les domaines de la vie sociale, une entrée victorieuse et complète." "Que le prêtre sorte de la sacristie,—que le prêtre aille au peuple."

"Tout le travail social s'exécute en trois parties; les études, la propagande, l'action." The Abbé Roux at the Conference at Saint-Quentin, September, 1895.

is found none too harsh to express the feeling of the clergy so that they merely adopt and repeat it, and (*b*) that such depth and magnitude of evil is beyond the healing of moral appeal, self-help, and charity, then the situation has but one logic,—recourse to compulsion, under which the diversity of economic interests spring into irritated activity. This, which is easily susceptible of theoretic demonstration, may now be seen in actual experience which removes all doubt as to the seriousness of the situation. The "left wing" at the Congresses taking, as the whole Church must, the stand-point of society, or the long run as against what the individual interprets as his immediate interest, brings into the field its list of proposed remedies: normal working-day; minimum wage or higher wage; assistance for strikes that appear to be justified; total discontinuance of Sunday work; entire elimination of married women from factories, etc. Having admitted that State action and legal compulsion may be necessary for the realization in practice of these changes, they fall at once into the area of party politics. If it were possible to compel all competitors to adopt the shorter working-time or the higher wage, many of the employers' objections would cease; but that feat, even within the smallest country, is not yet practicable. The beginnings have to be made at some place and in some specific business. This brings out the angry retort, "You are crippling me with my competitors; force them also to shorter hours, higher wage, and improved conditions." M. Harmel, from his own splendid patronal achievement, cries out, with eager sincerity, "My men do work too long; I would rejoice to have the shorter hours, but my margin of profits, as all may see, is so narrow that my competitors would at once take my business; make our Belgian and English rivals adopt the same regulations, and I will gladly comply." It is thus admitted that the larger good would be served by the lessened working-time, but M. Harmel thinks of his business interests during a future of three or four months. Unless his business has a monopolistic character or is exceptionally successful, he must take the short-run view rather than of the long run, which is the social and the Church view.

There is thus far but slight indication that the advanced party in the Church realizes in any fulness what honest defence can be made by the *average* business man against those who would introduce (wholly beyond sanitary measures) compulsory changes into his wage and time relations with his workmen. Even the compulsion of large trade guilds does not leave him free. The issue has an importance so vital and so urgent for those who would act wisely and bring the Church into no merited discredit, that further illustration should be given, not merely to show the difficulty of this more adventurous social reform, but also to show that the cry of immediate business interest cannot be allowed to set limits to industrial reforms.

Much space has been given at a score of Congresses to Sunday labor in industry. It was one of the earliest reform proposals, and one concerning which the unanimity of opinion has been most complete. It was observed that competition was forcing an ever wider and wider use of Sunday labor, with consequent injury to the family and the Church. Conservative leaders who agreed that such labor must be checked, yet believed that employers could be induced by moral suasion to discontinue a practice so unmistakably pernicious. Much encouragement was given by the speedy conversion of a number of high-minded employers. Here, however, the reform stopped. As Von Ketteler reluctantly admitted that funds for his co-operative scheme could not be won by moral entreaty to the faithful; as the Positivist remedy of "moralizing the upper classes" has been found to be a very partial and imperfect solution, so it appeared that these abuses of Sunday could scarcely be touched by moral forces alone. Experience showed that two classes of employers were beyond the reach of any voluntary influence—(1) those who recognized the evils in much of this Sunday labor, yet who felt themselves victims of a competition which compelled it; (2) the sharper and less conscienceless class eager to make every concession of their rivals an occasion of unfair advantage, as in the history of "early closing." *

* Of course many exceptions of inevitable work are seen to be necessary.

It is this palpable failure of free moral inducement to control the evils of Sunday work which has driven such numbers within the Church to turn to the State. Law, it is said, may compel the recalcitrant and introduce uniformity, so that the burden shall fall on all alike. Years ago Professor Périn prophesied * that if this principle of State help were once admitted, it would drag the Church into Socialism: "l'entraînement vers l'organisation socialiste est fatal." This was also the view, though with different reasons, of Le Play. It was the opinion of the most distinguished Catholic economist in France, the late Professor Claudio Jannet.†

It is certain that this principle of State intervention has been accepted, and must henceforth be taken with all its risks. This principle is admitted in the case of children and women. At the Catholic Congress at Breslau in 1886 ‡, appeal was made, by the sanction of the majority, for State help in regulating the hours of labor for men.

It may be said that this fairly characterizes the sentiment of the leaders in the German Congresses since this date. In the French and Belgian Congresses the discussions have roused far more violent differences of opinion. Before it became evident that the employers and corporations would organize instant and powerful resistance against State intervention, even Conservatives like Monseignor Freppel favored such control. At a gathering of *l'Œuvre des Cercles* in 1886, this influential prelate seemed to side with the Count de Mun in demanding further activity of the State for the Sunday rest and for insurance of workingmen, but in 1891 the agitation had so clearly brought out the practical bearings of such intervention upon certain great industries that he even voted against the law which extended merely to women and children. The Congress at Liége in the previous year had made it clear to all that the practical consequences of appealing to the State were momentous. It was observed that the great

---

* "Le Socialism Chrétien." † "Le Socialism d'État," ch. i.

‡ This is the residence of Cardinal Kopp, often called the successor of Von Ketteler.

remedy of the Church (corporate associations of free patronal type) gradually lost its interest as the doctrine of State help strengthened. The eloquent French parliamentarian, de Mun, the unquestioned chief of the progressives, made feebler defence of the "corporation" each year, and demanded with increasing confidence the enlarged activity of the State.

It was observable, also, that as the adequacy of *patronage* and self-help was lightly or even scornfully spoken of, so the sufficiency of charity was questioned in terms which recalled too vividly the gibes of the Socialists. Professor Périn insisted that charity is the final remedy for social ills; that mercy and good-will may meet every want. The need of a larger and a tenderer charity is not denied by the most hardy radicals in the Church, but it is strenuously denied that charity stands in any proper relation to many of the most stubborn evils with which the Church is called to deal. There is scarcely a Catholic Congress at which it is not maintained with apparent unanimity that economic conditions are so vicious as to produce unfitness, weakness, and poverty among the working-classes. Shall such victims, it is said, be held blameworthy? If not blameworthy, they should have "justice," and not charity.

At Maline, in 1892, the words of "the leading group of Catholic sociologists" are quoted with hearty favor. Society is economically "diseased, running to ruin under the wasteful influence of plutocracy." The proletariat is held to suffer "unmerited" (it is the Pope's word) misery. "We deny that drink is the chief cause, or the decay of religious faith, or the rise of Socialism. The evils spring both from the economic and moral disorders."

Wherever these views obtain as to the "cause of poverty," charity becomes intolerable as a general or final remedy. So far as society and circumstance are at fault, so far, it is urged, every victim should have "justice" and not charity. Nothing more characterizes the speeches of the progressive party than this claim that justice, not charity, should be organized for the great mass of those who suffer under "the system." The active Abbé Naudet calls his paper, *La Justice Sociale*. In his

book, "Notre Œuvre Sociale," he begins with a chapter on justice as the fundamental idea from which the Church should start. This talk of justice excited little attention until its practical implications began to appear. As the demand for State activity grew at the Congresses; as the proposals for shortened hours, regulated wage, elimination of night work, etc., grew more definite and *appeared in actual political programmes*,* this distinction between justice and charity suddenly acquired new meaning. Charity comes as a favor; it is voluntary; it seems to imply gratitude as for something not quite deserved. Justice asks no favors, does not come cap in hand, but as an equal to demand a *right*.

But more embarrassing still are the practical bearings of such "rights" when the line separating the abstract from the concrete, theory from practice, is passed. Once *apply* justice with its rights to actual cases in the programme of social reform, and it follows that under either ideal of this Church movement (*a*, large labor corporations; *b*, State interposition) compulsion is a necessity. An example is seen in the insurance of workmen against accident, sickness, and old age. This is claimed in the name of common justice, and the weight of opinion at the Congresses is for compelling such insurance, even though the State be not called in, as it is in Germany. Or is justice to require the exclusion of all married women from factories by a State law, with fixed penalty for disobedience? If opinion at the Congresses grows steadily away from mere moral exhortation, away from voluntary trade associations toward corporate and legal force, justice, as actually applied to wages and conditions of labor, will mean a series of changes against which the average employer will stubbornly fight, because those near and immediate business interests which are most vital to him will seem to be disturbed and threatened.

To this point the activity of the Congresses has brought the whole discussion upon the social question. A great many theories, principles, and phrases about labor and capital have

* The recent great extension of the suffrage in Belgium increased the anxiety.

been "discussed into clear consciousness." As these abstractions were forced into the field where definite proposals are made for their application to specific business and social conditions, the elements of conflicting interest among those concerned can no longer be concealed. The supposed interest of society, of employer, of labor, of larger future interests, and the pressing interests of business, one and all leap out for their defence. This stage of the inevitable strife has now been reached, and no page of the history which has led up to it is without proof that the economic basis of society is of almost limitless influence in determining the character and direction of reforms.

Marx, more powerfully, perhaps, than any other, has stated this doctrine, though with less clearness than Engles, to whom the meaning, in his own words, is "that view of the course of history which seeks ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the mode of production and exchange, etc." This is not merely the thought of the ablest Continental Socialists, but is continually asserting itself with great force among recent writers. It fills Professor Loria's book * on Society. It constantly appears in Professor Lamprecht's new "History of the German People." It is fundamental in the strong and skilful work which Professor Patten is doing from the side of consumption. If it is true that the material side of the problem gets from these writers much overstatement, it is even truer that their opponents have underrated the part which the strictly economic element plays in shaping and limiting those energies which seek to express themselves in reform, whether educational, political, or social. It is not merely that every bearer of heroic remedies is brought back, somewhat bruised and sobered, to a painful reckoning with the hard realities of business, but it is also true that the kind of remedy which the real powers within the Catholic Church seem more and more to sanction is a remedy which accepts the present eco-

* "Les bases économique de la Constitution Sociale," Alcan, Paris, 1893.

nomic order, with the wage system, private interest, rent, and profits. This remedy is one through which it is sought to turn the wage-earners into property-owners by making credit and small investments possible,—building and loan associations, savings and credit banks, profit-sharing and co-operation, and reforms of similar character. This all follows from the highest and most authoritative utterance upon the sacredness of private property as laid down in the Encyclical, and in such books as Professor Hollaind's "Ownership and Natural Rights," to which Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Corrigan give their most definite approval. Cardinal Gibbons, acknowledged to be a leader in the liberal interpretation of labor questions in the Church, yet speaks of the "principles which fence in the rights of private property * as a sacred trust confided to the Church by God."

One of the chief results of the long agitation within the Congresses has been to bring out the meaning of these principles as they bear upon practical issues. While this agitation has made the essential remedies—for broader distribution of property among the masses—far more definite upon the one side, it has upon the other driven the advanced party to change the emphasis and form of their demands without yielding anything essential to their radical character. The discussions bring out each year with greater distinctness, for instance, the direct difficulties of international competition. Belgian employers, in highest standing with the Church, submit elaborate evidence to show the intensity of their struggle with England in case of certain iron and textile industries employing hundreds of thousands of men. While it is known that this plea of the employer has been set up for a generation against every proposed change, the facts, in these special industries, are so convincing that they cannot be ignored. In the entire Catholic movement, moreover, the employing class has, through its co-operation and activity at the Congresses, great influence; the result is therefore to shift the centre of demand for reform onto *international* ground. As the papers and debates

* See Open Letter published in Professor Hollaind's book.

brought out the supposed difficulties of an enforced change within a given country of hours of labor, normal working-day, discontinuance of night and Sunday work, etc., the necessity of other countries adopting the same regulations grew clearer. Thus the Swiss leader, Decurtins, brought his plan of international action before the Federal Council in 1887. The dream of an international understanding upon industrial affairs is of much earlier date. Bismarck often coupled the two internationals—the black and the red; but no definite form is given to it, nor is there anything like common enthusiasm for it until its apparent necessity was brought out by the work of the Congresses. In Germany, the necessity of such larger understanding is proclaimed with much unanimity in 1885.* In 1882 the French Council of the *Œuvres des Cercles* urge the same step.† The claim is put forth anew by Kolp in Vienna, in 1890.‡ At the three National Congresses (Austria, France, and Germany), the feeling for the "international of labor" found the strongest expression.

Now, it is evident that the employer is not likely to oppose this braver enthusiasm to bring the whole world to some common action upon labor regulation. So far as it could be effected, he would doubtless accept it; but there is little evidence at the Congresses that he has the least anxiety upon this point. Better than the reformers he sees the immense obstacles to any such action *that can be enforced.* There is even evidence that this fervor for international understanding and regulation is directly encouraged as a kind of safety-valve for the more revolutionary spirits. "The more," says one employer, "they try to manage Europe the less they will interfere to manage my cotton mill."

Results thus far reached are (1) much clearing up of uncertain issues about the facts of competition as it now acts in a

* See "Jahrbuch der freien Vereinigung Katholische Socialpolitiker," 1887.

† "Association Catholique," 1888 (1).

‡ See full account of this movement in Grégoire's "Le Pape les Catholiques and La Question Sociale," pp. 221-231, Paris, 1893, and "La Question de la protection ouvrière internationale," Berne, 1889.

world market; (2) more definite knowledge about the application to business of such principles as "justice," "equity," "fair wage,"—a realization that, unless business conditions first admit of a given change, the applied "principle" is likely to prove harmful for all concerned, and therefore not just or equitable;* (3) a new sense that wherever reforms are put in practice, at least three points of view must be considered,—that of the community, that of the employer, that of the laborer; that while these interests, "as God sees them," may be identical, they are by no means in all cases identical as man sees them, that consequently much knowledge of detail is a vital prerequisite for all industrial reorganization. All this is but saying that something of the vastness, the diversity, and complexity of business interdependency has been brought out by the study and the discussion at the Congresses. Upon the negative side this is the greatest good thus far accomplished.

It would be obviously unfair to assert that no other results had been attained. Many actual social experiments of extreme value have sprung directly and indirectly from the Congresses. An educational force of the first magnitude has grown into strength through at least a thousand clubs (in the countries where Congresses have been held), composed of workingmen, boys, employers. These clubs in great variety exist because the social question exists. They are directly related through their chief activities to some phase of the social question.

But aside from these results, others of perhaps more significance are making themselves felt. Though the employer is vehement against enforced changes in his business,—changes which are to be controlled from without,—he is by no means uninfluenced by this organized pressure for reform, which speaks in the interest of some good larger than his own. Indeed, most of the employers' organizations for rais-

* It was shown, for instance, after much debate and many papers of more general character, that in certain industries the eliminating of married women would work serious injury; that no *general* proposal applied in all places and to all businesses could possibly result in good.

ing the condition of their laborers can be traced directly to this constraint of the surrounding public appealing in the name of religion, humanity, the social welfare, for a more wholesome human life among the toilers. As employers, scornful of "consumers' leagues," are yet ill at ease until their names are upon the "white list," as they will even hasten to make voluntary improvements in store and shop, so the pressure of a strong public demand leads business men to initiate other reforms within their free control which are often more fruitful of good because they are felt to be free and self-directed. This type of industrial amelioration is certain to extend under the constraining influence which acts through these Congresses upon the social question.

Nor is it unlikely that these "indirect persuasions" will prove to be the best service which the new sociological instincts within the Church can render to the cause they champion.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

NATIONAL PREJUDICES.

THE recent international courtesies at Havre probably signify little, but that little is certainly in the right direction. England and France have just now some important matters in dispute, yet their leaders can be friendly and pleasant together. It has not always been so, and it is well to notice that we do seem at last to be making some progress, though it be little, in these respects. Nations do not seem to hate each other quite so bitterly as formerly, and every year's continuance of peace enables them to know one another better and despise one another less. "Are the English as great fools as the French?" said the German Candide in his day to Martin. "C'est une autre espèce de folie," replied Martin. "Vous savez que ces deux nations sont en guerre pour quelques arpents de neige vers le Canada, et qu'elles dépensent pour cette belle guerre beaucoup plus que tout le Canada ne vaut."

Martin did not seem to think that there was much to choose between them. The English, however, he thought, were not very amiable,—"fort atrabilaires." * And when the two travellers arrived on their coast, they found them engaged in shooting Admiral Byng, as it was a habit of the Islanders "occasionally to kill an admiral in order to encourage the others." But a century has passed since then, and ignorance is not quite so dense and general.

A little time since, Lord Dufferin attended a meeting of the Franco-English Guild held in Paris, and made a genial, sympathetic speech, cordially approving the purpose with which the Guild has been founded. This purpose is to enable English and French people to know each other better through the medium of lectures, classes, and other means. He said that this was the best kind of service which could be rendered to two great nations: "half the misunderstanding and the recriminations that break out from time to time in the press of one and the other country were due to the false views of the manners, customs, feelings, and history of each of the two nations prevailing in the other." If the British minister can by his advocacy and support help forward a movement of this sort, it will be one of the most important services of his distinguished career.

For there is no doubt that the chief cause of national antipathies is ignorance. The farmer, crossing the mountain in the fog, beheld something approaching, which at first affrighted him with its monstrous appearance: as it got nearer, however, it became smaller and clearer, though certainly it resembled a wild beast. Nearer, it became more like a man,—no doubt a bandit! But step by step, as distance diminished, the terrible figure revealed itself as a quiet fellow-traveller, and finally as his own brother John. This is the kind of disillusion which most of us experience on nearer approach to persons of other nations. "That hearty contempt and aversion for all foreigners which is natural," disappears or diminishes, and we find him a human being much like the rest,

* Voltaire, "Candide," ch. xxiii.

having the same needs, passions, sympathies, sins, and sorrows as ourselves.

These international prejudices are generally unjust, and sometimes are "quite curiously the reverse of the truth." Consider, for instance, a man of the genius and knowledge of Swift writing thus:* "The greatest Inventions were produced in times of Ignorance; as the use of the Compass, Gunpowder, and Printing; and by the dullest Nation, as the *Germans*." Think of the extraordinary perversity of ignorance which could speak of the Germans as being *par excellence* the dullest of all nations! Is not the statement itself to be considered as a "great Invention in a time of Ignorance"? Partridge, in attacking Swift, would surely have been revenged for the almanac business if he had called him a German, instead of weakly accusing him merely of being "a foreigner," "a Frenchman, a papist . . .," and so forth. Again, how could the impression have ever originated which caused us to sneer at "Dutch courage," and use the terms to indicate something approaching cowardice. Whatever else we may lay to the charge of the Dutch, it seems absurd to sneer at the courage of the people who withstood the all-conquering Roman Legions; who flooded their country with blood and salt water to maintain their independence against the enormously superior power of the Spaniards; who had the hardihood to brave the might of the English in the Thames with a handful of men in De Ruyter's ships, and who joined with us under the valiant and illustrious king, whom they had bred and reared for the time of our emergency, to save all Europe from the ambitious lust of Louis XIV. The typical idea which the mass of the ignorant in continental countries hold of John Bull, we trust we can say is also not only untrue, but the reverse of truth. The brutal and blundering John Bull of old time who scattered his guineas about has been supplanted by the representation of a treacherous, grasping, fat old man, with rabbit-teeth, who makes himself by his hypocrisy the Pharisee of the nations in order that he may

* Miscel. I., 259.

mask the evil deeds of "perfidious Albion." We find many of the things foreigners say of ourselves very unpleasant. We think them grossly unjust, based on solid ignorance; and we are grateful to those among them who give us a better character because they know us better. We can submit to a few rebukes from men like Lemoinne, Max O'Rell, and Jules Simon when we see that their criticisms are on the whole fair and kindly.

But if foreigners have been mistaken in their representation of us, let us admit the possibility that we may have been also mistaken as to them. And, in fact, we have made a little —though not much—progress since Swift's time in these matters. The genial spirit of his countryman Sterne has not been without its effect. His advice to Smelfungus* (Smollett), who had been travelling over the Continent and saw everything in a jaundiced light, cannot be too frequently quoted. Smelfungus had found everything miserable, all barren from Dan to Beersheba. "I'll tell it," he cried, "to the world!" Sterne counselled him to tell it to his physician.

The events of the French Revolution, however, threw us back a century in this respect. Poor France! It was bad enough for her to have a trouble of that sort on her hands, without having all the other nations on her back, with their hands in her hair (to use Petrarch's figure concerning Italy). No wonder she went mad for a time. Why didn't they let her alone to settle her own affairs? Napoleon would have died an artillery officer; Trafalgar and Waterloo had never been fought. A flood of international rage and hatred broke loose. Even the broad and capacious mind of Burke is tinged with its stain, though in his bitterest reproach he spoke of the French as "a nation of gallant men, a nation of men of honor and of cavaliers." But few were as temperate as that. Coleridge's abuse of foreigners was pretty general. The Germans, indeed, he knew something of, and therefore he is not so hard on them; but a German never was wholly in the

* "Sentimental Journey."

right; he had "never met a German clergyman who was a Christian."* The Russians, however, were "brutal." The Dutch were "animals," and very dirty. The Belgians, "as impudent as they were iniquitous," consisted of "four million restive asses."† But all this was a mild form of adverse criticism compared with his perpetual abuse of that "shallow-hearted people," the French. In a phrase as brilliant as it is malevolent, he says, "Frenchmen are like grains of gunpowder: each by itself smutty and contemptible, but mass them together and they are terrible, indeed!"‡ Coleridge, however, was far ahead of his contemporaries in appreciation of the progress of the Americans and the difficulties which such a young country, with an immense surface to be guarded, has to surmount; and he deplores the unfriendly and unfair way in which English writers attacked them.

A little farther back, *la bête noire* was America. Dr. Campbell asserts that Dr. Johnson said of the Americans in 1769, "Sir, they are a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging."§ He is pretty strong against foreigners in general. "What do you expect, dear sir," he says of the French, "from fellows that eat frogs?"‖ Scotland "was a vile country, to be sure," and when asked mildly whether, after all, God had not made it, he replies, "Certainly He did; but we must always remember that He made it for Scotchmen; and comparisons are odious, Mr. Strahan, but God made Hell."¶ In his calmer moments, though, Johnson expressed himself less uncharitably. He scouted the idea of nations having any fixed peculiar characteristics. "There is no permanent national character," he said; "it varies according to circumstances. Alexander the Great swept India; now the Turks sweep Greece."** Then he goes on to say some things more appreciative of the French: though not the highest in any department of literature, yet in every department they were very high. He was

---

* "Table Talk," 128. † Idem. ‡ Idem.
§ Montagu, "Johnsoniana," 34. ‖ Idem, 313. ¶ Idem, 297.
** Idem, 59.

"willing" (when in these moods) "to love all mankind, *except an American.*" Of the Irish he usually spoke with a kind feeling and appreciation, very exceptional for those times,—or till a century later. "He had great compassion," says the writer quoted, "for the miseries and distresses of the Irish nation, particularly the Papists; and severely reprobated the barbarous, debilitating policy of the British government (of that time), which, he said, was the most detestable mode of persecution." *

In a treatise by the German writer, Georg Ludwig Kriegk, entitled "Schriften zur allgemeinen Erdkunde," there is a good deal of information as to local and national contempts and hatreds. Each country has its *bête noire* among the others, which changes as time goes on; and each country has within its own boundary usually some province of which it makes a butt for its not very good-natured jokes and witticisms. Thus in Italy it is the Lombards; in France, the Gascons; in Austria, the Magyars, who have the misfortune to be the subject of the nation's jests. In Belgium it is Mecheln at which people laugh; in Holstein, Büsum; in Prussia, Schildau (but I think in Germany generally Saxony seems to be the butt). Honest John Bull has always a good many people on hand for butts. He is "blunt," and says out what he thinks. He calls the Hindoos, of whom he governs hundreds of millions, "black men," and that settles their business. He is quick to detect the blemishes of his brother Scots or Irish, and makes a good many jokes of more or less good taste on what he supposes to be their peculiarities; but why should he invent the proverb that "Taffy was a thief"? Was it because he himself took little Taffy's country from him by promising he should have a Welsh-born prince to reign over him, then bringing his own wife into Wales to be *accouchée* of a son in order to give him the rule? Yet John might, and perhaps sometimes does, recollect that Welshman, Scotchman, Irishman, and Hindoo have all contributed to the glory of his magnificent empire.

---

* Montagu, "Johnsoniana," 227.

The learned Kriegk, however, does not confine himself to these countries in regard to this subject. Why should he? All the world is before him. And when all the world is before the German professor, he usually proceeds very deliberately—*ohne Hast, aber ohne Rast*—to amble in a gentle, elephantine manner through it. He likes to exhaust his subject; and if, in doing this, he exhausts his reader as well, so much the worse for the reader. *Festina lente.* "Hurry is Sheitan," say the Turks.

Thus Kriegk gives us a catalogue of *die geographischen Spitznamen und Spöttereien* used in lands many and various, *pays différents, mœurs différentes;* but it is to be feared that we are all rather badly mannered in the way we use nicknames. We do not give ourselves the trouble to think that, as the Hindoos say, contempt pierces the shell of a tortoise. With the Greeks every foreigner was a barbarian, which name was innocent enough at first, but soon changed into a term of disparagement and contempt, precisely as our word "outlandish" has come to signify everything ridiculous and clownish, though it originally merely meant "foreign," in the innocent sense in which the Germans still use the word (*ausländisch*), and the Dutch, *uitheemsch.* Thus the term by which the Chinese express their hatred and contempt of the foreigner is *Tatse;* the Hindoo, *Yavanna;* as Christendom has stamped the words "pagan" and "heathen" to describe all outside, so to the Jews all other peoples are *Gojim;* though the sacred books of both Christian and Jew give no countenance to such parochial patriotism. The law-giver of the Jews commanded that mercy and courtesy should be shown to the stranger within their gates; whilst their prophets looked forward to a time when all nations should be blessed out of Zion; and the Christian Apostles foretold the assembling of all kindreds and peoples under the celestial benediction of the Most High.

Whether we listen to Science or Revelation, the statement is the same; that "God hath made of one blood all nations;" that human nature is essentially the same everywhere, though local circumstances and conditions doubtless tend to modify,

develop, or distort it. Is it not time that we began to hate and injure one another less and appreciate one another more, to spend more of our time in seeking to assuage the unavoidable miseries of mankind, and less of it in fostering and stimulating national antipathies, and in designing new weapons of slaughter and destruction? Nations can no longer excuse themselves by saying that they are led into wars by "sovereigns and statesmen." The will of the people is now so strong that sovereigns and statesmen cannot act independently of it. Therefore is the necessity the greater that true information and candid interpretation as to our brethren of other nationalities should be diffused among us. How long, for example, have the Russians and their ruler been held up to our execration as having incessant designs upon our existence, yet recently we heard Lord Dufferin, who is the highest diplomatic authority on the subject now living, speaking thus: "Many publicists held the opinion that the contingency of peace and war depended mainly on the czar.* If this were the case, the peace of Europe was in safe hands, for each day gave fresh evidence of that sovereign's wisdom, moderation, and peaceful intentions." Lord Dufferin had long known him to possess these admirable qualities. He remembered at a public dinner, shortly before he started for India, that he ventured to express his admiration for the character of his Imperial Majesty: "In some quarters considerable dismay was felt that a person so manifestly under the spell of Russia as himself should be sent to safeguard British interests in Hindostan."

The result, however, fully justified his predictions, based on his knowledge of the emperor's character. On his return he was able triumphantly to point out that not only had the attitude of Russia on the Indian frontier been correct and friendly, but that during the formidable crisis of Isak Khan's rebellion against the Ameer of Afghanistan the czar displayed his accustomed magnanimity and high sense of honor. If Russia had chosen, she could then have done England some

* The late czar.

mischief. He then spoke some graceful and appreciative words of the French expressions of sympathy when the catastrophe to the battleship "Victoria" occurred, and of English expressions of sympathy when the gallant MacMahon died. He would spare no pains, he said, in his official capacity to promote good understanding. He had reason to be grateful for the courtesy, good-will, and conciliatory spirit of those with whom he had to transact important business.* No wonder that both the French and the Russians have expressed wide-spread pleasure and satisfaction at the speech. The old definition given by Wotton was "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth." Is not the time come when we can remove the emphasis from the word "lie" to the word "honest"?

And is not the time coming when, instead of fastening our attention on the faults peculiar to the different nations, we can find satisfaction in the recognition of some good characteristic? Enlightened men abroad no longer use the word "perfidious" to characterize Albion. We do not care much for their calling us a nation of shop-keepers, nor do we mind their retention of Froissart's expression, "Ils s'amusent tristement selon la contume de leur pays." We hope the times of furious invective of men like Félix Pyat are going by, and recognize with pleasure and gratitude the generous eulogy of a noted French publicist recently on our administration in Egypt. But even if we do not find ourselves judged justly by foreigners, let us set them an example in this,—as we may say with satisfaction we have given them examples in some other respects,—that we are willing to acknowledge the truth wherever we find it, and to confess the insufficiency of the creed we used to hold,—that all foreigners were "Mossoos," and that all Mossoos perpetually perpetrate evil deeds, eat frogs, and talk jargon, it being their nature to do so through their having been constructed in a peculiar manner from a cross-breed of monkey and tiger. We are getting to distinguish, too, a little. They are not all the same, though there

* Speech of Lord Dufferin to British Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

is a good deal of human nature everywhere. If they have each peculiar failings, they have each some peculiar features that are worthy of our observation, sometimes of our admiration.

Not only may we appreciate the inventive power and enterprise of the Americans, the brilliant intellect and dashing courage of the French, the sterling valor and plodding industry of the Germans, but in those nations whom we have been inclined to be most bitter against, or most contemptuous towards, may we find something favorable. The stolid patience and loyalty of the Russians in their terrible sufferings from war, famine, and pestilence during the last sixteen years is a stupendous fact, hate them as we may. The passive courage with which the Asiatic or American Indian will calmly submit to the most horrible tortures is equal to what we know of any ancient Stoic of them all. We may be mistaken in saying that a whole people, even the inarticulate Terra del Fuegans, can produce nothing good. A recent writer was hoping that this race would soon disappear from the earth. But, as Swift's madman said to the soldier who told him that his sword was to kill people with, "Leave them alone, and they'll die of themselves." These Terra del Fuegans, it seems, are a horrible people: a husband crouched over a fire in a boat under a snow-storm, while the wife, entirely unclad, was rowing the boat, and at the same time suckling a baby which she sought to protect from the piercing wind with her own body. Well, so long as there are women among them who could, under such terrible conditions, show the beautiful attributes of maternal love and solicitude, I think we may let them "die of themselves." I am not sure but that there are some highly respectable mothers in Belgravia or the Faubourg Saint-Germain who might learn something from that poor "savage."

The Greeks scoffed at the ignorance and stupidity of the inhabitants of Bœotia, yet out of it came Hesiod, Pindar, and Plutarch. The devout and honorable Nathaniel said, "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" yet out of it came that magnanimous philosopher who sent forth his Mes-

sage of all-comprehending charity impartially to every nation on the earth.

JOHN CODE BAYLY.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS.

"IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?"

In the last number of this JOURNAL, Professor James, in his delightful, mettlesome style, undertook to deal with this question. Instead, however, of treating it in a universal, impersonal way, and seeking to make an answer emerge from an exhaustive discussion of the import of life, as it reveals itself in man, and of worth, as an attribute of such life, he has preferred to suppose the question put by a person in a certain pathological condition,—"a fellow mortal who is on such terms with life that the only comfort left him is to brood on the assurance, 'you may end it when you will.' What reasons," he continues, "can we plead that may render such a brother (or sister) willing to take up the burden again?" (pp. 5, 6.) In other words, what cure can we find for that "religious disease" (p. 7) called pessimism, that "definition of the world" (p. 22) which leads a man to the brink of suicide? To the question, so formulated, the answer naturally comes in pathological terms, and in such Professor James has answered it.

The answer seems to amount to this: If your patient is not past power of reflection (if he is, he is hopeless), there are two possible cures for him. Either (1) through the rousing of certain pathological conditions, pride, hatred, etc., inducive of absorbing activity, "the longing to read the facts religiously may cease, and leave the bare facts by themselves; or (2) supplementary facts may be discovered * or believed in which permit the religious reading to go on" (p. 8). In other words, you may either cause your patient to desist from reflection on life, as a whole, altogether, or

* The possibility of cure through the *discovery* of supplementary facts Professor James here alludes to, but in the sequel entirely ignores, and I shall do the same. Of course, the discovery of facts that would justify or compel a hopeful, optimistic interpretation of the world and life would lead to a perfectly rational, instead of a pathological, cure; but such a cure Professor James, so far as I can see, does not consider possible (pp. 21–24).

you may by beliefs so transform the world, as he knows it, as to make him interpret it in an optimistic sense. If we ask how these beliefs are to be imparted to him, the answer is: By making him realize that while "our Science is a drop, our ignorance is a sea" (p. 17), and encouraging him to conceive that in the oceanic unknown there may be isles of bliss whose delights would more than outweigh any amount of suffering here. And this conception may even be rendered plausible by certain analogies, which "vividly suggest" to us "that our whole physical life may lie soaking in a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for apprehending" (p. 20). Having thus transferred confidence from the little garden of Science to the boundless domain of Nescience, you can say to your patient: "Now take any of the *maybes* of Nescience you please as realities, struggle to reach them as if they were such, and you *may* (who knows?) find that your very struggle has actually made them such." Thus it seems that the best cure to be found for pathological pessimism is a hopeful agnosticism, and a hypostatic faith (see Hebrews, xi. 1) in the objects of hope. In other words, when men find it impossible to live by the grace of Love for the world that they do know, you may save them from suicide by inducing the graces of Hope and Faith in the world that they do not know. The only difference between this and the old-fashioned Christian cure seems to be that a harmless bread-crumb pill has been substituted for a drastic physic compounded of heaven and hell. But this is certainly a great advantage, although, until the new cure has been extensively tried, we may be unable to say whether it is as effective as the old.

However this may be, I should not dream of disputing with so distinguished a psychologist as Professor James on the efficacy of cures for religious diseases, or any other pathological degeneracies. I am entirely willing to believe that his proposed remedies will accomplish all he claims for them—under the given conditions. It is, therefore, not because I have any quarrel with him that I now write, but because I think that the question which he has treated as a pathological one, and therefore answered by *argumenta ad hominem pathologicum*, may be treated as a philosophical one and answered in terms carrying conviction to the normal, rational man. There seems to be some danger that, when the question of the worth of life is put in universal form by a man of genius, a member of the philosophic faculty in our oldest university, and then receives only a pathological answer, many persons will unwarily conclude

that this is the only sort of answer that can be given, and that all our warrant for leading a noble life, or indeed a life at all, comes from the dim, chaotic *maybes* of the formless unknown. Now, such a conclusion—namely, that life, as a whole, is a mere speculation, a mere game of hazard, in which, no matter how well you play, you are as likely to lose as to win—cannot, in my opinion, fail to be injurious, especially to reflective young men, such as those for whom Professor James's paper was originally written. This is all the more true that the hazard involved is of no ordinary kind. People who play games of hazard nearly always know that, however many lose, *some* are certain to win—that winning is possible; but in the hazard-game of life, even according to Professor James himself, it is not certain that anybody has ever won, or will, or can win. I have accordingly accepted the invitation of the Managing Editor of this JOURNAL to say a few words on the other side, that is, in favor of a conviction of the *infinite* worth of life, based upon rational science.

It seems to me that the reason why Professor James is compelled to seek the warrant for the worth of life in the "grand pentêtre" of the unknown, is that he limits the domain of the known and (with our present faculties) knowable to the region of physics. This comes out clearly in a passage already quoted, which identifies a "spiritual atmosphere" in which "our whole physical life may lie soaking" with a "dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for comprehending." (The metaphors here being a little mixed and material, I am not sure that I completely understand them.) This is the reason why he finds that "the order of Nature, taken simply as science knows it, cannot be held to reveal any harmonious spiritual intent. It is mere *weather* . . . doing and undoing without end" (p. 16). Accordingly, he casts the god of Nature, along with the god of Hebrew revelation, into a common limbo of obsoleteness.

Now, one might perhaps contend that even the weather reveals an harmonious spiritual intent, in that it contributes to the development of spiritual beings by supplying their bodies with food, while it is somewhat difficult to conceive how any one believing in the doctrine of evolution, as Professor James may be presumed to do, can altogether deny the presence of an harmonious spiritual intent in Nature—intent being taken to mean immanent teleology (*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*), and not conscious purpose distinct from execution. But, letting this pass, may we not fairly ask why he confines the

term Nature to physical phenomena, and excludes from it the whole of man's spiritual nature? Is it not possible that in the latter might be found a rational and, therefore, universal answer to the question touching the worth of life? Indeed, since the worth of life means its worth for the bearer of that life, can we deal with the question at all intelligently without a clear understanding of the nature of that bearer? If the bearer of life be essentially transient and unprogressive, life will have one kind of worth; if he be eternal and progressive, it will have another and far higher kind.

Now, I am forced to believe that any one who, without prepossessions and in the light of modern philosophy and psychology, studies the nature of the human spirit, will discover that it is essentially eternal and progressive; that only an eternal being, a being standing above time, space, and causality, can think at all, and that physical nature, which, when regarded as something standing for itself, "reveals no spiritual intent," is dependent for its very existence on the activity of spirit,—is a mere manifestation of spirit. It is needless to say that I cannot here offer a demonstration of these truths,—that would require a treatise,—but I can safely say to every inquirer regarding the worth of life: Before you conclude that the warrant for a noble life can be found only in the domain of Nescience, and therefore is pathological in character, be sure that you have exhausted the domain of Science, and especially that portion of it which treats of the nature of the bearer of the life in question,—that is, of the intelligent spirit. If any one should contend that such science is "mere metaphysics," and therefore "unverifiable" and "unscientific," one may admit the premise and yet deny the validity of the conclusion. As Professor James has so ingenuously admitted in his delightful work on psychology, metaphysics is only correct thinking. The truth is, metaphysics, as the science of the necessary conditions of thought and knowledge, is not only the most scientific and verifiable of sciences, being directly self-verifying, but is also the guarantee of the truth of all other sciences. Hence the science which lies at the basis of all others is the very same that demonstrates to us that the essential condition of all science is a being standing above time, space, and causality. In other words, the eternity of spirit is the condition of science.

If it be maintained that metaphysics demonstrates the existence of only one such spirit—God—of whom human spirits are mere transient creations or manifestations, depending for existence upon

his "grace," the reply is that such contention rests upon a Hebrew myth involving a materialistic notion of spirit as an effect due to a cause, and that, in order to account for obvious facts of an intellectual and moral sort, spirit must be eternally one and many, the many as real as the one. Spirit which should be merely one would not be spirit at all, since there could be no relations and no truth for it; whereas "created spirit" is a contradiction in terms, creation being an act in time, while spirit is above time.

If what has been said be true, then we may not only conjecture that "our whole physical life *may* lie soaking in a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for apprehending," but we may say with absolute certainty that physical life is but the manifestation of spirit, and that we know the spiritual "dimension of Being" better than any other, since it is the essential condition of all knowledge whatsoever. To those who clearly see this, the question whether life is worth living can never present itself except as a purely theoretical one, to which only one answer is possible. Indeed, since life is the condition of there being any worth at all, the question is equivalent to asking: Has the essential and constituent condition of all worth itself any worth?

In conclusion, let me say again that, in these brief remarks, I do not claim to have demonstrated the eternity of spirit and consequent infinite worth of life. Far from it! I have merely wished to point out the direction in which a universal answer to the question proposed may be found, and a way opened out of that agnosticism, hopeful or hopeless, which must always be the creed of those who cannot recognize that they themselves are the "spiritual atmosphere" in which "physical life lies soaking."*

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

PROFESSOR JAMES ON "NATURE."

I HOPE that the ethical experts, with the large-mindedness which their science develops, will pardon what may be a mere misunderstanding in this protest from a biologist in regard to some remarks on "Nature," in Professor James's beautiful article, "Is Life worth Living" (October number, pp. 1–24).

* For a further development of views similar to mine, see Professor Howison's recent address on "The Conception of God," before the Philosophical Union of the University of California.

The remarks, which I shall immediately specify, would not have surprised me if uttered by an orthodox Darwinian, but they did surprise me from the famous psychologist of Harvard, who has had, I believe, a biological education, and whom one would have expected to find free from what appear to me the prejudices of the schools. His remarks form part of a suggested argument to the effect that Natural Religion is hopelessly bankrupt,—a conclusion, which, though repugnant to myself, is not likely to excite many biologists. But when the Professor proceeds to say that visible nature is "all plasticity and indifference,"—"a multiverse, not a universe,"—"a harlot,"—and "mere weather," and so on, I cannot refrain, though it seems rather grotesque to stand as apologist for Nature, from denying the libel.

For *plasticity*, I should read order; for *indifference*, "selective synthesis;" for *multiverse*, a progressive cosmos, and delete the "not;" for *harlot*, mother; for *weather*, evolution. But then, as he says, "the good-will of the men of science exceeds their perspicacity."

But is not the biggest fact in Nature the cumulative progress of things—by differentiation and integration—from simple to complex, from carbon atoms to diamond, from aggregate to integrate, from Protozoa to Man. He, the first really to awaken to the drama of evolution, has, quaintly enough, become suspicious that it is an immoral spectacle.

The orderly progress is plain both in individual development and in the history of a race. We see the crystal arising out of a solution, with an apparent breach of continuity, but forming itself definitely, a product of "selective synthesis," in Lloyd Morgan's phrase, becoming an orderly, beautiful integrate. We see the germ-cell divide and redivide, in definite, orderly, often rhythmic fashion, until it becomes such a perfected integrate as a butterfly or a bird. We have, from American biologists alone, sufficient evidence to show that organic variations have often been quite definite, sufficient evidence to lead us to disbelieve that the phrase, "a chapter of accidents," used by some, is an adequate expression of evolution. And we know, above all, the long result of time, the world-becoming, the ascent of life. In this progress each step is beautiful, the metakinetic is more and more expressed, mind grows over matter, and the primeval altruism, of which the non-sentimental Spencer speaks, rises gradually to greater prominence, moderating egoism, and is itself originative.

If it be said that organic progress is wholly the result of the natural selection of fortuitous variations in the struggle for existence, I should answer (1) that this interpretation has many limitations and difficulties; (2) that a *secondary* or directive factor, such as natural elimination in the struggle for existence is, must not be spoken of as if it were a *primary* or originative factor, nor magnified into a formula for Nature's sole method of progress; (3) that the struggle for existence is a function of numerous variables, and is often better described as an endeavor after well-being on the part of kin-bound, socially-bound creatures, whose egoism is not satisfied until it becomes altruistic.

There has been a great discussion of late, in this JOURNAL and elsewhere, in regard to the relation of the ethical process to the cosmic process, but in this discussion what has impressed me most has been the trustful manner in which so many have assumed that our lost leader said the last word on what the cosmic process really is. Now Professor Huxley's view of Nature, as expressed, for instance, in his essay, "The Struggle for Existence—a programme," and in his Romanes Lecture, was Darwin's, without the grace of Darwin's saving-clauses; and Darwin's view was, or was greatly modified by, an unconscious projection upon Nature of a generalization induced by the competitive conditions of the industrial age, as Geddes has pointed out. I yield to none in reverence for the master, but I agree with the few heretics who believe that his picture was too red in its color. The copies certainly are. Hate and death are the universally accredited factors; to insist on love and life is "bio-optimism," "sentimentalism," or imposture. But it would be difficult to prove Herbert Spencer guilty of these vices, and it is long since he stated the case for altruism in Nature. Fiske, Geddes, Kropotkine, Drummond, and others have corroborated Spencer's position.* At any rate, when "our science is a drop, and our ignorance a sea," as Professor James says, one would think there is room for legitimate doubt as to whether the cosmic process has yet been adequately appreciated.

But, granting *disease* (especially when man interferes), *ugliness* (only when man causes molecular discord, or in relatively rare monstrosities), *cruelty* (our estimate of which is apt to be unduly anthropomorphic and Pharisaical), *parasitism* (not nearly so loathsome as

* Since this protest was written, I have tried to state the case briefly in *Natural Science*, December, 1895.

among men), occasional *internecine struggle* (much oftener assumed than observed), and so on,—all the seamy side,—I, though with no temperamental optimism, cannot help being most impressed by the definiteness, the selectiveness, the order, the beauty, the progressiveness of Nature. I see no harlot, but the mother of us all.

J. Arthur Thomson.

Zoological Laboratory, School of Medicine
of the Royal Colleges, Edinburgh.

The Meaning and Origin of Societies.—Notes of some Recent Sociological Discussion.

Having been recently engaged in certain fundamental political inquiries, and having found myself conducted to the conception of a number of men making up a unity or whole, a social body or society, as a prerequisite of political formations,—a conception the investigation of which, however, might be said to belong to sociology rather than to specific political science,—I have looked with interest upon whatever treatment of the subject I might find in such recent sociological literature as I was able to get hold of.

I.

As it happens, some valuable discussion has been going on as to what is (or, shall we say? shall be) the precise meaning of sociology.* Involved in this question and, I should suppose, lying at the root of it, is the question as to what "society" itself means. For it goes without saying, I imagine, that sociology is the science of society,—this whatever its more exact definition, whatever methods it is to pursue, or whatever be its final purpose. But what is society? In one sense the answer can only come at the end of extended special investigation. But in another sense we must have a notion of what the word means before we can even know what we are to investigate. We must have some idea, however general, associated with a word before we can profitably use it at all. It does not help matters much that we are all using the word, when we may mean different things by it. I trust that it may be of interest to others, as it has surely been to me, to learn something

* If any one wishes to see what need there is of discussion of this sort before any edifying use of the term can be made, he should read the jumble of opinions gathered into an article, "What is Sociology?" in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, July, 1895. Unhappily, the editor, at whose solicitation the opinions were given and who comments at length upon them, seems to be more or less confused himself.

of the sense in which a few recent sociological writers use this fundamental term of their science.

I have remarked on the vagueness with which the authors of "An Introduction to the Study of Society" use the word in a review of their work elsewhere in this JOURNAL. Once they tell us, "Society is a complex of activities and movements originated by the energy of those physical and psychical attributes which determine human motives" (p. 55), though this is hardly meant as a definition. Again they say, "The reactions which result from voluntary or involuntary *contact** of human beings with other human beings are the phenomena peculiarly social as distinguished from the phenomena belonging properly to Biology and Psychology" (p. 60). But "contact" is still rather a vague word, as the authors seem themselves to feel. More definitely they go on to say,—

> "There remain unique classes of social facts which we may distinguish, in general, as facts of co-operation. When men find themselves in proximity to other men, they instinctively attempt to adjust themselves to necessities or advantages which the association involves or permits. *The activities properly called social* may be said to consist of acquiescence in the requirements of physical and psychical contact between human beings, and appropriation of the opportunities of such contact between human beings. In calling attention specifically to *man as a co-operating animal*, the reference is to those social facts which arise when men begin to take conscious account of each other, *in attack and defense*, purchase and sale, *mastery and obedience*, emulation, rivalry, organization, authority, persuasion, *assent and dissent*, with all further relations involving volitional combinations of man and man" (p. 61).

An advance is made here, but there is still apparently some confusion. "Co-operation" is plain, and would seem to come very near what we ordinarily have in mind when we speak of one being standing to another in a *social* relation. But what sort of co-operation is that in which beings attack one another or defend themselves against one another, or in which one masters others and compels them to obey him without regard to their own good? These are indeed phenomena of contact, but are they of social contact? We should hardly speak of man-eating apes as making a society with their victims, though they were in unquestionable contact with them; and I see not how the phenomenon becomes any more social when it is between beings of the same kind,—

---

* The italics in these notes are mine, save where otherwise indicated.

that is, when both are, for example, human beings. Cannibalism may properly be examined as a primitive custom, but it would be rather grim to characterize it as a *social* phenomenon.

The authors of "An Introduction to the Study of Society" appear to have a sense of the inadequacy of these definitions (or descriptions); in any case, they at least imply in other passages much clearer and more definite notions. For example, social aggregates (as distinguished from organs) are described as being "held together in certain relations by various *bonds of common interest*" (p. 203). The positive problem of social welfare is thus formulated: "How shall the society of competent and willing men cooperate to the largest individual and social advantage?" (p. 80) and a perfect society is by implication regarded as a "fellowship of reciprocally helpful co operation" (p. 82). In such suggestions a tolerably definite conception of social phenomena as phenomena of co-operation and mutual help seems to be contained. The authors once make a noble statement of this social idea: "The proper task of society . . . is such perfection of social fellowship that each individual capable of a social service shall contribute that service to social welfare, and in return shall have the amplest assistance from society in the realization of his manhood" (p. 79).

It is gratifying to find two such distinguished thinkers as Professor S. N. Patten and Professor F. H. Giddings agreeing substantially in a conception of the meaning of "social" similar to that just mentioned. In speaking of what I may call the looser and stricter senses of the word "sociology," Professor Patten says,—

> "In the one sense, sociology treats of the phenomena due to the occupation of a common environment by several individuals,—the phenomena of mere contact in a physical environment. In the other sense, sociology treats of the phenomena resulting from certain subjective feelings which bind men together. In the first sense, hostile men or a beast and its prey are parts of one society and 'associate' with one another. In the second sense, only friendly bonds create a society. It is a relation existing between a number of similar beings united for common ends. The one is the phenomena of hostile contact, the other that of friendly contact. Professor Giddings calls both these classes of phenomena 'social,' and treats them as though they were co-ordinate phenomena belonging to one science. Evolution of 'the good old way' of survival through conflict is grouped together with that secured through such bonds as those which bind a mother to her child." *

---

* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1895, p. 118.

Though he does not say so, it is evident here, and is indicated in so many words elsewhere, that the phenomena of "friendly contact," of "union," of co-operation are, in Professor Patten's judgment, those which are properly called "social," and that it is only they that give rise to "a true society." Professor Giddings alleges that Professor Patten misunderstands him in the above quotation, and, on the point now under consideration, he reaffirms Professor Patten's essential conception. His words are:

"Dr. Patten is mistaken in thinking that I would call the hostile contact of a beast and its prey 'association,' or regard creatures of different species as parts of one society, or group such phenomena together with the bonds that unite the mother to her child; and it is this misapprehension which leads him to say that my thoughts would give to the words 'social' and 'association' 'a new meaning opposed to all usage,' and so 'confuse two concepts which must be kept distinct.' I have never thought or spoken of mere physical contact, hostile or friendly, as constituting association or a society. It is association *if*, and *only if, accompanied by a consciousness on the part of each of the creatures implicated that the creatures with which it comes in contact are like itself.* This consciousness of kind is the elementary, the genuine social fact; it is sympathy, fellow-feeling in the literal as distinguished from the popular sense of the word." * (The italics here are Professor Giddings'.)

On the other hand, I find Dr. G. Simmel, in a notable article on "The Problem of Sociology," contributed to the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale* for September, 1894, somewhat uncertain in his conceptions on the subject. Dr. Simmel holds that sociology should include in its consideration all the forms of relation between men,—not only associations in the strict sense (in the sense of co-operation and harmonious unification), but also combat and competition ("la lutte et la concurrence"), since these, too, establish, or rather are, relations, reciprocal reactions, and show, despite the difference in cases, a likeness of forms and evolutions (p. 502, n). At the same time he says that sociology properly so-called studies "exclusively that which is specifically social, the form and the forms of association as such" (p. 499). Moreover, he speaks of "the particular causes and ends without which naturally there is no association" (p. 499), apparently suggesting thereby the idea of common interests. What sort of an association can be said to be constituted by combat? Combat is indeed a case of

* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1895, p. 98.

"reciprocal reaction," but what does this show save that "reciprocal reaction" is altogether too vague to serve as a mark of distinctively social phenomena? One may quite sympathize with the drift of Dr. Simmel's remarks (namely, that sociology, if it is to be a special science and not an *omnium gatherum* of information about society in general, must isolate the distinctively social in human phenomena, study the form of association as such, leaving the contents to be treated by the special historical and material sciences,* and even restrict itself to what *comes about by society*, as distinguished from what *merely happens in society*), and yet feel a lack of precision in his manner of dealing with this fundamental conception.

But, after all, it may be said, the phenomena of hostility, combat, and war surely belong to human society, and in this way must come within the scope of a sociology which is the science of society. "Human society," however, in the sense just used is too vague a thing to serve as the subject-matter of a new and distinct science. Society, so far as it lends itself to treatment by such a science, must be understood as equivalent to societ*ies* (or as an abstract term for what they have in common). It means families, tribes, clans, communities, nations, or the general type of social relationship exemplified by them. Sociology may, of course, consider the phenomena of combat and war as taking place *between* societies, and as having great and perhaps decisive effect upon the fortunes of societies, but not as themselves social phenomena. In the same way it may consider combat between individuals in the same society, and may trace its effects in weakening or perhaps undoing the societies, but cannot class it as itself a *social* fact. Professor Small attempts to meet the difficulty by inventing a new word, "societary," which shall cover what we may call the unsocial phenomena among men, as well as the contrasted phenomena. He says, "Whether we assume or not that sympathetic feelings are characteristic of societies as such, we have to deal with societies in conditions in which the spirit of hostility is more demonstrative than the spirit of co-operation. We obviously

---

* *Cf.* the drift of Professor Giddings's language: "Sociology therefore may be defined as the science of social elements and first principles. It is not the inclusive, but the fundamental social science. It is not the sum of the social sciences, but the groundwork, in which they find a common basis."—"The Theory of Sociology," p. 18.

need, then, a word plainly appropriate to the phenomena of societies as such without prejudgment of the content or quality of the phenomena. We have the word already made. Whatever is *of or pertaining to society* is "societary." * (Italics are Professor Small's.) But he forgets that, so far as societies have more of the spirit of hostility in them than of the spirit of co-operation, they are to this extent not really societies, but simply individuals juxtaposed. To speak of "the phenomena of *societies as such*, without prejudgment of the content or quality of the phenomena," is to admit that mere juxtaposition constitutes society, and thus to empty the word of any distinctive significance. Why, I may ask, is it not enough to consider the phenomena of hostility (so far as they are between individuals in the same society) as simply marks of the imperfection of the development of the society, or (so far as the conflict is between societies) as simply indicative of the failure as yet of the several societies to become component and co-operative parts of the one greater society, which shall include the human race? In this way it is equally possible to take account of the facts and yet not to introduce confusion into our fundamental ideas.†

II.

Another interesting subject of speculation in some of the articles above referred to is as to the forces that ultimately produce social phenomena. On this point, Professor Patten and Professor Giddings (in the course of an argument as to the logical priority of economics and sociology, which of itself need not detain us) appear to take somewhat different views. Professor Patten says,—

"The social feelings are but a developed type of a large class of feelings due to the love of means by which ends are attained. The hunter loves his dog

* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1895, pp. 123–4. Professor Small, in speaking of the discussion between Professor Patten and Professor Giddings already referred to, appears to be mistaken in saying that "Professor Giddings is attempting to vindicate the claims of a science which deals with phenomena embracing all the variations of hostility as well as of fraternity" (p. 121). *Vide supra.*

† *Cf.* Carlyle's language: "We call it a society, and go about proposing openly the totalest separation and isolation. Our life is not a mutual helpfulness; but rather, cloaked under due laws-of-war, named competition and so forth, it is a mutual hostility." Here there is no confusion between the facts and the idea,—this, whether the facts are somewhat one-sidedly stated or not.

and gun, the herder his cattle, the mechanic his tools, the farmer his lands, the merchant his business, and the lawyer his profession. Animals love their master or the persons who feed them; they even have an affection for the place and time which are associated in their minds with the presence of those on whom they depend. There is therefore nothing peculiar about the rise of social feelings as soon as beings are placed in a position where they must resort to indirect methods to satisfy their wants." *

In a similar way, Mr. Herbert Spencer sees men leaving the state of nature and submitting to political subordination "through experience of the increased satisfaction derived under it." † Society, so viewed, is not a simple primitive fact, but a means to an end, an expedient, the advantages of which are experimentally learned and the pleasures connected with which arise by association.

On the other hand, Professor Giddings holds that "the beginnings of the social feelings and of social actions are as primitive as the beginnings of individual instincts." ‡ More particularly, and as marking clearly the issue, he says,—

"The issue then narrows down to this: Is a consciously hostile conflict for food, among creatures of like kind (a conflict so consciously carried on that it can result in the discrimination of degrees of utility), antecedent to a consciousness of identity or likeness of kind and its accompanying phenomena of imitation; or is the recognition of kind the earlier and more elementary phenomenon? This question goes to the very root of the subject. Upon it must divide those who hold by the doctrine of Hobbes, that rampant individualism and remorseless conflict preceded all society and all social instincts, from those who believe that the germs, at least, of fellow feeling, of social instinct, and of association, are as old and evolutionally as primitive as the individual, and that from the first they have contributed to the psychic development of the individual." §

Professor Patten is thoroughgoing in the view above stated. He, indeed, objects to Professor Giddings defining society "as though its only characteristic was the phenomenon of imitation," and does not admit the issue in exactly the form which Professor Giddings, as just quoted, has given it. But he reaffirms that "the

* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1895, p. 121.

† This is said, it should be noted, of *political* society; as to society, or rather the social impulse, in and of itself, however, Mr. Spencer apparently holds that is as original as the impulse of self-preservation. *Cf.* "Data of Ethics," § 75.

‡ *Annals, etc.*, March, 1895, p. 101.

§ Ibid., pp. 100, 101.

instincts which lead to conflict [even among those of the same kind] are older than the social instincts."* He thinks that beings of like kind may become hostile to one another now as soon as they are "conscious of an opposition of interests."† Let me endeavor to give a brief statement of the historical order of development as maintained by Professor Patten.

We start with beings capable of pleasure and pain. They may evolve in either of two ways,—by becoming adapted to their local environment, each for itself and by means of a competitive struggle, or, if the local environment is not sufficiently favorable, by unitedly appropriating the benefits of a wider environment. In the former case, progress is secured by the increasing perfection of the individual organism, in the latter by the development of social impulses and habits. All depends on the character of the environment or, more specifically, the peculiarities of the earth's crust, as to which way will be taken. If, owing to the conformation of the earth, nothing is to be gained by trying to make use of a more extended surface, the social impulses will not arise, or at least attain any development. To quote Professor Patten's own words,—

> "The crust of the earth to which society must adjust itself must be so constituted that an ever-increasing advantage is secured by enlarging the environment of society, and thus securing more points of contact with the surface of the earth. *Without these conditions, social progress would be undesirable.* It would be better to strengthen the individual in functional activity and desire through greater local adjustments."‡

In such circumstances social impulses would remain "mere adumbrations."

Under contrasted circumstances, however, they not only arise, but in time create a social fabric of laws, institutions, customs, and ideals,—which relatively to the individual makes another environment that has equally to be considered with the primary objective environment, since only by harmony with it can adjustment to the objective environment be accomplished and the goods of the latter be appropriated. Under an evolution of this sort, the individual organism may not be so highly developed, and single pleasures may not be so keen, but on the whole the lot of

---

* *Annals, etc.*, May, 1895, p. 117. † Ibid., p. 119.

‡ *The Failure of Biologic Sociology* (No. 121 of Publications of the American Academy of Political and Social Science), p. 88.

the individual is improved (Would it not be more accurate to say that the lot of the mass is improved, though not of certain single individuals? Professor Patten's language is, "In this process there is perhaps a loss of function and of the intensity of individual desires, but the harmonious blending of the many products secured from the general environment creates for the individual a better consumption than any local environment could afford." *) According to such a view, societies become an economic expedient or necessity in certain defined circumstances, just as indeed, under other circumstances, a highly developed organic mechanism may be so regarded; or, to put it differently, sociology and biology alike "rest upon economics as an underlying science, and are [deal with] particular means of increasing utilities and goods."†

In another connection, Professor Patten gives a somewhat different and yet not inconsistent account of the matter. After saying that there are at present organisms without social instincts (*e.g.*, the cobras), and that "it is easy to see how millions of generations could have passed away before organisms began to associate for common ends and learn of each other through suggestion and imitation," he asks, How do hostile individuals "conclude to become social"? I cannot do better than quote his answer in full:

> "The answer to this question is not difficult if we look for a solution among those objective conditions that determine a progressive evolution. The objects that are goods to each species are unequally distributed throughout the environment. The stronger animals of each species secure for themselves the localities where these goods are most abundant. The weaker animals are forced thereby into unfavorable localities where their food is scarce. They must, therefore, resort to new means to secure it or perish. They find this means in co-operation, and thus new relations grow up between them that are absent from the stronger animals which occupy the better localities where individual exertion can secure the needed food. Social bonds at first arise, not among the victors, but among the vanquished. They are the means by which the vanquished outwit their conquerors."‡

---

* *The Failure of Biologic Sociology*, (No. 121 of Publications of the American Academy of Political and Social Science), p. 83.

† Ibid., p. 90.

‡ *Annals, etc.*, January, 1895, p. 120. Professor Patten says, "The earlier organisms, living when the struggle for existence was not so fierce, could have prospered without any social bonds." It is but turning this into the language of every day when Mr. W. L. Sheldon says, "If we were all happy, and the world went easy with us, if we could have had our way and none of us ever had to endure pain or struggle, there would be little or no fellowship in the world."

Thus again—and in a manner perhaps more readily intelligible than that above indicated—society appears as a device for individual ends. The further process of the same sort of evolution is also hinted at by Professor Patten. The weaker members of a species who unite and form a society in the manner described become thereby so strong that they may in time succeed in displacing the superior individuals who had laid hold of the better portions of the environment. "However powerful," says Professor Patten, "an isolated being may be, he cannot withstand the encroachments of a group of weaker but united beings."* Hence the isolated individuals of superior gifts are compelled themselves to become social, and the process of forming societies, once started, goes on. To quote Professor Patten's pregnant summary, "When, therefore, social feelings appear in any group, they force the growth of social feelings in all the groups with which they come in contact. The power of surviving lies with the more compactly united social groups."†

Social relationships are thus only somewhat accidental to man, according to Professor Patten. Under readily conceivable circumstances they would not arise at all. Such a view requires a pretty radical revision of the Aristotelian dictum that "man is, by nature, a political animal" (*Politics*, i. 2). I had myself been led to minimize such a claim to the extent of substituting "social" for "political" (government turning out to be an expedient rather

---

Again, "It is the awful struggle for existence which makes fellow-feeling and fellowship. Far back in history, when it was one terrific struggle for the human race to keep alive, then it was that the feeling of brotherhood began. Shoulder to shoulder man had to move on in trial, pain, and difficulty, in order to preserve existence. It was in such struggle that fellow-feeling or altruism had its origin." —*Ethical Addresses*, May, 1895, p. 96.

Professor Patten elsewhere observes, however, that "a period of plenty destroys the opposition between individuals and tends to develop social relations" (*Annals, etc.*, May, 1895, p. 120), and I notice that the Italian criminologist, Professor Enrico Ferri, in his recent work, "Socialismus und Moderne Wissenschaft" (translated from the Italian by Dr. Hans Kurella, Leipzig, 1895), remarks to the same effect. ("Das Leben einzelner Individuen, Gruppen von Individuen und ganzen Gemeinschaften lässt stets erkennen, dass wenn die Nahrung, die Materielle Grundlage des Daseins, gesichert ist, das Gesetz der Interessengemeinschaft über das der Konkurrenz und des Kampfes dominiert, und umgekehrt."—S. 37.) Just how to reconcile the varying points of view I do not for the moment see.

* *Annals, etc.*, January, 1895, p. 122. † Ibid.

than an organic necessity to man); but if Professor Patten is correct, we cannot even say that *society* is organic to man's nature, —it is a shift no less than the state.*

All this is very different from Professor Giddings's contention, that "the germs, at least, of fellow-feeling, of social instinct, and of association are as old and evolutionally as primitive as the individual, and that from the first they have contributed to the psychic development of the individual." And yet, practically, I cannot make out that Professor Giddings differs widely from Professor Patten. He says, for instance:

> "The struggle for food discloses the fact that creatures of the same kind or species are usually too nearly equal in strength and skill for any large number of them to depend habitually on conquests over their fellows for subsistence. They are forced to tolerate each other and to convert their struggle against one another into a war on lesser creatures."†

After all, then, social relations would seem to be a fruit of experience rather than the result of original instincts. The passage suggests, I may say by the way, a third manner of accounting for the rise of social phenomena, but my motive in quoting it is to show that Professor Giddings himself apparently supposes that a more or less individualistic struggle preceded social co-operation. So he seems, following the course of further evolution, to regard negative co-operation as coming first and as being "succeeded" by alliance, or positive co-operation.‡ It may, of course, be that Professor Giddings is representing a logical rather than an historical order of development, but his language does not make this clear. Moreover, he says (with a comparatively late stage of social progress in mind), "Conscious that their social relations are their most important means of defence, succor, pleasure, and development, individuals endeavor to conserve and perfect them."§ But if from utilitarian motives individuals may endeavor to conserve and per-

---

* Professor Huxley observes that progress in general in the living world is more or less accidental. "At the same time it has been shown that certain forms persist with very little change from the oldest to the newest fossiliferous formations; and thus show that progressive development is a contingent, and not a necessary, result of the nature of living matter."—"Collected Essays," Vol. i, p. 126.

† "The Theory of Sociology," p. 29.

‡ Ibid., p. 30.

§ Ibid., p. 35.

fect a thing, why may they not from the same motives have substantially originated it?*

As to the contrasted views of the origin of social phenomena (views which, it must be admitted, are more or less speculative in character),† I am only concerned now to state them, and do not venture to give an opinion of my own.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

FREE-WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.

MY reply to Dr. Hyslop's criticisms (in the October number of this JOURNAL) can only be a very short one; for otherwise I should simply have to repeat all that I endeavored to make clear in my article in the July number. And I will ask any readers of Dr. Hyslop's criticisms, who care to know my position, to look again at what I said in that article. Dr. Hyslop complains that I "naïvely assume an antithesis between the free-will doctrine and the necessitarian doctrine." If by this is meant that I think there is ultimately an inevitable antinomy, I am somewhat astonished at the remark; for the main purpose of my article was to show that there is no contradiction between the element of truth which, in my view, is contained in the traditional free-will doctrine and a carefully-stated doctrine of psychological necessitarianism. That there is an antithesis between the free-will doctrine as usually asserted and the necessitarian doctrine as usually asserted, no student of philosophy can seriously deny; and I do not see any *naïveté* in assuming the existence of an old and famous controversy.

When Dr. Hyslop goes on to speak of "capacity of choice between equal motives," the expression seems to me extremely ambig-

* It may, of course, be said that at least the social *impulse* (or rather germ of social feeling) must have pre-existed. But Professor Patten admits as much (by implication) when he speaks of social impulses as being "mere *adumbrations*" under circumstances that make societies unnecessary, but not as non-existent.

† A somewhat amusing instance of how the very same facts may be variously interpreted by ingenious minds is given in Professor Giddings's supposing that an amœba does not devour a fellow amœba, because, having learned the "feel" of its own substance, it has a similar "feel" when touching one of its fellows, and "recognizes the creature as an object like itself, and therefore as not food" (*Annals, etc.*, March, 1895, p. 101), while Professor Patten urges that the amœba mistakes the other creature *for a part of itself*—in other words, that we have here "a case of mistaken identity due to a lack of development" (*Annals, etc.*, May, 1895, p. 119).

uous. Does he mean "between motives which *seem* equal to the agent," or "which *seem* equal to other persons"? If they are actually equal and are really "motives," they must neutralize one another and produce suspension of activity, until something occurs to make one outweigh the other, and then they are no longer equal. Further, is the "choice" between such motives a volition with or without a motive? If it is a volition with a motive, I do not see where Dr. Hyslop differs from psychological determinism; if it is a volition without a motive, Dr. Hyslop's new "freedomist" is but old indeterminist writ queerly. There is the less need for me to elaborate this point, because it has been very clearly put by Professor Royce in his review of Dr. Hyslop's work on Ethics (in October number of INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). With Professor Royce I should agree in holding that psychological determinism is an inadequate philosophical theory in so far as it involves a merely mechanical conception of causation in mental processes, but that the fact of deliberation and of choice presents no difficulty whatever to any consistent determinist theory.

As to my reference to Robert Owen, I did not quote him as an authority on a philosophical question. I referred to the honored father of industrial co-operation as a conspicuous example of a *practical* reformer, who knew from experience the existence of certain bad social effects of the common free-will doctrine. I did not say that Robert Owen's knowledge of psychology or of philosophy or of the history of controversy was any better than that of the average "practical" man, who believes, or is taught to believe, that some acceptance of the free-will formula, in however crude or illogical a form, is an essential part of an ethical creed, and who is unaware that what he takes for the verdict of "common sense" is in great part the dregs of a Scholastic theory.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIETY. By Albion W. Small, Ph. D., and George E. Vincent (University of Chicago). New York: American Book Company, 1894. Pp. 374.

This book modestly disclaims being a contribution to "sociological knowledge," and comes as a proffered help in the training of beginners. It proposes simply a "method of preliminary investigation adaptable to the use of college students." What is meant by sociological knowledge or sociology? The words are often used at the present time, and it is highly desirable to have clear ideas as to what is covered by them. What is it we are to investigate?

The authors start out by telling us that sociology is "the systematic knowledge of human beings," which is not exactly reassuring, as psychology or, at any rate, anthropology might be spoken of in much the same way. But they immediately pass on to say that "the facts of *associated** human life" are its proper territory, and a little later they identify it with "precise examination of social facts." It is true that they sometimes appear to put it on a par with "social theories" or "systems of social doctrine," and once roundly call it "the philosophy of human welfare," but this is because they have in mind a larger use of "sociology," according to which it is practically coincident with "social philosophy." Under the latter head are included three divisions: (1) the scientific exhibition of social facts, (2) the science of the ideals "which the facts implicitly contain," (3) the investigation of the means and available resources for changing the actual into the ideal. The first is called Descriptive Sociology, the second Statical Sociology, the third Dynamic Sociology. And plainly, if we know what society is, what it ought to be, and how it may become what it ought to be, we have what we may properly call social philosophy.

The authors limit themselves to the first division, referring only incidentally to the others. They do not even deal in full with Descriptive Sociology, but only with *contemporary* Descriptive Sociology,—*i.e.*, attempt an analysis of contemporary society not

* The italics throughout this notice are the reviewer's.

in its origins, but as it is now found in the more advanced civilization of Europe and America. It must be admitted that it appears to be somewhat difficult for them to keep to the objective and analytical point of view. We are privileged to have their "views" on a variety of topics. They make use of the familiar bogy of the French Revolution, identifying its spirit with destructive dogmas and enjoining the teacher of sociology to make his influence felt "against every destructive tendency." They run a tilt against "those zealous prophets of righteousness who teach that the only reason why the kingdom of God cannot be established on earth to-morrow is that Christians will not put their knowledge of social principles into practice," though they appear to be themselves followers of him who came fervently prophesying, "The kingdom of heaven is *at hand*." They venture to speak of idleness as a "pathological condition," and yet add, "In the case of all idleness, *especially that of the rich*, hasty judgments should be carefully avoided." They speak rather harshly of "hazards dignified in conventional phrases as commercial speculations," but hasten to reassure us by saying, "Wholesale denunciation of stock and produce exchanges will be avoided by the careful observer of society." They tell us that "from the sociological stand-point" the "demands of the laborer have been too exclusively in terms of wages and too little in terms of manhood," a contrast which sounds *imponirend*, though its force is somewhat abated by another statement that it is nothing less than "quackery to conceal the fundamental necessity and the universal utility of wealth."* We even hear that "in contrast with the eagerness of socialism, the policy of sociology is to make haste slowly," as if sociology were to be identified with a special sort of social programme.† But

* The authors finely say, "The world will not be right until every adult man's labor can command, for himself and for the family that should be a part of himself, access to everything essentially human." Again, "Civilization is a miserably crude experiment until it is possible for each member of society to command food and clothing and shelter and surplus and leisure enough to permit progressive and all-sided expansion of manhood." They add, "The struggle for this consummation is not a class contest, however. It is a common interest of all sections of society." This is true in an ideal sense, but the authors would probably admit equally that, because it is not an *actual* common interest of all sections of society, it remains for the time necessarily "a class contest."

† The same idea appears in another statement: "In the Hegelian idiom, conventionality is the thesis, socialism is the antithesis, sociology is the synthesis." But socialism is really one possible way of formulating the social ideal and one

this is perhaps all explicable, partly in view of the fact that the authors, despite their somewhat severe reminder that the "primary task is not to reform society, but to understand society," cannot quite keep out of mind the larger aspects, the ultimately practical purport, of their science, and partly since in launching a new department, which is popularly supposed to have something to do with "social questions," in a university situated in the midst of the trying atmosphere of Chicago and supported by its sensitive wealth, they have encountered peculiar difficulties and have been somewhat exercised in their minds.

The description and analysis of social phenomena that make up the greater part of the book are not altogether satisfactory,—not from anything that is said, but from what we may call a lack of clearness in the point of view. "Society" may be taken as a synonym for the human race in general or some portion of it (*e.g.*, the Western peoples), or as an abstract word, the actual meaning of which is societ*ies*,—various particular kinds of human association. Sometimes the word appears to be used in the former sense, as when it is said "we are attempting an analysis of contemporary society, as it is found in the more advanced civilization of Europe and America;" and sometimes in the latter sense, though the only kind of society that is specially considered (aside from the vague *ensemble* just mentioned) is the family. We may possibly make our meaning clearer if we ask, Is the "contemporary society" of which the authors speak really a society? Can France and Germany properly be spoken of as a society? They belong to society in the vague sense, it is true, but can they be said to make, or compose, *a society?* Can those who are warring against one another (or are ready to) make up a real social whole?

Now, analysis of "contemporary society" in general is a task of bewildering complexity, and we cannot say that we have found any special enlightenment on this vast subject in the two hundred and seventy-five pages which our authors have given us. And as to study of societies in the concrete, of the various forms of association, of the principles underlying them, of the conditions and forces which call them into existence, we find very little of it.

---

possible method of accomplishing it. Sociology, then, in its "statical" and "dynamic" phases, has to consider it; but sociology cannot by any possibility be contrasted with it any more than political economy can be contrasted with the theories of free trade or protection.

What we find under the attractive title of "The Natural History of a Society" is a highly interesting narrative of the growth of a city in the western part of America from the time of the arrival of the first "prairie schooner." But this, as Professor H. H. Powers has already observed, is hardly more than a study in colonization, and simply shows how people fitted (and unfitted) for social life in one place found themselves similarly fitted (or unfitted) in another. It is excellent history, but strikes us as only in a very loose, or at least secondary, sense, sociology. Sociology should tell us what makes societies in the first place. We must do the authors the justice to say that they do not assume to more than describe the present (p. 183); but how can we perform the difficult task of *understanding* society, which they equally urge upon us (p. 19), if we do not know something of its antecedents and of the forces that have made it what it is?

Books III. to V., entitled "Social Anatomy," "Social Physiology and Pathology," and "Social Psychology," elaborate in a not extravagant way the analogy between society and an organism. The authors accept the principles of the system of Schaeffle, and state it as the aim of their manual "to place students in possession of the organic hypotheses of society, as a working-tool and a useful instrument." But surely to work out an analogy, however conscientiously, and to give us new designations for old facts, is not to lay the foundations of a new science.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS: THEIR PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT. A Thesis presented at the University of Minnesota for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. By John Ernest Merrill, B.A. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1894. Pp. 175.

This thesis is divided into two parts,—the first of which is "metaphysical" or theoretical, and the second, historical. Though these parts are closely related to one another, the second giving the historical verification of the position established theoretically in the first, the first part alone falls within the proper province of this JOURNAL, and fairly within the knowledge of the present reviewer. The "thesis," completely stated, is that "History shows a parallel development of institutions and the moral ideal. In this development, the ideal has been prior to and causally connected with its

corresponding institutions." While the second part seeks to prove by historical evidence that this is the actual relation between ideals and institutions, the first part attempts to demonstrate that, by the very nature of the case, this relation must exist. Brief as this metaphysical discussion is, it raises, and deals effectively with, the fundamental questions involved. The interpretation of the moral ideal accepted by the author is that of T. H. Green, whose conception of moral development he also adopts. Institutions are defined, first, "concretely," as "organisms, centres of force deposited by society, and conserving particular forms of social order," and then "abstractly," as "habits of social living." The form of institutional progress is "a series of institutions, or, more properly, a series of variations in single institutions. Apparently, from time to time, new institutions arise; but they are seen to be, in fact, only specializations of existing main divisions, the complexity which always accompanies higher forms of life." "A part of the development of institutions seems to be their decay, just as in animal bodies that is a feature of life and change. Yet, as there, not the whole dies, but a part which is sloughed off." Institutions have no intrinsic value or significance; their importance is merely instrumental. "They serve humanity only as they are forms under and through which there is manifested the ideal. The facts of life are purposes and actions; ideals direct the first, and institutions are the general forms for the second." Institutions and ideals are, therefore, inseparable elements in a single whole. The institution, severed from the ideal, becomes an inert form; the ideal, without the institution, dies because it finds no medium of self-expression. Yet the correspondence between the two is never perfect. For, in the first place, "institutions are primarily and only social," whereas "the ideal, while having regard to persons as in social relations, is first individual," and, secondly, even from the stand-point of society, "entire correspondence would mean that the ideal was fully realized, or, to put it in more startling form, that the existing condition of things was ideal." All that we can say is that "institutions and ideals in a broad way answer to each other," or that "the institutions of society correspond with the general moral ideal." It follows that the development of institutions is parallel with the development of ideals. The notes of development are the same in each, viz.: broadening of range and deepening of content. "In another way of putting it, the centre of all development is personality. As broadening in range, it includes more and more

individuals as complete persons; as deepening in content, it reveals new depths and resources of self conscious individuality." Finally, it is insisted that, in this parallel development, "the ideal has been prior to, and causally connected with, its corresponding institutions." Since an ideal is an "active idea," or an idea which dominates activity, institutions, being "habits of social living," must be posterior, at least logically, to "the ideals which dominate the social life;" the ideal is cause, the institution effect.

The entire discussion is excellent and highly suggestive: its only fault is its brevity. It is to be hoped that Mr. Merrill will develop in greater detail the very promising investigation of the present thesis. His emphatic assertion of the ethical element in institutional progress, of the causation of ideals in the development of institutions, is well-timed. The author suggests an important practical corollary of his own principle. The secret of progress lies in the man himself, not in his environment, however important in a secondary sense the environment may be. "There are those who do not accept this view of the Causality of Ideals. To this number belong, for instance, many socialists and communists, if we may judge from their programmes. They expect to elevate men by improving their surroundings and the conditions of their lives. The same is true of many philanthropists. On the other hand, the secret of such enterprises as Hull House, Chicago, and Andover House, Boston, of the social work of General Booth 'In Darkest England,' and of all sorts of missionary endeavor, is the changing of men's moral and social conditions by the prior elevation of their ideals. Not upon doing for men, but upon the possibility of persuading them to do for themselves, rests the assurance of ultimate success in the endeavor to elevate mankind."

JAMES SETH.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

OUTLINES OF SOCIAL THEOLOGY. By William DeWitt Hyde, D.D., President of Bowdoin College. New York: Macmillan & Co., and London, 1895.

It is most interesting to watch the "social movement" which marks our time penetrating, step by step, into all departments of the higher literature. A dozen years ago this rising tide of social interest was to be seen just rippling into periodical publications and filling the magazines and reviews with its new influence. Soon the same sweep of thought flowed up on the flats of Political

Economy and enlarged the channel of Ethics, and at last within the last two years it has been approaching the point of philosophical statement. President Hyde now boldly takes this tide at its flood and opens the gate for the new way of thinking to enter into the sphere of Theology. Here, for most believers as well as for most theologians, has been the highest and driest region of individualism. The God who is my keeper, the Christ who is my Saviour, the redemption which is for my personal soul,—these have been the familiar ideals of traditional religion. "Father of *me*," says the hymn, with pleasant subordination of every one else:

> "Father of *me*, and all mankind,
> And all the hosts above."

This whole region of self-centred faith waits to be refreshed in its turn by the wholesome tide of the "social movement;" and this new step in Sociology is what this very suggestive little book sets itself to take.

What is religion? "Religion is the universal form of our social relationships" (p. 107). What is the test of our religion? "Our serviceableness to our fellow-men is the exact and infallible measure of our acceptableness to God" (p. 107). What is the Holy Spirit? "The spirit of social service is the Holy Spirit" (p. 80). "To be without the Spirit and to be without the life of unselfish social service is the same thing" (p. 150). What is sin? "All self-assertion of the individual against the social order . . . is sin" (p. 90). "From this social point of view sin is deadly because it is selfish and anti-social" (p. 146). What is the Church? "The Church is the inspirer and director of social service" (p. 180). What is the redemption of the neglected classes? "Social settlements and the industrial school, which carries the substance of civilization, rather than the mission which carries the form of evangelization is the effectual agency for the redemption of these classes" (p. 219). And what is regeneration? "Without regeneration there can be no true and worthy social life. Take the family, business, science and art, social intercourse, and the state. In each of these spheres regeneration is an absolute necessity to the realization of its ideal. . . . First, the family. No man can be rightly married who is not therein born anew. This is simply another way of saying that no man can be rightly married without love" (pp. 152, 153). In short, this little book is a restatement of Christian Theology in terms of the modern social ideal. Its

author would, no doubt, deny that this broadening of definition involved any inconsistency with earlier historic statements. The personal applications of Christian doctrine lie, no doubt, within his conception of social redemption. Yet the shifting of emphasis is, in itself, not far from a theological revolution. It carries with a practically new ideal of life and duty, a new way of Christian preaching, and a new thought of missionary duty. The issue of this translation of Christian doctrine into the language of social ethics gives theology a new right to be the queen of the sciences, and it is sure to be invigorating in practical religion. President Hyde's book will seem to some readers too compact in form and abrupt in expression, as if persuasiveness had been in some degree sacrificed to brevity. But the significance of the book in modern theology is much beyond its size or its pretensions. It means that many thoughtful men within the Christian Church are being led to a complete reconstruction of doctrine, and a more generous view of the purpose of the Christian religion. Among the first contributions to this conception of religious life was Canon Fremantle's "The World as the Subject of Redemption." President Hyde's book is of the same type, claiming for the Christian life identity with all moral progress and summoning the believer from self-interested salvation to self-sacrificing service.

FRANCIS G. PEABODY.

HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL.

SOME BOOKS ON SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. By J. J. Rousseau. Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Henry J. Tozer, M.A. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. iv., 247.

ANNALS OF THE BRITISH PEASANTRY. By Russell M. Garnier. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. vi., 460.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIALISM. By F. A. Laycock, LL.B. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. ix., 390.

THE BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF THE POOR LAW. By W. Chance. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xii., 260.

THE LOCAL CONTROL OF THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC. By Arthur H. Boyden. Warburton Prize Essay. Manchester: J. E. Cornish.

THE SOCIALIST STATE. By Professor E. C. K. Gonner. London: Walter Scott & Co.

Mr. Tozer deserves well of students and of the general reader by this edition of the Contrat Social. The "Historical and

Critical Introduction" cannot be said to contribute anything of itself to the study of its subject, and is lacking in distinction; but it is a conscientious setting out of what others have written. Mr. B. Bosanquet contributes a short but felicitous preface. The edition supplies a want, and it is to be hoped that it may be widely used.

Mr. Garnier's "Annals of the British Peasantry" was probably more interesting to the author to write than it will be to the reader to read. He writes from the stand-point of the Christian Social Union, but his account of that position as an "effort to subordinate political action to religious dogma" does not seem particularly happy or inviting. The book is conscientious and, wherever Mr. Garnier cites from personal experience of peasant life, instructive; but, in spite of the author's enthusiasm, the history is that of an ambitious amateur, the generalizations exceedingly loose, and the information often incomplete and misleading.

The point of view of Mr. Laycock's economics is that unrestricted competition, or the full and free play of supply and demand, is the one means—the only perfect means—of supplying the needs of the race. He claims that this "natural system" has only to be tried in its entirety to be justified. His argument, therefore, is directed just as much against every form of trade combination, or of protection, as against socialism. On the other hand, "competition by persons who are not free cannot be called free competition,"—a point which seems to require development. Mr. Laycock's own programme may be summarized as a charge for coinage and a single-tax on ground values; for the rest, complete *laissez faire*. He writes with a naïve and buoyant dogmatism that is almost contagious; and he is satisfied that he has arrived at a demonstration of the cause and cure of trade depressions and national poverty. A curious book, certainly not "dismal," but mainly, perhaps, because it is not "science." His remark that "the community of goods which passes by the name of Socialism finds its chief economist in Marx" is typical of his *apparatus criticus*.

Mr. Chance advocates restriction of out-door relief, with a view to its virtual abolition,—a position which he supports with a good deal of expert evidence. His book should be most useful to Guardians, and contains matter of interest and instruction to all good citizens.

Mr. Boyden advocates concurrent experiments initiated and carried out by the various local authorities, but under the general

supervision of some central body which would collate and publish results. There is so much useful and sensible matter in Mr. Boyden's essay, that it is a pity it was not submitted to some kind of orthographical revision.

The general reader who wishes to understand modern socialism "as in itself it really is," will derive considerable help from Mr. Gonner's modest but workmanlike essay. His discussion of the socialistic outlook, although necessarily sketchy, is eminently reasonable and impartial. But his assumption that socialism logically involves the guarantee of employment certainly requires justification, and I doubt if he has fairly faced the difficulties of "distribution" in a socialist state. Mr. Gonner's book shows, perhaps, as much as anything else that there are many departments of socialism in which thinking has hardly begun. But he has certainly helped to clear the ground for fruitful and practical discussion, and his book may be heartily recommended as an unusually trustworthy, if somewhat elementary, introduction to the subject. It should be noticed that Mr. Gonner (in accord with the modern conception) treats socialism throughout as a method of business or system of production; his point of view, therefore, is exclusively, perhaps too exclusively, economic. But the effectiveness of Mr. Gonner's treatment gains more than it loses by this limitation.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

IPPOLITO TAINE. By Professor Giacomo Barzellotti. Rome: Loescher & Co., 1895. 8vo. Pp. xxi., 405.

This book belongs to the sphere of literature and æsthetics rather than to that of ethics, and therefore can hardly claim a lengthy review in this JOURNAL. As a presentation of the activity of a *littérateur* and critic who exerted a profound, if not a lasting, influence on the thought of Europe, it deserves hearty commendation, being throughout marked by judicial fairness and an absence of hero-worship. All the works of Taine, witnesses to his many-sided interest and study, are passed in review, their principles presented, and their merits and defects placed side by side, with impartial hand. This is done so well that the result is not altogether what the writer seems to think he has produced. Taine does not come before us as a great or as an original man. Rather he is an able, even brilliant, *doctrinaire*, combining the mathematical mind of the Frenchman with the evolutional idealism of the German,

and the deterministic naturalism of the Englishman. The result is a syncretism, the discordance of whose elements is concealed only by his pungent, epigrammatic style. In morals, Taine was a determinist of the school of Mill; in æsthetics, a naturalistic theorist, who explained everything about art except art itself; in philosophy a Condillachian sensist with Hegelian categories; in history a reactionary, who saw in the French Revolution only the cause of the defeat of France in the war of 1870. He had a certain cosmopolitanism of the limited sort which alone seems possible for a Frenchman; but it remained a matter of the intellect and never penetrated to the roots of his nature, which remained to the last French, that is, sensuous, positivistic, mathematical. All this Professor Barzellotti has brought out with great skill and vigor, and, though he himself seems to incline to a somewhat exaggerated estimate of Taine, he supplies the reader with the means of correcting that estimate.

The literary style of the book is excellent,—rather French than Italian.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

SELECTED ESSAYS OF JAMES DARMESTETER. Translated by Helen B. Jastrow. With Memoir by Morris Jastrow, Jr. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1895.

The volume of Mr. Jastrow, which was to introduce James Darmesteter to a larger public in America, appears now as a memorial. On the 14th of October, 1894, while the essays were still in the hands of the translator, Darmesteter died at the early age of forty-five. It is with a sympathetic hand that Mr. Jastrow sketches the short life-history and gives us specimens of the life-work of a man who, as he tells us, "becomes our master even though we do not follow him in every particular." Born March 28, 1849, at Château-Salins, in Lorraine, the son of a poor Jewish bookbinder, Darmesteter's earliest training was Jewish as well as his surroundings and association, and it was no doubt largely to this influence and his early studies of Hebrew and the Talmud that his bias for the language and literature of the East may be traced; but it was at the suggestion of Michel Bréal, the distinguished philologist, that he took up the study of Zoroastrianism. His rapid mastery of language and of philological method gave him at once high rank among Persian scholars, and before he died

he was universally acknowledged to be the greatest authority on his special subject. His most important work, and the most enduring monument of his great learning, is the French translation of the Zend Avesta, completed over a year ago,—three large quarto volumes, with a commentary, and enriched by a series of essays summing up his own views and giving a new point of departure for other scholars. To this great work was awarded the prize of twenty thousand francs from the French Academy, granted biennially for the most noteworthy achievement of French scholarship. Nor was it only in the studies of the past and of dead languages that Darmesteter excelled and interested himself. He was in quick touch and sympathy with the present, with all the living issues of the day; an ardent patriot, and a critic and exponent of modern life and literature, publishing a volume of essays on English literature and also of original poems, editing many of the English classics, and finally, a few years before his death, accepting the editorship of the *Revue de Paris*. All this, while at the same time he was professor of Persian at the College de France and at the École des Hautes Études, as well as secretary of the Société Asiatique, publishing yearly a masterly review of all contributions made to Oriental science by French and in part by other scholars. The volume before us consists of seven essays, chosen by Mr. Jastrow "with a view of illustrating the many-sidedness of Darmesteter's activity and the man himself." The essay on Afghan life, as illustrated by Afghan songs, was regarded by Darmesteter as one of his most satisfactory productions. But it is his essays on Jewish subjects that will have more general interest, especially as giving more insight into the life and character of the man. And what perhaps is most striking is his intensely Jewish conception and philosophy of life. Although, as Mr. Jastrow says, "in the course of years Darmesteter moved far away from the lines of orthodox tradition," his Judaism remained a deep-seated force, the motive power of his thought and action. When legal Judaism had ceased to appeal to him, it was the Judaism of the prophets that took hold of him, in whose moral ideals, divested of all dogma or theology, he found inspiration and strength, the soul of his own faith, and thence of all faith. The keynote of his belief seems to have been struck by Rénan, whose "History of the People of Israel," he says, "will form an epoch in religious evolution. The novelty and originality of this great work consist in having made prophecy the centre of interest of

the history of Israel. Its power of attraction lies in the unlooked-for kinship existing between the heart of the prophets and the heart of the twentieth century." Here was the vital point, the touch that struck fire to the heart and brain of Darmesteter, who says, "Other nations have had their prophets,—men who spoke in the name of God or of supernatural powers. . . . What is unique in Jewish prophecy is that it became the all-powerful weapon, not of charlatans and fools, but of those inspired ones in whom the mind and conscience of modern humanity found their first successful and lasting expression. . . . The dawn of prophecy is the dawn of a new idea; the birth of a new phenomenon for mankind, —a god, become the instrument of morality, whose command is to do justice and to love mercy, who delights not in sacrifice and burnt offering, but in the pure heart and the clean hands. . . . 'Cease to do evil; learn to do well,' He says, through the mouth of these His servants, His holy ones, who have learned to know and do His will. . . . Practical morality, a code of ethics and of politics, the realization of justice on earth without the support of a reward beyond the tomb; this then is all the law and all the prophets, all that we need of divine and human guidance; and now, after twenty-seven centuries, we, the disciples of the modern, of science and of progress, can do no better than to hark back to that cry, the eternal voice of reason and of conscience in the soul of man. . . ." "What matters it," says Darmesteter, "that they spoke in the name of a God,—Jehovah,—and that the modern age speaks in the name of human thought? For their Jehovah was only the apotheosis of the human soul, their own conscience projected heavenward. . . . Hence their religion is the one best fitted to survive, because it is the religion most in keeping with the ideals and spirit of the age,—not the Judaism of myth and ritual, which cannot endure if it renounces its ritual nor spread if it retains it, but the Judaism than can dispense with these; prophetic Judaism, that holds the two great dogmas of the divine unity and Messianism,—unity of law throughout the world and the terrestrial triumph of justice in humanity. These are the two dogmas which at the present time illuminate humanity in its progress both in the scientific and social order of things, and which are termed in modern parlance *unity of forces* and *belief in progress*." To be rid of supernaturalism and mysticism, of mythical religion in every form, to confine our ideals and aspirations to the world in which we live, to the bettering of ourselves and those

around us, is the goal to be attained, and for this, in some way not quite clear to understand, science and prophecy open out the path and furnish the watch-word.

Such the simple and austere code which Darmesteter practised as well as preached, and one hesitates to criticise, knowing with what high and steady courage he lived up to his ideals and to the creed which thus sufficed him to live by and to die by. But we know very well that this is not enough for most men. "The divine word is not in Ibsen, nor yet in Tolstoï," as he says, neither is it in Darmesteter. His is not the message which shall feed the hunger of the world, the famine not of bread nor water that has fallen upon the souls of men, "but of hearing the word of the Lord." Whether or not we agree with Darmesteter that the Hebrew prophets have spoken the last word of holiness, of justice, and of peace on earth, it seems to us that to draw no distinction between men who spoke as they did, in the name of a personal God in direct and personal communication with themselves, and through them to others, and the men of a modern age that speak in the name of human thought, human conscience and moral sense, is curiously to miss or to set aside the whole weight and power of their words, that which above all carried conviction and authority to the hearts of those who heard and followed them. Whatever belief we of modern times may hold in regard to a supernatural or superhuman principle and basis of life and conduct, in the case of the Hebrew prophets we cannot ignore this without ignoring the very source of their inspiration; we cannot separate their morality from its background of religion without divorcing the body from the soul, the life from its own cause and vital principle. We cannot thus misread the past, and hope to read the future aright, or even solve the riddle of to-day. But the problem of our age is a difficult and complex one, and who can say how it shall be unravelled? Darmesteter may not be a seer, but he is a scholar in the large and true sense, not alone in the world of letters, but of life, where his patient and faithful endeavor, his moral and mental honesty, and his devotion to ideals will secure him an honored place among those who have done service for mankind.

JOSEPHINE LAZARUS.

NEW YORK.

PERSONALITY, HUMAN AND DIVINE. Being the Bampton Lectures for the year 1894. By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 274. Price, $1.75.

These lectures are an attempt to show that belief in a personal God is an instinctive judgment, and that that judgment is justified by reason. The old lines of distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion are ignored, and doctrines like that of the Trinity are treated as necessarily involved in the conception of personality. Because man is triune, he must conceive of God as triune also. The chapters in which this argument is elaborated will be found, by most readers, to be more ingenious than convincing. They do not prove enough for the orthodox theologian. The lecturer says that human personality is essentially triune "because it consists of a subject, an object, and their relation." But we are, after admitting this, as far from the doctrine of the Trinity, as formulated in the creeds, as ever. On the other hand, the freethinker, having attained to trinity, is not satisfied that he cannot carry his analysis further into multiplicity. Indeed, the speculations as to why the human mind loves the number three, and why the threefold divisions are so convenient, are of the same order as the speculations of Emerson's forest seer on—

> "Why nature loves the number five,
> And why the star form she repeats."

The chapter on "Moral affinity needful for the knowledge of a person" is full of suggestive sentences. "Self-communication is of the essence of personality." To know any person there must "exist the kind and degree of affinity between us which can alone make self-revelation on his part possible." "The same limitations which qualify our power of knowing a person, qualify also the possibility of his making himself known to us."

The treatment of pre-Christian religion is of scholarly breadth. The old form of apology which endeavored to prove the truth of Christianity in contrast to the falsehood of other creeds is given up. Christianity is treated as the culmination of an historic process as old as humanity itself.

The book is of value for its indications of ethical and spiritual insight rather than for the cogency of its formal argument.

SAMUEL M. CROTHERS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

VIA, VERITAS, VITA: Lectures on "Christianity in Its Most Simple and Intelligible Form." Delivered in Oxford and London in April and May, 1894. By James Drummond, M.A. (Oxon.), LL.D., Hon. Litt.D. (Dublin); Principal of Manchester College, Oxford. Williams & Norgate, 1894. Pp. xiv., 331.

This volume brings to a close, for the present at least, the series of Hibbert Lectures, the trustees believing that, "in providing for a lectureship of ecclesiastical history at Oxford which shall give special attention to those churches that have kept themselves free from the fetters of dogma, they are continuing the same work under another name." As the terms of the original trust provided that the funds should be applied in the manner deemed "most conducive to the spread of Christianity in its most simple and intelligible form," Dr. Drummond has set it before him as his special task to deduce "from the New Testament, under the illumination of the various previous studies, the fundamental and essential teachings of the Gospel." He has purposely put aside all doctrinal and critical questions, and confined himself to a general exposition of the religious and ethical ideas embodied in the New Testament. And his treatment of these is naturally of a popular rather than a scientific character.

In the view of the writer, it is the special work of our time "to recover the fundamental spiritual facts which alone can justify any system of doctrine," and the fundamental and permanent fact in Christianity is not a law of duty or of ritual, not even a doctrine, but "an inward experience of life with God of a peculiar and vivid kind, the consciousness of a spirit breathed over the disordered passions and desires, and reducing them to the peace and harmony of love." The earlier lectures deal with the Christian Church, the Bible, the Kingdom of God, and the Doctrine of God. In these there are many remarks that are true and just, though the thought often suffers in expression from a rhetorical richness of phrase, and principles are made use of which are rather assumed than proved.

The sixth and seventh lectures are devoted to an exposition of the ethical teaching of Christianity. Not pleasure or happiness or utility, but spiritual perfection is its end and aim. Conduct indeed has a large place, but mainly as a "sign of the inward condition." This subjective aspect of the moral life is made prominent in the war against impure thoughts, covetousness, worldliness, envy, hatred,

anger; in the necessity for conversion, which is a change in the inward principle of life; in the law of self-denial, and in that power of faith "to which all things are possible." The virtues which are presented as characteristic of Christianity are (1), in relation to God, faithfulness, vigilance, sincerity, humility, prayer; (2) love to man, universal in its extent, expressing itself in forgiveness of injuries, almsgiving and mutual kindness; (3) duties towards self, such as openness to truth, purity, and the right use of wealth. These various points are passed rapidly in review without much attempt at elaborate or distinctive treatment, but with an earnestness and simplicity of exposition which will commend them to many. In the last lecture there are some interesting remarks on the doctrine of the "Logos."

ROBERT A. DUFF.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING. By W. D. Mackenzie, M.A. London: The Sunday-School Union, 1895.

Mr. Mackenzie shows by clear analysis and effective illustration that "gambling," great or small, through its appeal to "chance" in the apportionment of "property," tends to "derationalize" man, substituting for the healthy normal play of human motives a distinctively non-human principle. Mr. Mackenzie admits rightly that in a bet even the loser may get something for his money,—viz., a pleasurable excitement; but he shows that the terms by which this pleasure is purchased are such as to injure "manhood." He deals, on the whole, effectively with the Headmaster of Harrow's defence of "three-penny points;" though it is just possible that Dr. Welldon might defend the retention of a slight and occasional appeal to hazard on the ground that human nature is not to be treated as wholly rational, and that the irrational element can only be gradually eliminated from life. The economic basis of "gambling" described by Mr. Mackenzie does not really differ from the "utilitarian" basis of Mr. Spencer,—viz., that "benefit received does not imply effort put forth." Indeed, had Mr. Mackenzie followed more closely Spencer's clue, I think he would have strengthened his account of the origin of the modern craze for gambling. The disturbance of the right adjustments between "effort" and "benefit" determines the transfer of property more and more by "chance" or by "coercion." Mr. Mackenzie, deeming a full treatment of the theory of property

beyond his scope, ignores this latter disturbance. But the growth of "gambling," both among classes and masses, is due to an irrationality in transfer of property of which "chance" is only one important element. Commercial gambling in particular is closely linked with powers of monopoly or theft which are also irrational modes of transfer of property. An ordinary business "contract," unless the two contracting parties are equally free, *i.e*, have equal economic resources at their back, is not a "rational" mode of transfer. Mr. Mackenzie does not see that "gambling" is only one important "species" of irrational transfer. At the same time, his book is both acute in its reasoning and highly serviceable as an exposition of the degrading and dehumanizing influence of gambling.

JOHN A. HOBSON.

THE SEXES COMPARED, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Edward Von Hartmann, Author of "The Philosophy of the Unconscious," etc. Selected and translated by A. Kenner, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. 8vo. Pp. xi., 164.

In the first essay, whose saleable title is given to the book, Dr. Hartmann exposes the fundamental fallacy of "the faddists who clamor for the equalization of the sexes." They forget that woman is female! But he himself leaves us with the impression that a woman is a sort of sublime cow,—a good creature, no doubt, and masterful in her way,—but inhibited by being always more or less in calf. Otherwise, too, Von Hartmann is naïvely old-fashioned, speaking as if all the peculiarities of woman were permanent characters, whereas many of them are obviously acquired and artificial —the results of her being treated now as a child and again as a domestic animal. He says that one of the results of her emancipation would be "the gradual triumph of papacy over the whole earth," which should cheer the hearts of the Ultramontanes. And, although the illustrious philosopher has said that justice requires the equality of all sensating subjects, he does not write up to this, for a woman who is mortally offended at her lover's former amours is "ridiculous," "it is only old maids who consider innocence an estimable quality in young men," "the experienced and well-tried man is much more fit for a chaste woman than a novice in the field of love," but if the woman has been so much as engaged before her ultimate lord and master appears, "the fragrance has departed

from the rose." In short, woman must take what she can get and be thankful, but it is man's prerogative to be a sexual epicure.

The second essay is on "The Vital Question of the Family." Hartmann maintains that among the cultured classes there is an increasing proportion of bachelors, the mean age of marriage is later, the average number of children in a household is falling, and the standard of vitality is being lowered; *inter alia*, he also says, that the German people are indebted to the mothers of illegitimate offspring for the increase through which alone they are enabled to maintain themselves victorious against France. Among the evil conditions, he notices excess of work and pleasure, the strain of living above position, the enervating effects of luxury, the inducements to an unconstrained bachelor life, the miseducation and selfishness of modern women, the currency of a false prejudice against large families. In part, too, he makes a scapegoat of the past, believing, for instance, that, owing to the senseless blood-letting of the last century, we have become an anæmic and chlorotic race. Hartmann looks for improvement in life and ideals, but suggests, meantime, a special tax on bachelors, and giving married heirs the larger share of the patrimony of an intestate.

It is impossible to criticise in a few lines the author's opinions on this important question, but, assuming for the moment that the facts are right, we venture to suggest: (1) that the ideal of "eugenics" or good-breeding is qualitative as much as quantitative, that there are other ideals for the German maiden than that of keeping up the fighting strength of the nation (whose population, according to a recent German writer, is increasing over half a million per annum), and that there are great compensating advantages in small families, *e.g.*, greater intensity of education; (2) that if the cultured become increasingly of a selfishly non-mammalian, undomesticated type, they must (and should) disappear, however rich "in the capitalized possession of the work of past generations," even by that process of Natural Selection whose principle, Hartmann says, they are subverting; (3) that the relative infertility of the capables is probably in great part not selfish, but organic—a tax on their individuation. Eagles do not spawn, nor do they fear those who do.

In the essay on "Our Relation to Animals," Dr. Hartmann maintains that our "natural cousins of an older generation" have, as percipient beings, moral rights. They should be treated upon a basis of moral justice, for sentimental soft-heartedness is a highly dangerous quality, as is illustrated by "the forty-nine cats with which

the good-natured young poet found himself blessed a year after he had interdicted the destruction of the first brood." It is a duty we owe to humanity to exterminate the superfluous brutes, for the rights of the creature must not interfere with ours. But granting that we are of more value than many sparrows, we wonder whether we might not spare a few men, and keep, let us say, the giraffe. The trouble is that man is a somewhat short-sighted judge as to what is superfluous. "The significant question as to whether the ultimate use of certain experiments is sufficiently weighty to justify the pain suffered by the animal lies, of course, quite beyond the pale of legal or judicial interference, and can only be answered by a competent authority. Public opinion should, by its voice, sharpen the knowledge of inquirers, and refine their tact."

The other essays in this interesting and well-translated volume discuss, "The Comforts of Pessimism," which consist in being thoroughly disillusionized in this life, and in contemplating the painlessness of the no-life to come; "The Need of Books;" "The Modern Lust for Fame," and the great differences between Hartmann's philosophy and Schopenhauer's.

J. Arthur Thomson.

University Hall, Edinburgh.

The Female Offender. By Prof. Cæsar Lombroso and William Ferrero. With an Introduction by W. Douglas Morrison, Her Majesty's Prison, Wandsworth. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895. 8vo. Pp. xxvi., 313, 26 plates.

The point of this learned and ghastly book is explained in Mr. Douglas Morrison's excellent introduction. We have an elaborate organization for dealing with crime; the official expenditure in Great Britain is at least ten millions sterling per annum, and yet crime increases "like a tide that has no ebb." To what is the impotence of criminal legislation due? In part, according to Mr. Morrison, to the fact that the laws are framed and administered on the hypothesis that the criminal exists under the same set of conditions as an ordinary man,—an hypothesis fundamentally false. In part, furthermore, to the fallacy that each offender must be dealt with on exactly the same footing if he has committed the same offence, whereas judicial sentences and disciplinary treatment should be determined by the social and biological conditions of the offender quite as much as by the offence he has committed. Finally, the criminal is largely the product of anomalous biological and

social conditions; while these remain the criminal must be always with us.

The present volume is a translation of that portion of Lombroso's "La Donna Delinquente" which deals with the female criminal. It is a laborious induction showing that the criminal, particularly, of course, the habitual criminal, has a high percentage of abnormalities, and represents a type midway between the lunatic and the savage. Whether the existence of a specific type be admitted or not, and we confess ourselves unconvinced; whether all Lombroso's interpretations be sound or not, and we venture to think that some are fanciful, there is no denying the cumulative evidence showing that abnormality and criminality are correlated. In the light of this fact the female offender is to be judged and treated.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

NEW BOOKS.

HEDONISTIC THEORIES: From Aristippus to Spencer. By Professor John Watson, LL.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

A SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS. By Charles F. D'Arcy, B.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

BUCKLE AND HIS CRITICS: A Study in Sociology. By John Mackinnon Robertson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PLATO'S ETHICS. By Arthur Bernard Cook, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co.; London: George Bell & Son, 1895.

VIVISECTION: Can it advance Mankind? By Charles Selby Oakley, M.A., Formerly scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Dryden Press, J. Davy & Sons, 1895.

STUDIES IN ECONOMICS. By William Smart, M.A., LL.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

THE BROTHERHOOD OF MANKIND: A Study towards a Christian Philosophy of History. By the Rev. John Howard Crawford, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895.

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. By Professor Alfred Marshall, LL.D. Volume I. Third Edition (greatly improved). London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. By Paton J. Gloag, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895.

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By R. Falckenberg. Translated by A. C. Armstrong. London: George Bell & Sons, 1895.

CATHOLIC SOCIALISM. By Professor Francesco S. Nitti. Translated from the Second Italian Edition by Mary Mackintosh. With an Introduction by Professor D. G. Ritchie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

SOCIALISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By the Rev. M. Kaufmann, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1895.

ESSAYS AND NOTICES: Philosophical and Psychological. By Thomas Whitaker, B. A., Oxon. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895.

STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF FEELING. By Hiram M. Stanley. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

MORAL PATHOLOGY. By Arthur E. Giles, M.D., B.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

JULIAN, PHILOSOPHER AND EMPEROR, and the Last Struggle of Paganism against Christianity. By Alice Gardner. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1895.

LIVES OF TWELVE BAD MEN: Original Studies of Eminent Scoundrels, by various Hands. Edited by Thomas Seccombe. Second Edition. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894.

PLEA FOR A SIMPLER LIFE. By George S. Keith, M.D., F.R.C.P.E. London: A. and C. Black, 1895.

VIERTEHALB MONATE FABRIKARBEITERIN. (A Companion to Göhre's "Three Months in a Workshop.") Eine Praktische Studie. Von Minna Wettstein-Adelt. Berlin: Deutsche Schriftsteller-Genossenschaft, 1894.

IPPOLITO TAINE. By Giacomo Barzellotti. Rome: Ermanno Loescher & Co., 1895.

THE SPIRIT OF JUDAISM. By Josephine Lazarus. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1895.

ETHNOLOGISCHES NOTIZBLATT. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von A. Haack, 1895.

A CATECHISM OF LIBERAL FAITH. By Charles F. Dole. Boston: Unitarian Sunday-School Society, 1895.

CHRISTIANITY REINTERPRETED AND OTHER SERMONS. By Charles Strong, D.D. Melbourne: George Robertson & Co., 1894.

ADVANTAGES OF CHASTITY. By Dr. M. L. Holbrook. New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co. London: L. N. Fowler & Co., 1894.

ANARCHY OR GOVERNMENT? By William Mackintire Salter. New York and Boston: T. Y. Crowell & Co, 1895.

LIST OF BOOKS FOR GIRLS AND WOMEN AND THEIR CLUBS. By Augusta H. Leypoldt and George Iles. Boston: American Library Association, 1895.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. Fr. Jodl, Gerstengasse 43, Prague, Austria.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., 58 Claude Road, Cardiff, Wales.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.